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24 June 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ANNUAL MEETING OF ARAB MONETARY FUND REPORTED

Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 24-25 Apr 83 p II

/Text/ (MAP-AFP)--The annual meeting of the council of governors of the Arab Monetary Fund (FMA) came to an end on Tuesday in Algiers.

The participants decided to increase the resources of the fund to 600 million Arab dinars.

These increases will be made in five annual installments, the first of which should take place, at the latest, at the next annual meeting of the fund's council of governors, to take place in Abu Dhabi.

It was also decided that changes in the shares of each member country could be put into effect only with the authorization of the ministerial committee which was set up on Monday and which is responsible for proposing a plan to reform the statutes of the five Arab financial institutions.

These decisions were made public on the conclusion of a closed-door meeting which was preceded by a plenary session during which the participants considered the 1982 annual report submitted by Said Ahmed Ghobache, president of the fund.

Lastly, the governor from the Sudan to the FMA was elected chairman of this seventh meeting of the fund. He will be assisted by the Syrian governor.

Moreover, a profound restructuring of the five major Arab financial institutions was decided on by the Arab finance ministers meeting in Algiers, in order to adapt these institutions' operations for the development of the Arab states and the economic evolution of the Arab world.

This decision was taken at the conclusion of a joint meeting of the governors of these five institutions, whose loans in favor of the Arab states and other

Third World countries--principally Africa and certain states in Asia--amounted to nearly \$5 billion in 1982.

A committee made up of the finance ministers of six states--Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia--was set up to finalize the plan for reforming the structures of these institutions: Arab Economic and Social Development Fund (FADES), Arab Monetary Fund (FMA), Arab Organization for African Investment and Development (BADEA), Arab Investment Guarantee Organization (OAGI) and Arab Agricultural Investment and Development Organization (OAIDA).

At the end of a meeting which lasted 2 days, and not 5, as anticipated, in the presence of the chief directors of these institutions, the finance ministers decided to entrust to this committee, chaired by Algeria, the care of drawing up the balance sheet of the five financial organizations and of readjusting their structures according to the current economic realities of the Arab world and international circumstances.

While waiting for the adoption of this reform plan, which will be submitted to the next annual council of the Arab finance ministers, it was decided to double the resources of the Arab Monetary Fund (FMA); the Arab states turn to this fund to fill in their balance of payments deficit once they have exhausted their reserves in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The FMA's capital is thus going from 300 to 600 million Kuwaiti dinars (1 dinar: approximately \$3.5). The increases decided on will be paid in five annual installments, the first of which should be paid, at the latest, at the next meeting of the fund's council of governors in Abu Dhabi in 1984.

Moreover, the council of governors of the Arab Bank for African Economic Development has decided to maintain at the previous year's level the total amount of loans to be provided to African states in 1983, or \$90 million.

It also decided to transfer \$250 million of its reserves to its capital, bringing the latter to \$988,250,000, by calling on those member countries of the bank which have not yet paid their share for the increase in capital to pay this as soon as possible.

Behind closed doors, the council of governors adopted BADEA's draft 5-year plan for the period 1983-87, dealing with resources and their allocation for the financing of development projects of African countries.

Furthermore, the meeting of the council of the Arab Agricultural Investment and Development Organization, which was to be held in Algiers at the same time as the other Arab financial institutions, was postponed for 3 months.

The main Arab financial organizations' meetings in Algiers were marked by the signing of four loans granted by the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund to Algeria (4.7 million Kuwaiti dinars), Tunisia (4 million), Djibouti (3 million) and Bahrein (3 million).

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CSO: 4519/228

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PDRY, SYRIAN PARTIES' STATEMENT

GF121200 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 11 Jun 83

[Text" of statement issued by the YSP and Arab Socialist Ba'th Party delegations after the YSP Party delegation's visit to Damascus 2-10 June-- no date given, read by announcer]

[Text] In response to the invitation by the regional command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party [ASBP], the YSP delegation, led by Comrade 'Abd al-Ghani 'Abd al-Qadir, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the YSP Central Committee, visited Syria 2-10 June 1983. The delegation included Comrade Hadi Ahmad Nasir, member of the Central Committee and first secretary of the party organization in Aden; 'Abduh 'Ali 'Abd al-Rahman, PDRY ambassador in Damascus; and S'id Rashid 'Ali, member of the foreign relations group of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

The delegation was received by Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, secretary general of the ASBP and president of the Syrian Arab Republic. The delegation conveyed the fraternal wishes of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the YSP and president of the PDRY. Comrade Hafiz al-Asad conveyed to the delegation his warm wishes to Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.

The PDRY delegation held meetings with Comrade 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, assistant secretary general of the ASBP; Comrade Muhammad Zuhayr Mashariqah, assistant regional secretary general of the ASBP; and with the leadership of the Damascus and Tartus party branches.

The delegation also visited the liberated city of Al-Qunaytirah where it acquainted itself with evidence of the deliberate brutal devastation which the heroic city was subjected to at the hands of the Israeli forces. It also acquainted itself with some economic achievements and features of civilization in Syiraria.

The delegation held party and political talks with an ASBP delegation which was chaired by Comrade Muhammad Haydar, member of the National Command and head of the foreign relations office, and which included Comrade Dr 'Abd al-Hafiz Ma'mun, member of the National Command of the ASBP; Dr 'Ala' al-Din 'Abdin, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Damascus branch; Muhammad Abu Zard, director of the foreign relations office of the National Command as members.

The talks were held in a fraternal atmosphere dominated by mutual confidence and understanding and the high feeling of responsibility in facing the delicate situation the Arab nation is passing through. During these talks, a constructive and fruitful exchange of views was made on the activities of the two parties and their struggle, the progress in the two fraternal countries, the close fraternal relations linking them, and means of strengthening and expanding them. An exchange of views was also made on Arab and international issues concerning the two parties and their common struggle.

The YSP delegation expressed its great pride in and appreciation for the steadfastness of heroic Syria--party, people and government--in its decisive confrontation of all imperialist, Zionist and reactionary plots in the region. It also hailed the great sacrifices Syria is making to confront these plots and affirmed the support of the PDRY party, people and government for heroic Syria. It called on all national and progressive forces in the Arab homeland to bolster Syria's struggle and steadfastness.

The ASBP delegation expressed its opinion of and support for the PDRY policy in the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean which is aimed at establishing peace, security and friendship in them and at diverting the threats of U.S. influence and presence in the region.

The two delegations reviewed the tense and grave situation in the Arab region and their fully identical views that this situation is a result of the insistence by U.S. imperialism and Zionism on implementing their aggressive designs against the Arab nation, which the Lebanese-Israeli accord constitutes the gravest of its main links with its conditions and restrictions undermining Lebanon's peace, sovereignty and independence. The accord is also turning it into an Israeli protectorate and undermining Syria's and the entire Arab nation's security and is more threatening than the treacherous Camp David accords.

The two delegations expressed their full conviction that this accord which is intended to be forcibly imposed on Lebanon by the United States and Israel and the forces collaborating with them does not express the Lebanese people's will and it undermines Lebanon's freedom, impairs control of its territory, endangers its national unity and isolates it from its Arab environment. It is primarily directed against Syria and its security and the security of other Arab countries. It is also a deliberate attempt to acquit Israel from the brutal crimes it committed during its invasion of Lebanon and its devastation of Lebanese villages and cities and the massive killings and genocides against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples whose ugliness exceeded that of the Nazi and fascist crimes during World War II. The accord contravenes international principles and the UN Charter which do not approve of the occupation of others' lands with force and also contradicts Security Council resolutions, particularly UN resolutions 508 and 509 which call for the unconditional withdrawal of the invading Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory.

The two sides affirmed their rejection of the accord and their decisive determination to struggle with all available means to fight it and to try to foil it, along with all other plots and imperialist, Zionist and reactionary designs--foremost of which is the Reagan plan--aimed at imposing capitulatory settlements on the Arab nation, liquidating the Palestinian cause and spreading total hegemony over the Arab nation. They also affirmed that bolstering Syria's steadfastness and enhancing its defense capability and full support for its confrontation all the U.S. and Israeli threats, deepening the struggle alliance between Syria and the Lebanese Nationalist forces and the Palestinian resistance, and deepening this alliance through a wider alliance among all Arab liberation movements and their progressive forces will foil this accord and all the capitulatory imperialist and Zionist designs, liberate all the occupied Arab territories and attain the Arab masses' goal in acquiring their freedom and for the sake of their progress and establish the united Arab socialist society and achieve its unity on democratic bases.

The two sides affirmed their full support for the Palestinian cause and the Arab people's struggle for repatriation and self-determination and to establish an independent state on their national soil under the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative. They affirmed their unity to ensure the continuation of the Arab Palestinian people's struggle. They hailed the struggle of the Arab Palestinian masses in the occupied territories who, through their continuing uprising, are decisively confronting the autonomy rule plans, the so-called civil administration, the Zionist occupation and the expansionist Zionist settlement policy. They condemned the Zionist enemy attempt to spread its authority and those of its agents and the brutal oppression he is practicing against the Arab masses in the occupied Arab territories. They called on world public opinion to condemn the Zionist enemy and his criminal acts and to support the just struggle being waged by the Arab Palestinian people. They emphasized the need to rally the ranks of all factions of the Arab liberation forces and to bolster their confrontation of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary forces and to achieve an alliance among the factions in all countries and on the pan-Arab level to form the pan-Arab progressive front.

The two delegations expressed their great satisfaction over the qualitative development of the friendship and cooperation relations between their countries and the Soviet Union, which serve the Arab nation's interest and its just causes. They affirmed that the principled strategic relations with the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, are a basic condition for the decisive confrontation of imperialism and Zionism and to achieve victory over them. They also affirmed their support for the Soviet initiatives aimed at curbing the nuclear strategic weapons, relieving humanity of the threat of a new devastating war, achieving international detente and peace and security for humanity and curbing the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism. The two sides also affirmed their support for and solidarity with the just and legitimate struggle of the Asian, African and

Latin American peoples and their liberation movements against imperialism, Zionism, racism and reactionism and for the sake of national independence and social progress.

The two sides affirmed the significance of the results of the Seventh Nonaligned Summit which was held recently in New Delhi and evaluated the important role the Nonaligned Movement is playing in international relations for the sake of international peace and the people's freedom and progress and to establish a new world economic system. They expressed their satisfaction over the level of relations between the two fraternal parties and countries which strengthen their common struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reactionism, and affirmed their efforts to continuously improve and expand them.

CSO: 4400/380

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT METHODS REVIEWED

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 12-18 May 83 pp 9-11

[Article by Fatiha Bisker: "Responsibility and Courage, Khatik!"]

[Text] A low rate of technological integration, a lack of highly-skilled manpower. The origin of these evils, according to the theories of some national economists, lies in "local limits on effectively acquiring modern technologies." Could the engineer or the Algerian laborer be congenitally incapable of assimilating know-how, of creating? From such a thesis emanates a stench of colonial theory. Certainly, difficulties do exist. However, they do not justify either a negative balance sheet or a generalization as to Algerian industry as a whole. There are examples to prove it.

A wheat field, poppies, shimmering olive trees, prickly pears, dwarf palms, this road to Mers El Hadjadj adds to our enjoyment with symbols of poetry and peace. Then, as a complete change, a profound blow, three little flames are dancing at the gray bottom edge of a nostalgic sky: the first sight of the industrial zone. Here the blue of the ocean is contradicted by the black, white or yellowish curls of smoke that escape from the stacks of the largest gas liquefaction plant, the oil refineries and the ammonia complex. Here is our country's pulsebeat. Algeria has brought into play an ambitious industrialization policy that is certainly costly and undoubtedly difficult, but has the indisputable merit of putting the problem of economic independence, and consequently the country's new-found independence, on a true base*. To be responsive to the requirements of a genuine national development, this commitment requires that an industrial structure for developing the natural resources be put in place. The action that was undertaken was to adapt the energy policy to promotion of development by realizing a vast program of electric power plants, combined with modernization, strengthening and widespread interconnection of the entire transportation and distribution network.

To supply the desert with electrical energy there are to be industrial centers in the interior of the country*. To introduce electricity into all Algerian homes before the end of the year 1986. This objective is not only written into the National Charter, it is becoming a reality on the worksites of M'Sila,

*Akkache

*Ten years of effort.

Mers El Hadjadj, Ras Djanet, etc., with the participation of managers, technicians, national laborers. In Mers El Hadjadj these workers have proved, and are still proving that when there is the will, it is possible to win the industrialization wager in a field as complex as the building of a steam-operated thermal power plant; this is the most important plant in Algeria, since it is made up of three groups, each producing 168 megawatts of power (millions of watts), for a total of 504 megawatts. However, when it is assessed there are inadequate technical data. For, although building a steam thermal power plant has its technological requirements, they are relative, depending on whether it is being built in a developed or developing country. In Algeria this is a complicated project and one that is in the national interest. Also, from the initial phase SONELGAZ [National Electricity and Gas Company] has determined the criteria for rational utilization of each piece of information to build economically. Because a project can be rejected if it occasions cost over-runs. Prospecting in the legacy left by the EGA [Electricity and Gas Company, which dates back to colonization] makes it possible to salvage their studies. Updating them saves the costs incurred if they had had to be performed all over again, or if foreign bureaus had had to be called upon. This advantage is exceptional; not all national companies inherit someone's experience. SONELGAZ has also benefited from studies conducted by SONATRACH for the liquefaction plant for the port of Arzew.

"We tried to collect the maximum of information and thanks to the cooperation of people in the industrial zone, those preliminary studies cost us nothing in either time or money and were extremely valuable." A serious study of the project was begun, and in 1976 the general management officially decided to build. This was where the engineering department's work began. Its broad goal is to have the national operators contribute, for there is no question of doing the work according to the formulas that are currently too widely accepted: 'ready for occupancy' or 'ready to produce.' Turning the matter over to someone else, remaining a spectator and intervening on details--that dilemma doesn't exist for SONELGAZ," say that company's managers. Is there not a risk of cost over-runs? Long delays in meeting deadlines? All of these "weaknesses" that are generously attributed to the national operators, whereas it would be tedious to cite the list of all the foreign firms which on various pretexts have left projects in the planning stage; projects, by the way, that were picked up by the national companies. "What difference does it make?" reply the SONELGAZ managers. "Isn't the objective basically to operate a transfer of technology? We accept that, 'for the nif' [translation unknown]. Whereas many people choose the easy way, the "ready for occupancy." In that case, even the chair is imported." The degree of dependence on the foreigner may be measured from that moment.

"Leaders must have the desire to develop certain equipment in Algeria that make possible a foreign currency savings and the assimilation of know-how. This requires taking an inventory of all potentials and skills, technical as well as human. We have opted for that choice." The engineering department has set up rigorous methods, to lead the foreign builder to agree to an actual transfer of his technology and his industrial know-how, to carry out appropriately his obligations with respect to building the project whose construction has been entrusted to him, and not to transfer to his Algerian partners the risk that must continue to be his.

It was on the basis of respect for these criteria that the choice turned to a state-owned Italian firm. In collaboration with it and in accordance with the practice of SONELGAZ, which awards most of the subcontracting in Algeria. The shares were carved up and redistributed among the developers.

"For a thermal power plant there is a quantity of electromechanical equipment and civil engineering work that can be realized, for example, by SONATRAM [expansion unknown], SNS [National Steel Company], SN METAL [National Metal Construction Company], SONATIBA [National Infrastructure and Building Construction Company], etc. We are taking responsibility for it vis-a-vis the builder."

GTP [expansion unknown] (ALTRA) [Algerian Construction Company] and SN METAL are the big contracts set for the firm. "We suggested in advance, urgently, that they canvass their potential for development. That was a major criterion, a decision that was reflected in knowledge of the capabilities for national development. We believe that if you transfer hours of work that must be performed to the foreigner, you fight unemployment in Algeria and improve the productivity and know-how of the national operators."

Similarly, the foreign subcontractors were subject to SONELGAZ approval. In spite of the administrative sluggishness at the time, the work began in 1977. The site came alive. SONATIBA workers poured the concrete, SN METAL workers raised the framework and SONATRAM workers built an artificial dike. The intricacy of the operations required the collaboration of several firms with other specialties. This demanded a real coordination between the various companies operating simultaneously on the SONELGAZ worksite. Here, the threshold of tolerance in executing a project was lower, because strictness was necessary. Here, industrialization was not a theory, but a struggle in cold and overwhelming cold and heat and tedium. Five years later, the result of that immense physical commitment was a work of concrete, steel and galvanized iron. The expression in the eyes of the tightrope-walking workers and the managers shines with a poorly contained pride, "We did it!"

It is useful to show how the definition of a well understood international cooperation policy enabled the national production apparatus to develop efficiency. Chronologically, which projects are indispensable to building a power plant, those entrusted to the national companies? And how has each of them performed?

SN METAL, subcontracting for the builder, built all the framing, the storage depots and the moving cranes. Certain construction projects mark the passage of a higher technological stage, for example: the manufacture of boiler equipment, supply tanks, heat exchangers and condensers. "Before, the SN METAL people didn't know what a condenser was. They built it for the first time on the basis of plans and detailed studies drawn up by the Italian firm." The execution of the plans gave rise to exchanges in which the firm's specialists took part. This kind of work, carried out on site, is a concrete illustration of a transfer of technology. In addition to these standard activities of assembling metal framing and cranes, boilers 40 meters high were entirely re-assembled on site. Each one weighs 1,000 tons and necessitates 3,500 high-pressure welding operations. This kind of high-technology assembly is unprecedented in the annals of national business. The conditions for its success are intimately tied to the degree of skill of the TIG [expansion unknown] welders, whose work guarantees the boiler's reliability. This professional category is little known and therefore

undervalued in Algeria. To raise the qualification standard for these workers, a training school has been established on the site, supervised by an Italian welding engineer.

GTP (ALTRA) is also one of the builder's contractors. That firm installed virtually everything in the interior of the engine room, nearly all of the power plant's mechanical equipment (4,300 tons), with the exception of the turbo-alternators, which were fitted by the Italian builder. All of the electrical part, except for the regulating equipment--1,200 tons with 306 km of cable--was provided by ALTRA, which also prefabricated the pipes; for 8 months this activity mobilized a production chain on the existing three. ALTRA records illustrate that it is active in projects as important as the Hassi Messaoud refinery (entirely state-owned), the Arzew ammonia complex, cement works, etc. In 1978-1979 the company manufactured and installed 70,000 tons of LNG [liquefied natural gas] pipes. Was there, then, when this thermal power plant was built, any acquisition of know-how? The answer of the GTP managers is qualified. "There was consolidation of know-how. Difficulties arose and we surmounted them. For a refinery, the pipes spread out over some km in the open air, so it is possible to use trucks, cranes, etc. A thermal power plant has its peculiarities, it is a juxtaposition of jumbled equipment, the project is concentrated vertically, it requires utilizing small equipment to install large parts." From the technological point of view, the specifications for welding and assembling are very severe; no one but highly qualified personnel can carry them out. For the needs of this worksite, ALTRA, which has a training school in Arzew, retrained its own personnel. It is to the advantage of that national firm that at each site it has the support of a logistic base that supports and provides for all its needs: personnel, administrative and equipment problems. This is an asset. Rational organization of the work and the skill of the Algerian staff has made it possible to refute certain theories, according to which there are local limits to acquiring effectiveness in modern technologies*.

SONATIBA, subcontracting for SONELGАЗ, realized a "first" in building the banks of large-sized turbo-alternators. This was an extremely restricting operation. To obtain homogeneity in the concrete work, it must be done without interruption over a period of 50 hours. "Once the foundation is finished, it's an impressive bank, surrounded by framework. A genuine work of art." The national operators' pride is commensurate with their efforts.

In this case, integrating a building and civil engineering company into an industrial project is going to increase its know-how in that field.

SONATRAM, contracting for SONELGАЗ, is a national marine civil engineering company. At Mers El Hadjadj it built an artificial dike to make it possible to operate dry, a seawater catchment, a pumping station and the seater displacement canal. These works were carried out under difficult conditions, sometimes at depths of more than 10 meters. The continuous infiltration of the water necessitated continuous pumping. A storm or unfavorable atmospheric conditions may halt or challenge the advancement of this national company's work, but despite this it distinguished itself by building, for the first time, a seawater pumping station. It is a performance, for this was a considerable project. "But at

*Benissad: "Economie de developpement de l'Algérie." ["Algeria's Development Economy"], OPU [expansion unknown]--National Charter.

SONATRAM, responsibility and courage Khatik [translation unknown]!" declares a SONEGAZ manager.

In all, close to 10 nationally-owned and three privately-owned companies participated in building this large project. It would be tedious to name them all, but we might mention ONAMHYD [National Office for Hydraulic Material], which supplied the seawater pipes; SNS [National Steel Company] for the cable links and part of the pipe system; SONAGTHER [National Company for Large-Scale Water Resource Works and Rural Equipment] for supplying electricity to power plant annexes (canteen, offices, workrooms, storerooms); SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] for installing very high voltage electrical lines and elevators.

According to SONEGAZ estimates, contracts with national companies represent 30 to 40 percent of the budgetary envelope allotted to this project. "This is a considerable percentage, if you consider the degree of technology and the complexity of the project," a SONEGAZ manager remarks.

This kind of step has made possible a considerable saving in foreign currency, capitalizing on modern technologies and better control over the execution of future projects, and finally it has furthered the acquisition of the "industrial mentality."

In this connection, the SONEGAZ managers affirm, "Because of their integration with such a complex project, the national companies have outdone themselves." We might add that in executing the various projects they proved that today, in Algeria, the will and the means exist to make bread, nails and a 504-megawatt thermal power plant.

Defeatists may think that we are still condemned to buying turbo-alternators. It is true, this is a fundamental problem. However, we can reassure them by saying that this kind of equipment is the monopoly of a few highly industrialized countries. The prospect of developing such equipment cannot be envisaged for Algeria, except very far in the future.

In this period, which has been called "the test of truth," motivation is a key factor on which the country's future depends. How can it be aroused to meet the challenges of modern industrial systems of production? "By making the national operators responsible, by making them partners in developing projects in the national interest. Motivation is an essential factor and the nature of this work has brought about its birth," reply the SONEGAZ managers. "It's an activity that has brought together 1,500 workers, most of whom made up the personnel of the national companies. Collaboration has been woven between the engineers and technicians who have a knowledge of metals and experts from the grass roots who have a practical knowledge of building problems." It would be absurd to deny that difficulties cropped up. But the SONEGAZ managers, conscious of the fact that the national companies are gaining their first experience in this field, opted for cooperation. "We unjammed many situations. We didn't adopt a passive role, applying penalties or breaking contracts. We took another position, we detected problems (personnel, transportation, equipment) and we established a frank dialogue. The tactics consisted of having the national companies express themselves on their problems, because, by the commercial nature of the contracts, they were going to try to get out of them. By motivating them, even

politically, we led them to raise problems and when that first step had been taken, you might say the difficulties were resolved."

This kind of practice is traditional at SONELGАЗ, which underlines the obvious advantages of operating with national companies, especially where control is concerned.

Concerning maintenance, SONELGАЗ shows the same logic and the same consistency in laying in supplies over several years to avoid the fluctuations in the world market, and in installing, on site, a replacement parts workshop.

Moreover, for a smooth takeover of the plant by its developers, it is the policy of SONELGАЗ to detach, 4 or 5 years ahead of time when the studies are being done, two or three engineers who have already participated in developing other power plants. This is one of this company's special efforts.

As the assembly of the thermal power plant progresses, this professional body is strengthened. At the time when it goes into operation, they are the ones who, under the builder's leadership, are going to experiment and exploit the new power plant.

SONELGAZ' experience in Mers El Hadjadj demonstrates that an energy policy cannot be envisaged without an industrial policy. The latter must provide a higher standard of qualification for workers and the short- or long-term reproduction of the equipment needed for operation of this strategic sector.

One question remains, however: Will there be a transfer of this experience, for the national operators who took part in the project? Some of them are going to participate in the Ras Djinet project, and the rest? GTP (ALTRA) is announcing lower production. The local SN METAL official is going door to door to sell their under-utilized assembly capability. The response they are getting has a halting resonance--"turnkey, turnkey." In the sky above Arzew, three little flames dance in the wind. Where is it taking them?

CSO: 4519/241

FOREIGN TRADE EXAMINED

Reflections on Twentieth International Fair
Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 19-25 May 83 pp 4-5

[Text] If there are two factors that have brought changes in the 20th Algiers International Fair that opened last Wednesday, ONAFEX [Algerian National Office for Fairs and Trade Expansion] officials found them respectively in the opening date--this year the fair is held in spring instead of summer, as summer was not convenient for all international exhibitors--and in the new formula which emphasizes both the exhibition (it intends to reflect the country's economic activity) and the balance of trade.

This, therefore, is the prospect in which we must view this tool for commercial expansion which provides a setting for technological confrontation. Also, those who are looking for entertainment should be advised that the 20th Algiers International Fair is no longer the big village fair it used to be. This goes without saying, for all has been carefully reviewed. The method. The manner. The program which is rich in every respect, and especially the high-level technical meetings. It is no longer as in previous years. Experience has been acquired and it will be put to good use. Problems are more under control. If the number of foreign countries represented is about the same as last year, that of exhibitors, on the other hand, has considerably increased. The ONAFEX management is aware of all this and ready to handle it. They are planning. They are thinking of next year, when part of the fair grounds will be cut off by the highway that will eliminate some 10 or so national booths. They are working relentlessly, without the bustle that used to lend a folkloric appearance to the fair, despite its importance.

This year, the fair will be on a scale with the efforts made during the past 20 years. As Mr Ali Oubouzar will say, it must be "a faithful reflection of our economic and social development." An important meeting ground for specialists who will give its meaning to a large-scale commercial meeting that, from now, will be the pride of the Algiers International Fair.

Interview With Ali Oubouzar

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 19-25 May 83 pp 4-5

[Interview with Mr Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state to foreign trade, by Ahmed Larbi; date and place not specified]

[Text] Mr Ali Oubouzar (secretary of state to foreign trade) answers four questions:

- South-South cooperation: a new step forward.
- AIV [expansion unknown]: an original experiment.
- Exports: our strike force still lies with oil and gas.
- FIA [Algiers International Fair]: to promote the country's production.

In an interview with ALGERIE ACTUALITE, Mr Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state to foreign trade, stressed the importance of this 20th Algiers International Fair, and took advantage of the opportunity to answer a few questions concerning the place of our country's economy in the context of harsh international economic conditions.

[Question] A new structural data in our country's economic relations, South-South cooperation seems to be bearing fruit already, judging from our decreased dependence on western countries.

Mr Minister, could you give us a few more details on this subject?

[Answer] Algeria, which initiated the New World Economic Order, is sparing no efforts to create a flow of exchanges of a new type with its southern partners.

Substantial results have already been achieved. Thus, our trade with the Third World, which amounted to only 300 million dinars in 1963, increased to 600 million in 1971 and 3.7 billion in 1981.

These increased amounts also resulted in a greater diversification in the structure of our trade. Our trade, restricted to a few products and for the most part to four or five countries, keeps getting diversified and is expanding to include other southern countries.

Our efforts have led to an appreciable reorientation of our supply sources. For certain products, especially food products (coffee, sugar, tea, spices), nearly all our supplies come from the South. The same is true of some raw materials: wood, hides, cotton are taking an increasingly important place.

As far as our exports are concerned, we should mention our penetration of new markets, especially African markets, on the one hand and, on the other hand, the fact that these countries are beginning to use certain products of our young industry.

In importing as well as in exporting, we are continuing our efforts to make sure that our trade involves a large proportion of intermediate goods, even durable goods. For instance, vehicles and mechanical and electrical equipment are beginning to appear in our trade.

The participation of certain southern countries in our economic development, and the completion of industrial, housing, road and port infrastructure projects will soon enable Algeria's trade with southern countries to take a new step forward and will lead to a veritable restructuring of our foreign trade.

[Question] With a program that is said to be well thought-out, our foreign trade is intended to meet both international competition and the needs of our citizens. Mr Minister, could you comment on that?

[Answer] In 1983, at a time when international economic conditions are very difficult, our country has adopted two essential strategic foreign trade objectives that would appear to be conflicting. On the one hand, we must safeguard our financial balance with foreign countries and, on the other hand, we must provide normal supplies for our economy. This veritable tour de force would have been impossible without a rigorous planning of our economy and without the State's monopoly on foreign trade.

Indeed, these have given the State full control over our economy. This is why, in spite of the oil crisis and the world recession, which has been a tragedy for the Third World, Algeria's goods trade balance is showing a surplus in 1983 for the fifth year in a row. The successful diversification of our oil and gas exports, both by country and by product, and the optimization of our imports have protected us to a certain extent from the detrimental effects of the world crisis. Our strike force on export markets still lies with oil and gas which we now export under four different forms: gas, crude oil, refined oil and condensate. Thanks to this diversification, our exports are very flexible. Actually, in accordance with the resolutions of the extraordinary congress of the FLN and with the provisions of the five-year plan, the State scrupulously sees to it that the extraversion coefficient of our economy is reduced: in five years, that coefficient was practically halved, falling from 43 to 24 percent.

These encouraging results were obtained through foreign trade planning, using the system of the AGI [global import permits] which became more consistent when annual plans for economic agents were introduced. Protecting the country's production (all sectors together) has become the major concern of the State. This protection therefore represents a powerful economic integration factor and a vector for the optimization of our imports. To this should be added, in the context of the PGI [expansion unknown], the coordination and permanent concentration of domestic foreign-trade operators to answer international invitations to tender and for negotiations, which enables us to take maximum advantage of international competition, which is now acute. Finally, we should point out to the austerity policy implemented at all levels, and whose objective it is precisely to prevent any interruption in our supplies of goods indispensable to the citizen's daily life, the proper operation of our economic units and the continued implementation of our investments.

[Question] Mr Minister, as far as foreign trade is concerned, two facts received unanimous approval from the citizens. These are the new method of importing with payment on delivery, and especially the importation of private vehicles. Is it possible to have an opinion on the former? Is it already possible to judge the latter?

[Answer] Remember that the slogan of the fourth FLN Congress was for a better life!

As far as foreign trade is concerned, two major decisions having a direct impact on the citizen's daily life were made. First, the introduction of parcel post with payment on delivery. After some hesitation at the start, the operation became very popular and all were satisfied. Households and artisans can now promptly settle their maintenance problems, and monopolies are relieved of some relatively minor concerns since the products involved are very specific and had to be imported in small quantities. This has had a beneficial effect on the country, which was rightfully concerned with the maintenance of its inventory of durable and other hard goods.

Concerning the procedure involving the importation of automobile vehicles without payment, there again we should point out that the operation is progressing quite normally. This is an original experiment aimed at reducing tension on the private vehicle market without increasing our imports. As far as Algerian citizens are concerned, it should be noted that their waiting period to acquire a new vehicle from SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company] will be reduced since beneficiaries of the AIV [expansion unknown] in question will not be allowed to purchase another new vehicle for the next four years. We can say that the administration is looking for permanent solutions to make the citizen's life easier in the context of the country's fundamental options and its financial and organizational potential.

[Question] Mr Minister, the 20th Algiers International Fair, as a tool for commercial expansion, is intended to provide a new image of our industry, which is expected to be more aggressive, to sell and export more. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The Algiers International Fair is an economic event intended to promote the country's production and develop our trade. The 20th fair faithfully reflects the economic and social development of Algeria. It shows the considerable progress accomplished by the country in all sectors of activity, and it also testifies to our commitment to a new international economic order and our support for liberation movements.

This year, the Algiers International Fair will celebrate its 20th anniversary and will focus on the following major themes:

- promoting domestic production to meet domestic requirements, and looking for outlets for surplus production available for exportation;
- restructuring large public enterprises;

- intensifying South-South cooperation.

It will also promote the development of international exchanges and strengthen the unity of developing countries.

In this context, South-South cooperation will materialize in that many developing countries will participate in the 20th Algiers International Fair, and will thus make it possible to initiate contacts and business relations that should yield mutually profitable results.

Besides, as far as commercial expansion is concerned, in addition to the Algiers International Fair, we take part in some 20 fairs, mostly trade fairs, and, especially since 1982, we have been organizing purely Algerian exhibitions in Africa and the Middle East; two such exhibitions have already taken place in Nouakchott and Bamako and have met with resounding success. On these occasions, Algerian products met with considerable interest, contracts have already been signed and several more are being negotiated. At the two exhibitions I just mentioned, alone, over 50 million dinars in intents to order were booked. The 20th Algiers International Fair will provide domestic economic operations with a new opportunity to improve presentation and sales techniques for their products, especially during the technical symposium and during the enterprises' symposium organized to this end. They will receive help from the recently created National Center for Foreign Trade, especially when making market surveys.

If we were to consider the evolution of the Algiers International Fair from its creation in 1963 to date, we would be struck by how perfectly it matches the economic and social evolution of Algeria.

Indeed, during these years, the number of national companies represented at the Algiers fair increased from 11 to 217 and the number of participants from 136 to 1920, whereas our gross domestic production increased from 11 billion dinars in 1963 to 160 billion dinars in 1981, and our total foreign trade volume from 7 billion dinars in 1963 to 110 billion dinars in 1982.

This close match shows that the Algiers International Fair truly reflects the country's economic activity.

Foreign Commerce: A New Dimension

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 19-25 May 83 pp 5-6

[Article by Ahmed Ben Alam: "Foreign Trade: A New Deal"]

[Text] Anything can be planned, foreign trade like everything else. This is why we are surprised by a mentality that appears to be deep-rooted in Algeria, where AGI (global import permits) are much talked about, although not enough is said about export permits. And we arrive at the conclusion that this is quite serious considering that the international situation is characterized by crisis, recession, and trade balance deficits. At the Secretariat of State to Foreign Trade, we were told that such a deficit prevailed only until 1978, and that since 1979 we have achieved a trade balance surplus. This surplus,

we were told, is large enough to cover some of the deficit of the services item and to enable the country to repay its debts despite the generalized economic crisis that is affecting all countries, whether in the West, the East or the Third World. Of course, the question is to know what impact this has on our import volume. Also, is it true that, following OPEC's decision to lower oil prices, Algeria decided to review and reduce its projects and programs? At the SECE [Secretariat of State to Foreign Trade] we were told that oil prices fluctuations did not induce a decline of our imports, hardly 15 percent but with respect to forecasts. "The reason for this is that we are no longer in 1974, and crude oil represents only 75 percent of our oil and gas receipts."¹ To a question concerning the low level of our exportations, we were told at the SECE that three factors must be considered:

1. Economic conditions have resulted in the creation of a surplus. We are now witnessing a phenomenon of excess inventory, whose causes might deserve a more thorough analysis.
2. Algeria used to enjoy a "relative advantage" with respect to a number of products--alfa, early vegetables and fruits, garden crops... which it no longer exports. These are sub-sectors which have been lost. "It might be possible to reconquer them, but you should note that whatever is not exported is consumed by a population that doubled and whose standard of living is increasing."
3. The third factor is entirely different; it consists in laying the foundations for an export policy... "With respect to the three factors we have just seen, permanent and coordinated efforts must be made, for you don't become an exporter just like that." Actually, the products must first exist; then, a market survey is necessary. Selling existing inventories is a short-term measure and cannot serve as a basis for a policy. The question we must ask in this case is whether we do have an export policy, or whether we are just going from one shortsighted objective to the next.

To answer this question, it may be useful to go back to 1962 or 1967, when fundamental decisions were made. "It is not a secret that the strategy adopted at the time was that of intense industrialization." The challenge was to transform oil and gas resources over a period of 30 or 20 years into development plans likely to generate an industrial space through the implementation of a production apparatus. This is why we cannot just cast the first stone, saying that 98 or 95 percent of our receipts come from oil and gas; we must convince ourselves that this is the result of a deliberate choice, for the simple reason that 10 or 15 years ago the plan reflected the necessity to give priority to oil and gas development. "You must not believe that we were aiming at something and got where we are now." And careful consideration will show that large investments were made in oil and gas deposits: Arzew, Skikda, etc. "In 1962, we could have chosen another way than the one we followed; for instance, we could have developed tourism, we could have fought to retain or develop certain sub-sectors, we could have invested on the coast or in the Mitidja Valley..." Our economic framework would be only more artificial, and the slightest earthquake would have cracked it. In a word, the question of exports must be considered in the context of the global national development policy: We wanted an ambitious development program, we needed the means for it, and we thought that oil and gas were our major stockpile. "Without going back very far, we can recall that

the Fourth Party Congress, when it adopted the present five-year plan, decided that development would continue to be financed by oil and gas, which are our major source of export receipts. Nevertheless, the diversified side of our exports had escaped nobody's attention."

For the next plan, we are thinking about the ways that would enable us to achieve such a diversification of exports. We have many options, and we cannot decide what "orientations will be adopted by political authorities, for you cannot improvise a policy. It must be based on well-defined data." For the time being, we should note that most enterprises include a central import department and no export department. Why? Is it because we have nothing to export apart from oil and gas? Actually, this is not always the case. In fact, there are a number of products that would gain by being exported, either because the domestic market is saturated, or because production units in given sectors have the capacities to produce a surplus for export. The government has considered this question and a series of measures are being adopted to determine what help should be given to the enterprises that need it. The result will be the implementation of a system of export aids.² "Actually, it is just that a number of products require a subsidy to cover the difference between the actual sales price and the export price." A seminar was organized during which the measures required to refine a consistent subsidy system were debated. Similar seminars will take place in the future, and they will make it possible to publicize these measures. "Therefore, we can say that we do have a system of export aids, even if it is not very well known. To sum up, let us say that implementation texts remain to be adopted." The latter are being prepared and economic operators will be kept informed. All this, therefore, is for the future. For the time being, if we break down the range of exportable products, we note that they consist of inventories resulting from economic conditions, from a disruption in the development rates of the various sectors of the country's economy, rather than export-oriented products with a consistent excess production. "Take the case of ceramic products: we all know that SNMC [National Building Materials Company] had equipped itself to meet the requirements of a domestic market based on a delivery rate of 100,000 housing units per year. But we are delivering only about 70,000 housing units per year." An excess production is available and cannot be absorbed by the domestic market for various reasons. We asked if these products were imported and were told that their importation is absolutely prohibited.

The example of ceramic products emphasizes the consistence of the development policy with the export policy. In other words, the development policy was not aimed at exporting; rather, it was aimed at integrating the domestic economy and meeting internal requirements. "It is one thing to manage to produce a surplus, and another to establish a structure that is deliberately oriented toward foreign markets. Take the case of agricultural products. In view of our rate of demographic growth, our only concern is to make sure that we meet the needs of a population that keeps increasing. In all sectors, the Algerian market is expanding. What we do not export, we consume."

Similarly, new consumption patterns are appearing. For instance, in 1962 Algerians consumed very little cheese; this is no longer the case today. Household consumption patterns have changed, and if we look at the structure of the

Algerian population, we note that it used to be 90 percent rural. Today, we are witnessing the reverse phenomenon. The urban population is getting larger. Consumption patterns are oriented toward agricultural and processed agro-food products.

This being said, a breakdown of exportable products shows that a policy cannot be based on inventories resulting from economic conditions. Indeed, such inventories will never amount to any worthwhile percentage of our total foreign receipts. If we are interested in exporting them, this can be only a short-term operation, and these inventories do not offer an alternative for the post-oil era. True. However, these inventories are included in a list of about 100 products that could be exported,³ some 60 of which are manufactured products. Therefore, we must ask ourselves: What are we doing by way of foreign market prospection? Do we have agents abroad? "Following a recent cabinet meeting (5 September 1982), it was decided to undertake an operation to intensify our trade with developing countries, because our search for export markets is related to the search for diversification of countries with which we maintain relations. This operation is /specific/ and /global/ [in capitals]." It is global because it involves both the countries and the products, and a series of measures were taken to that end. It is specific as far as developing countries are concerned. "There, we can make a dual observation. First, a breakdown of products traded and receipts shows that non-oil/gas products account for a small proportion. Second, it also shows that developing countries also account for a relatively low percentage." All Third-World countries together account for approximately 6 percent. These figures are far from reflecting our political objectives and the orientations we have adopted.

The objective, therefore, is to increase the overall trade volume with countries in the South-zone. Certainly, this will require a broadening of the product range. If we look at the Third World, we note that considerable efforts have been made. In 1982, for instance, we can say that 80 percent of Algeria's coffee requirements were imported from Africa. Let us take an example in the field of market prospecting: a trade-fair was organized in Nouakchott, Mauritania, late in 1982. It was the first of its kind and it resulted in the exportation of various Algerian products worth about 1 million dinars. "It is not much, you will say, but, on the one hand, these were non-oil/gas products and, on the other hand, it enabled our operators to handle for the first time products that could be exported. In addition, it made possible an exchange of information between Algerian operators and their African counterparts, in that case Mauritians." Operations of this type, together with bilateral agreements signed with the countries involved, show that we would gain by getting better acquainted. At least six exhibitions of that type are scheduled for 1983.⁴ We should point out that these are prospecting missions involving both import and export markets. What is new is that these are trade-fairs and that the only products exhibited are products that can be exported. "Exhibits show products that are actually available for export and are also included in broader lists attached to trade agreements and defining long-term prospects." What matters is that the objective set is to purchase or sell products of that type. "If the objective I set for myself is to buy African cement, it does not matter whether I have actually bought African cement during the year."

In a first stage, we might obtain only 15 percent of the market, then 20 percent and finally 100 percent. We must define guidelines and it does not matter if, at first, we do not achieve much. These efforts must be seen in a long-term context, considering the structure of the Algerian foreign trade where 75 percent of all imports consist of durable goods.⁵ The remaining 25 percent represent consumer goods and it appears that a large proportion consists of manufactured consumer goods that can be found only in industrialized countries. If we also consider that cereals are sold by the United States, it appears that the proportion of products available from Third-World countries is not very large. But we realize that the progressive intensification of our trade relations with South-zone countries is not unrelated to the broadening of the economic basis and the degree of development of our respective economies, as foreign trade is just a reflection of the condition of domestic economies. Although this is not the only reason, the present low-level of trade with Third-World countries reflects the present development level of these countries; what is important is to remember that this development level is rising. Therefore, the objective is to define guidelines that will materialize in the future through concrete efforts. This is a long-term task. Of course, to encourage an intensification of our exports of non-oil/gas products, a number of measures should be taken, and they should include a system of export subsidies. Where are we now? "Globally, we can say that the government has shown its determination to provide all the aid necessary to export. Now, what practical form does this aid take?" There are procedures, circuits that are being implemented. The first consists in improving the dissemination of trade information among operators. Second, in the present state of things, "we could point out that aid can take various forms besides subsidies. A whole infrastructure must be implemented to accompany the aid provided. I can tell you that there are no obstacles on the part of the administration."

Will there not be precise conditions? After someone has received a subsidy for transportation, advertising and prospecting expenses, will that person not be required to earn a certain amount of foreign currency for the state treasury? We were told that, for the time being, an aid mechanism is being implemented. But the overall system which is being completed does not involve only foreign trade. "The Ministry of Finance have their word to say. What I was telling you involved only Algeria's traditional export products..."

The operator applies for an export license which is not covered by the same legislation as the AGI (global import permits); it is a document that gives permission to export certain products. "We have here a sub-department in charge of this, and it is to it that state monopolies as well as private exporters must apply, although the latter represent only a really small percentage." The private sector has exported remarkable quantities of products such as snails, capers, aromatic herbs, sheep guts. These are sub-sectors that may never interest state monopolies.

While we are on the subject of trade, we should mention the creation of the National Center for Foreign Trade (CNCE), an organization under administrative supervision, which, when operational, will have for its objective to make imports profitable and to increase the value of exports. In a word, its job is trade promotion. The center will act as an economic data bank. It is supposed

to provide operators with all the information they need on prices, products and countries. In this respect, it will fill a vacuum in this field.

In conclusion, we can say that foreign trade is in line with the overall objective of exchange diversification that was set as soon as the country became independent, if not before that. One facet deals with the diversification of countries and partners with whom we maintain trade relations. A second facet deals with the diversification of export products. Besides, each is a prerequisite for the other. Why?

"Imagine that we are trying to sell crude oil. It is obvious that importing countries are in the western world sphere. Conversely, if we want to sell to South-zone countries, we must realize that they import other types of products." Therefore, the partner-diversification objective is not separable from the product-diversification objective. We must see all this in the context of our development strategy, i.e. planning. Diversification per se is not an end in itself, it is only the means through which the country intends to ensure its economic independence. In addition, any export policy must be supported by a dynamic and performing domestic market. The variation in the proportion of imports in the gross domestic product is significant. It represented 42 percent in 1978 and dropped to 28 percent in 1982. It is expected to drop further in 1983. "We are dealing with a more global phenomenon, what we call the degree of extraversion, which does not have any special significance per se. A closer look shows that countries like Switzerland, France or Belgium have extraverted economies. Therefore, what matters is the quality of what we produce and what we trade... Therefore, we should not focus too much on this degree of extraversion. The problem is to know whether the flows are carrying dependence factors or not."

We cannot end this article without pointing out that the existing state monopoly on foreign trade has provided a veritable shield that has protected the country's economy during the present crisis, as it has attempted to limit the impact of international crisis on our internal balances. "It seems to me that all the problems we have discussed were related to our development efforts. Until now, our policy has been to integrate the economy and meet domestic market requirements. For the post-oil period, an effort will be necessary and we must undertake it right now in looking for new export markets."

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1982, the breakdown of the "oil and gas products" item was as follows: crude oil: 22.5 percent; condensate: 23.8 percent; refined products: 37 percent; liquefied natural gas: 1.9 percent; petrochemicals: 0.2 percent; fertilizers: 0.2 percent.
2. Among others, see Order No 82-01 dated 6 March 1982, containing additional provisions to Law No 81-13 dated 17 December 1981 dealing with the 1982 budget.

3. In the following sectors: textile, wood, cellulose, chemicals, food processing industry, building materials, hides and leather, tobacco, ores, steelmaking, metallurgy, electronics, agricultural equipment, etc.
4. Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Malta, Tanzania, Syria, Mozambique, Iran, China, Niger, Italy, France, Bulgaria, Mali, Mauritania, German Democratic Republic, Seychelles, Madagascar, Angola.
5. Let us say that two thirds consist of capital goods and 1/3 of consumer goods.

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DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNORATE OF BOUIRA EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 May 83 p 2

[Article by ADS: "A Tangible Reality"]

[Text] The governorate of Bouira has been experiencing since the beginning of 1983 an accelerated rate of development in all sectors of economic, social, and cultural activity.

Its geographical and strategic position has placed it among the newest governorates aspiring to a more promising and better future.

In addition, the agrarian revolution constitutes for this governorate an important economic vital resource which makes it possible to strengthen all the other sectors.

The establishment of industry in this governorate is also a possible and realisable project, in that all the conditions and means exist to lay the foundations for various industrial plants.

In addition, something that could contribute to the development of this area is the presence of water resources. Thus, bearing in mind all the governorate's potential, it becomes important to examine the development situation in the various sectors, and to do so for all the phases through which the governorate has passed.

The agricultural sector occupies 40 percent of the total area of the governorate. Three regions are outstanding for the variety of their agricultural production, taking into account their geographic characteristics. Thus, the Lakhdaria region and the west side of Djurdjura are famous for their fruit tree growing and their truck-farming. Bouira, Ain-Bessam and the north of Sour El-Ghozlane are in cereal growing.

Lastly, the south of Sour El-Ghozlane is characterized by animal husbandry.

Moreover it should be noted that the private sector occupies an important share of this agricultural area, that is, 118,620 hectares, while the self-managed sector has 50,580 hectares worked by 74 organized units.

In this context, it is to be pointed out that the agricultural production achieved during the year 1982 showed a noticeable improvement, particularly in grain crops: an increase of 12 percent over the previous years.

As an example, during 1982, cereal production reached 581,370 quintals, and overall production was 463,000 quintals.

However, the agricultural sector can achieve even more fruitful results on the sole condition that attention be paid to it, in particular with rigorous planning.

The governorate of Bouira has fertile soils and a favorable climate, conditions conducive to the development of the agricultural sector. However, the existence of certain problems, such as the shortage of manpower and the fact that water is not used in a rational manner, restrict production operations.

The situation is explained by the flight of manpower skilled in the domain of agriculture toward other sectors of activity, and that phenomenon leads to negative effects for the future of agriculture in this governorate.

In addition, this governorate that is famous for its agricultural vocation does not only produce cereal crops, but all sorts of fruit and vegetable crops as well, and certain industrial crops too.

The need thus results to develop the land and to start reforestation and irrigation operations, in particular by the construction of dams, given the quantity of rain that falls in the springtime and in winter.

To this end, the governorate has outlined a balanced program of work aimed at the use of all the existing water resources, to diversify agricultural yields and extend the areas devoted to truck farming.

It has also planned projects to extend the experiments that have been tried as concerns industrial crops and hard wheat, with, in particular, strengthening of the assistance offered small farmers regarding means of production, in addition to the strengthening of the existing organized production units at the governorate level, in particular with the establishment of an efficient product marketing and distribution infrastructure.

Beekeeping, Developing Sector

All these operations have the objective of increasing the value of working the land, and thus restrain the rural exodus.

It is also important to point out that in the context of agricultural yields, the cultivation of olive trees occupies a 15,222-hectare area and during the previous year achieved an appreciable yield estimated at 87,144 quintals. However, this production, which is processed by 104 private modern oil mills and 4 national industrial oil mills is suffering from certain problems of operation and maintenance.

In addition, an overview of the agricultural situation in the governorate of Bouira also brings us to examine certain important activities that relate to animal production, such as poultry raising, beekeeping, and cattle raising.

Thus, as concerns poultry farming, operations have been crowned with success at the governorate level, in that several bee-keeping [as published] collectives have been set up and their usefulness has been felt in the strengthening of the nation's economy.

The private sector occupies a large share of this operation. Thus, the quantity of white meat produced in the governorate during 1982 is estimated at 1,980 tons, or an increase of 10 percent over the previous year.

With respect to cattle raising, the number of cows reached 100,186 liters [as published] last year, while the production of white meat was 1,300 tons, or 2.2 kilograms per person.

However, the methods of stock-raising development in the governorate is still inadequate in terms of the existing stock-raising capabilities. Such is the case with the annual milk production, estimated at 150,000 liters, or 5 liters per person, whereas honey production was on the order of 5 tons. The latter will experience a definite improvement this year, after 4,000 bee-keeping permits have been issued to the advantage of the peasants.

In this connection, it must be pointed out that the positive results shown by the governorate in the domain of agriculture will be strengthened again as a result of efforts agreed to for product distribution. These efforts are centered on egg production and cattle raising, while at the same time encouraging experiments with industrial crops to involve them with corn growing, in particular in the daira [district] of Ain-Bessam, where there is an ONAB [National Animal Feed Office].

Moreover, the agricultural sector in the governorate owns large quantities of equipment, including 422 machines, sufficient to cover agricultural needs.

However, because of the shortage of spare parts, over 50 percent of the equipment is defective.

As concerns the lumber production in this governorate, it is close to 16,256 hectares. For this reason, the governorate has perfected a reforestation program. Thus, 20,000 hectares will be reforested in the "Dirah" region by National Service youth.

Four operations have also been completed in connection with the opening up of 150 kilometers, the development of 200 hectares, as well as the reforestation of Oued-Lakhal and the southern region of the governorate.

That is in addition to two other operations bringing about the development and equipment of the Djurdjura national park, which stretches over an area of 165,000 hectares, with in particular the establishment of three lumber camps and a water storage center.

In addition, the protection of these forests against fire is of considerable importance when it is known that this natural resource is increasingly threatened. Losses are estimated at about 50 percent, due in particular to

the fires that ravaged about 2,800 hectares during 1981, and 1,528 hectares during 1982.

In general, the interest now being shown the rural community in this governorate will enable agriculture to be in a position to meet the objectives assigned to it.

As concerns the housing and construction sector, which is of considerable importance in the lives of citizens, this young governorate has not escaped the housing crisis either. This is incidentally the result of great delay shown by the governorate in this area, in that the rate of achievement does not exceed 20 percent.

Thus out of the 4,391 urban dwellings planned since 1980, only 1,892 housing units were delivered, including 982 completed in 1980 and 1,286 others toward the end of 1982.

In addition, 874 dwellings are under completion, with a work progress rate varying between 40 and 60 percent; that is in addition to 1,000 housing units that the SORECAL [Regional Construction Company of Algérie] has undertaken to build.

In this context, the governorate report provides for the delivery of 2,000 housing units in 1982, and 500 more may be completed in 1984 on the sole condition of establishing control over the work-sites by providing them with the construction materials they need.

Thus, the interest shown in this sector by the governorate is all the more certain when one is aware that 1,535 housing units were completed within the framework of self-construction in 1980-1982.

Another 2,000 units are also in the process of completion, as the start of construction work on 2,000 more is provided for this year at the governorate level.

As for the self-construction program drawn up for the governorate, it includes a total of 6,976 housing units; that project will bring about a radical change in the rural world, and will consequently attenuate the housing shortage.

In addition, the governorate has completed 12 agricultural villages out of the 18 planned for it. Two agricultural villages have also undergone expansion work. However, the situation of some of these socialist villages is characterized, in terms of the hygienic conditions and maintenance of the structures, by total neglect.

With respect to the situation of housing in the self-managed sector, it is considerably behind schedule, since out of the 2,177 units planned, only 629 have been completed, and the rest will be finished over the course of next year.

In the urban development area, it is to be noted that eight city plans were completed last year, and 11 parcels of land divided, amounting to about 5,184 lots.

At present, work is under way toward the completion of the eight other interim plans and 11 city development and preparation plans, as well as the division of 25 parcels of land and four ZHUN [expansion unknown]

Delay in Social, Educational Sector

Before reviewing a different sector of activity, it is important to mention the question of illegal construction, which is beginning to spread in some towns in the governorate.

Thus, under pressure of the housing crisis and the lack of building land that should theoretically be made available to citizens by communities, the city planning movement has experienced a situation that is hard to control, particularly in Lakhdaria.

As for school construction, the governorate has produced satisfactory results in that 91 classrooms and 11 CEM [Colleges of Intermediate Studies] have been delivered so far. The governorate has also completed two secondary schools and a technology and education center, and two technical schools are also under completion.

In addition, the governorate has also made a start on the construction of a center for administrative training, and also plans to build a prefabricated professional training center. This is in addition to several other projects that it plans to achieve. The latter concern in particular the youth, sports, culture, tourism, health, and P and T [Postal and Telegraph] sectors.

In any case, the construction and housing sector in the governorate is experiencing a new start, and that is since the beginning of 1982, as a result of the strengthening of local and national resources for realization.

As regards the industry sector, the governorate has in all seven medium-sized industrial plants, namely, the SN-SEMPAC [National Semolina Factories, Mills, Pasta and Couscous Factories Company] plants at Bouira and Ain Bessam, the paint factory at Lakhdaria, the mineral water plant at Ben haroun, and textile industries in Bouira and the cleaning products factory at Lakhdaria.

All these plants have managed to achieve regional balance within the governorate. In the sense that within each district there exist some important industrial plants.

Besides these plants, the governorate also has some traditional plants, such as the Bouira jewelry factory and the Garouna carpet mill.

As for local plants that come under the PMI [Small and Medium Sized Industries] heading, there are three. They are jewelry, embroidery and general carpentry shops. All these plants started production in 1982, and as a result play a vital role in covering the governorate's needs.

Thus, to make up for the shortage of building materials, the governorate has made great efforts, resulting in the development of certain mining centers in the region. The work has produced positive results.

In addition, the move toward industrialization in this governorate has opened broad horizons for industrial manpower; the number of workers reached this year is over 2,620.

In a general way, these industrial activities as a whole have made it possible to assure regional coverage so far as certain products, such as semolina, flour, cleaning products, mineral waters, etcetera, are concerned.

The enterprise reorganization operation also had the positive result of providing this governorate with three new enterprises. They are the central industrial construction enterprise located at Bouira, the national cleaning products enterprise at Sour El Ghozlane, and the national paint enterprise at Lakhdaria.

In this context, there is also to be noted the contribution of the private sector to national development; this is in connection with application of the private investment code. Thus at a time when it is becoming increasingly obvious that the PMI need to be strengthened and extended, and restrictions thus placed on the heavy industries that require large areas and large quantities of industrial water, the traditional industries distributed around the governorate increasingly need to be upgraded, and it should be done by encouraging the artisans.

Before turning to the operations related to covering the needs expressed by citizens concerning the drinking water supply, health, rural electrification, transport, and education, it is appropriate to first give an overview of the water situation in this governorate.

Indeed, important quantities of water exist in this governorate, in particular in the Bouira, Lakhdaria, and Ain-Bessam districts. They are ample for the needs of the citizens. As a result, the rate of coverage of needs rose from 40 percent in 1980 to 65 percent during this year. It will be 75 percent this year after work on 17 projects now under way is completed, with an average of 170 liters a day per person.

As for the measures undertaken by the governorate in connection with the water shortage in the southern region, their objective is to divert the water in the M'Chedellah area by the establishment of two enterprises specializing in the development and channeling of water resources, as well as drainage work.

In addition, the hydraulic engineering services have concluded, after study, that the water potential of this region of the governorate are of strategic importance, either for supplying citizens with drinking water or for supplying industrial water to factories, particularly to the industrial area of Sidi Khaled, the cement works and the cleaning products factory in Sour El Ghozlane.

As regards the health sector, considered one of the vital sectors, it is also experiencing a sort of neglect, particularly as concerns medical buildings or even just the existence of any establishment of a social nature.

Overall, the governorate's health infrastructure has 991 beds, or 2.2 for every 1,000 inhabitants, distributed according to field of specialization as follows: general medicine: 221 beds; maternity: 165; pediatrics: 141; pulmonary tuberculosis: 115; general surgery: 164; ophthalmology: 35; neurology service: 140.

The number of skilled medical experts practising in the governorate amounts to 92 physicians, 7 pharmacists, 26 dentists, 20 medical technicians, 242 assistant medical technicians, and 442 nurses. Or one doctor for 4,671 inhabitants.

However, the health situation in the governorate will undergo a definite improvement with the completion of the projects under way. The instruction and education sector for its part covers about 82.5 percent of the citizens' needs and is experiencing a strengthening of its receiving structures, in all three cycles.

Moreover, it is to be noted that in the domain of technical and higher education, the governorate has set up two higher institutes and another institute of architecture and city planning with prefabricated buildings.

But this sector is having trouble with housing for teachers. So the governorate has made efforts, by setting up, during 1982, 105 classrooms, 99 housing units, and 24 school canteens in the primary cycle.

Thus, the improvement noted in the completion of the school projects has had positive results in the education situation, especially in the primary cycle, in that all children who have reached school age have started school.

In addition, the number of teachers reached 2,946 in the primary cycle in 1982, and 826 in middle school, and 282 in the secondary cycle.

In general, coverage of the governorate's needs is assured in the remaining sectors, as follows: 49 percent in rural electrification; one bed for every 1,320 inhabitants as concerns tourism; one post office for every 7,500 inhabitants, and lastly, one seat for every 57 persons in the transport sector.

12149
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PEOPLE'S SCHOOL DESCRIBED

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 12-18 May 83 p 13

[Article by Fatiha Akeb: "Reviving the People's School"]

[Text] The alleys of Algiers used to be accustomed to those scholars who attended night courses organized by the UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth], to their parents' great joy, but little by little the schools were closed. This is one of the few still in existence.

At a time when schools are closing their doors everywhere else, there are still a few, like the one in First of May Square, certainly among the last to bear witness to that magnificent spirit that the young people of the UNJA had some years ago when they opened the schools after 1800 so volunteers could teach courses free of charge! A very good idea, isn't it? All the more so because at the time--and this is still true--the illiteracy rate could only encourage the initiative and because the numerous children pushed out by the ordinary educational system at the end of a more or less superficial literacy program were sinking into the anguish of a future with no prospects. The determination of the youths to create people's schools in all communes and all neighborhoods pushed them into maintaining the effort and surmounting the difficulties they were encountering. Every day they felt the immense relief that accompanies being useful through their role as teachers, and their self esteem was rising. The parents of the pupils who were satisfied and bedazzled by the voluntary service of these youths, enthusiastically accompanied their children. The excitement in Algiers' alleys caused by the groups of scholars, who ended their supplementary courses at 2000, had become the normal thing. And in 1980 there were people's schools in the capital as well as in the interior of the country, in spite of frequent objections which put the contribution of such an enterprise on the same level as, for example, a smashed window or some missing crayons in the classroom.

The slightest error on the part of the youths was exploited to challenge the pursuit of the courses. However, although the people's school is not a "fundamental solution to educational problems, nor is it a kind of parallel school, it contributes to the effort to democratize education." In the sense that it welcomes children who are unable to study at home--the housing crisis no longer needs to be demonstrated--and also in the sense that it, the people's school,

receives those who are "excluded from the regular schools" to help them raise their levels and so to present themselves for various examinations and professional training courses.

The school is thus a fight against illiteracy, but above all--and this is the essential thing in these times when we talk about youth and how it will take charge--it is a privileged place in which to mobilize the young around UNJA's program. The people's school may be to education what the voluntary service of the students was to the agrarian revolution: a youth that is alive and feeling the upheavals in its country's evolution. It is agreed that to integrate the young people into the activities of their mass organization does not signify anarchy. The proof of that is certainly this spicy team which for four years has persevered in maintaining one of the few schools that still open their doors after 1800: it is the Mohamed Zekkal school in the First of May Square. The establishment's director believes that "the initiative, which is basically a good one but which depends strictly on the willingness of the young people, who have no help, should not be subject to complaints about these courses, which are attended regularly."

Parents continue to turn to the UNJA youths to register their children, sometimes beseeching, but since Mohamed Zekkal is the only people's school, it is inundated by the number of applicants. The kids come from all over the commune to prepare for admission to the elementary first year and their secondary education. They are supervised by about 40 youths who may or may not be members of the UNJA, but who have remained faithful to this voluntary service.

The people's school operates on the same system as an ordinary school; it has its internal regulations, its director and its curriculum, including student cards for each child who attends. Every day Mohamed Zekkal receives 500 pupils in 14 classes. The young Darradj who becomes the school director at 1800 rejects the argument that "would have you believe there is an overlap between the daytime teaching and the evening teaching." He says, "We are having the pupils review; the explanation of the course is not repeated unless it hasn't been assimilated by the children. On the other hand, even if we sometimes get ahead of the teacher, we will have prepared the ground for him and he will only have to do a simple review." He adds in a sincere tone of voice, "Maybe we don't have pedagogy, but we have a lot of willingness." Inside the classrooms, the pupils are used to coeducation and follow the course attentively: Tahar is the chief monitor at Thahalibia high school in the evening, but he finds time to give two hours of Arabic, motivated by the fact that his own children went through the people's school. Some parents, having been solicited, answer the call and volunteer to sacrifice several hours of their time. Bonds of fellow feeling are formed and cause the youths who themselves have taken the people's school course to ensure their admission to secondary school, to return to that same school as young volunteers, to help the new pupils. These masters who are teaching without pay certainly experience what a dental student expresses in these words: "I was giving courses for pay at home, but I was getting so many children that it was no longer possible to keep all of them. I enrolled them in the people's school where I also teach; the class then becomes an entity in itself, this gives me great pleasure and one gets real moral satisfaction out of seeing the children's level improve and out of passing them on the street after they have become successful." It would certainly be too bad if such a fund of energy and

commitment as exists among hundreds of young people were not utilized to revive these people's schools whose door has been timidly half opened; the UNJA, without a doubt, has in the people's school a worthwhile observation point from which young people can become interested in its activities. It will have to seize it wholeheartedly.

8946

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OPINIONS CONCERNING MUSLIM EXTREMIST GROUP AIRED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 2 Apr 83 p 4

[Article by Muhammad Imbabi: "The Emir of the 'al-Bawwab' Group Says: 'The Strife in Our Society and the Strife Involving Our Women Impelled Me to Emigrate!'"]

[Text] There was a confrontation, but it was an indirect one. The first party was a young man who was nearly diverted from the correct path, but who woke up before it was too late. The second party was the Emir or leader of the group to which this young man had belonged and which he had broken off and escaped from before, in his words, it could "ruin his future."

Mahmud al-Thaqbi sat quietly and related his story about the "al-Bawwab" group or the group run by Muhammad Yusuf al-Bawwab, who used to be a member of the Renunciation and Repudiation Society [jama'at al-Takfir wa al-hijrah] and had split off from it in order to form his own group bearing his name.

Mahmud al-Thaqbi, who is 22 years of age, began his story as follows: "I was in the second year of secondary school, and like any young person in the prime of his life, I began to make some friends, especially among those who were my age. I did not realize that I was being ensnared by an organized group. The main thing is that they did not inform me of anything. They merely encouraged me to discuss matters, so that they could gradually win me over. This is the method which they follow to exercise control over young people who are unable to out-debate them and thus end up being ensnared by them. As a result, whoever is won over by them ends up being totally dominated by their ideology. Gradually I found myself being completely isolated from everything. They told me that it was a sin to pray in mosques, that it was a sin to become educated, that it was a sin to read, and that it was a sin to associate with religious scholars ['ulama'] or clergymen."

The Emir of the Group Replies

We then met with Muhammad Yusuf al-Bawwab, 29 years of age, who is the leader of the group with which Mahmud broke off. Muhammad used to be a member of the Renunciation and the Repudiation Society. But then, according to what he says, he had a difference of opinion with the society concerning Muslim religious duties, and so he split off from the society. Then he formed his own group. The security forces arrested him at the Cairo Airport when he arrived on a flight from North Yemen, which is the country to which he had emigrated. In response to what Mahmud al-Thaqbi said, al-Bawwab maintained: "There is no proof for these allegations."

I asked: "What is your opinion about mosques?"

He replied: "There are large central mosques where public prayers are performed, and there are small mosques. As our population multiplied it became no longer possible to assemble all the people in one large mosque as was done during the days of the Prophet Muhammad."

I asked: "Why did you give up your studies as a student in the Department of Business at al-Azhar University?"

He replied: "I told them I could not take the exams."

I asked: "Why did you decide to emigrate?"

He replied: "There is a Prophetic Tradition [hadith] in the collection of Prophetic Traditions assembled by al-Bukhari [Sahih al-Bukhari] concerning flight from strife which says: 'God is nearly the best property of His servant, but with this approach he wishes [to avoid] the battles of the country and he flees, with his religious faith, from strife.'

"I decided to emigrate to Yemen in order to flee from two types of strife. The first type of strife was the strife in our society, and the second type of strife was the one involving our women!"

I asked: "What are your principles?"

He said: "First of all, I believe that in order for there to be conviction in a person's mind, something has to be put into this mind. The thing that has to be put into a person's mind is evidence or proof so that the person can become convinced. In order for me to worship God, I must have proof [of God's existence] to guide me. "As for knowing how to worship God, my opinion is that this knowledge can come from God alone."

"It says in the Koran: 'Say: God is the one who has the knowledge, and I am the herald who is speaking distinctly.' The verse was uttered in a way to show restriction or limitation. It says that knowledge comes from only one source--God--and not from mankind."

"As for right guidance, when I search for the source of such guidance to show me right from wrong, I find it in the Koranic verse which says: 'Say; God's right guidance is the right guidance.' This verse says that the only right guidance is that of God.

"Based on the above-mentioned, both knowledge and right guidance come from God alone and do not come from mankind."

Distorted Thinking

What do clergymen have to say about the thinking of Muhammad Yusuf al-Bawwab?

Dr Musa Shahin Lashin, professor of koranic Interpretation and Prophetic Traditions at al-Azhar University, says: "I have had the opportunity to meet Mr al-Bawwab. Based on the dialogue which I had with him and judging by what he said then, I can assure you that he is a person whose thinking is distorted.

"His opinion is that, as long as a given society is godless, then he should not learn what knowledge it has to offer and he should not study in its schools. This is why he abandoned his studies and why he has advised his followers to do the same. If you ask him how he expects them to earn their living, he will say that they should earn their living from commerce. This is simple-minded thinking because if all Muslims became merchants as he thinks they should, then who would they sell their merchandise to and how would they make a living?

"Another of al-Bawwab's principles is that as long as a given army is not, in his eyes, a Muslim army, then it cannot defend Islam and he therefore should not become a soldier in its ranks. He also believes that it is sinful for women to go out and work, that it is a sinful for men to shave off their beards, and that growing a beard is one of the basic principles of Islam. Another of his principles is that the people who built the mosques were not Muslims, that the people who pray in them are not Muslims, and that he therefore should not pray in them. What al-Bawwab says about knowledge and right guidance is a retreat to the periphery and to formalistic thinking in order to confuse the thinking of whoever debates with him. We all believe that all knowledge and all right guidance comes from God. Our religious scholars are guided by what all Muslims are guided by. But al-Bawwab rejects the consensus of the religious scholars [ijma']1 rejects what the religious scholars and clergymen say, and, as far as his followers are concerned, he is the only source of knowledge and religious-legal opinions!"

9468

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DISPUTE OVER ADMINISTRATION, CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT LANDS

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 2 Apr 83 p 4

[Article by Muhammad Shakir: "It Is Necessary to Settle the Dispute Between Eight Ministries Over the Ownership of 700 Million Square Meters of Land in Alexandria Worth 4 Billion Egyptian Pounds"]

[Text] Government bodies are content to merely make accusations while the land is in the hands of trespassers.

It is necessary to settle the dispute between eight ministries over the ownership of this land!

Most of the 700 million square meters of land, worth 4 billion Egyptian pounds, will otherwise be lost by the public treasury because of this dispute. This land is located in the Governorate of Alexandria. A government body called the Agency for Protecting Government Property has been formed, and it has been given all the necessary authority. Nevertheless, a number of ministries still do not recognize this government body. And this is not all. They have been waging legal battles against the governorate since they consider that these lands are their own property, although these ministries do not have the power to guarantee protection of these lands from trespassers. The result has been that some of the ministries have put the governorate in a critical situation--so much so that officials in Alexandria started telling a well-known joke, the essence of which is that the ministries do not consider the Governorate of Alexandria to be a part of Egypt.

The People's Assembly of the Governorate of Alexandria has taken action, and the governor of Alexandria, Fawzi Ma'adh, has established principles for the administration and control of government lands. He has issued executive decisions to put an end to the problem of trespassing on government property. People who deal with the administration of the governorate have begun to feel reassured, and they have begun to cooperate with the appropriate government agencies to establish the legality of their status by means of paying fees in exchange for usufruct of the property.

But this has caused a problem. The problem is not with the trespassers and the occupants of the property, but rather with the ministries which refuse to recognize that the Governorate of Alexandria has the right to protect government property located in the governorate in accordance with the Local Rule Law.

Now there is a dispute between the ministries. Concerning the nature of the dispute between the ministries, 'Izzat Qadus, head of the People's Assembly of the Governorate of Alexandria, had the following to say:

"It is not merely a matter of a dispute. The matter has reached the point of being a violent skirmish. This dispute is something which is not in the interests of the government. It is something which favors only the trespassers.

"There are some blatant examples of this. There are eight government bodies, each of which belongs to a particular ministry, and all of them are fighting each other over the ownership of the lands. We also have the Governorate of Alexandria, and it is the government body which, according to the Local Rule Law, represents the state. Other parties involved are the agency for dealing with publicly-owned property, the Public Authority for the Development of Agricultural Lands, the Nasir Social Bank, the agency dealing with [privately-owned] property, the agency dealing with public sequestration [of property], the agency dealing with agricultural reform, the Ministry of Religious Trusts, the Ministry of Agriculture.

"The head of each of these organizations and government bodies feels that any administration and control of the land by any other body constitutes an infringement upon the authority of the ministry of which his organization is a part. Lately we have found people violently fighting with each other, and this has made the people in each organization afraid to deal with those in the other organizations.

"In the end, the loser is the public treasury. These different government bodies are not capable of protecting the property. Furthermore, they do not possess the basic elements for setting up government bodies capable of administering and controlling this property as the Governorate of Alexandria, which is the appropriate government body in this case, is capable of doing. All actions taken by the Governorate of Alexandria are subject to control by the local people's council. In the final analysis, the government owns all of these lands, and the Governorate of Alexandria is assumed to be part of the government.

"Another case involves the Ministry of Religious Trusts. Every day we find the Ministry of Religious Trusts determining that all business transactions in a given area have to be conducted through the ministry. Not even the governorate is consulted--if only for the sake of coordination--to make sure that the ministry's actions are in line with everything that has been established as part of the governorate's development planning project. Relations have been broken off between the Governorate of Alexandria and the Ministry of Religious Trusts.

"Still another example concerns the agency dealing with government lands, the agency dealing with publicly-owned property, and the agency dealing with repossessed property. A dispute is still going on between the governorate and these government agencies. All of these agencies are under the Ministry of Finance. The result of this conflict has been that there has been a cessation of the registration of lands being used for large-scale food supply and industrialization projects in these desert areas.

"For example, the following took place: A particular company made a down payment for the purchase of some land in order to establish a project there. After the allocation was made, the project administration office requested that the rest of the payment be made in order that registration procedures be completed by the governorate. While the registration was being done, the governorate was surprised by a letter which it received from the agency which deals with repossessed lands and which had been written to the real estate [illegible]. The letter requested that registration not be carried out until the agency dealing with repossessed lands had had a chance to collect payment corresponding to the value of the land. When the people in charge of the project got in touch with the agency dealing with repossessed lands in order to pay the remainder of the value [of the land], they were surprised by the demand that they recover the sums of money that had been paid to the governorate. The dispute is still going on between the government organizations. People are still in the dark as far as which government organization it is that is supposed to receive the money.

"Here is still another example: The Nasir Social Bank is considered to be the body which oversees lands owned by individuals who have no heirs, and the Nasir Social Bank is also a party in this dispute. Dozens [of cases and transactions] have been suspended because of this conflict."

'Izzat Qadus has submitted many reports concerning this phenomenon which have been debated in the People's Assembly. Here are a few examples of the cases involved which we have selected to present to you:

The (Samuhah) lands were turned over to the Governorate of Alexandria on the basis of a decision made by the cabinet in 1976, and compensation was paid to the farmers involved. They were given alternative lands from among the property of the governorate, at a rate of 2 feddans per feddan [of their own land which they had turned over to the governorate], in addition to compensation for their crops. The governorate took 6 million Egyptian pounds out of its budget to spend on these lands in order to provide services. Of this total, 3 million Egyptian pounds were for sewage and water, and the other 3 million were for electricity. This is in addition to what the governorate spent in order to prepare the plan to zone this land as a residential area and a natural extension of the city's urban area. The governorate has signed a contract with the Construction Cooperative Agency. However, the matter still has not been settled. Another example concerns the Muntazah Palace. Law Number 565 of 1954 granted the minister

of municipal and rural affairs the right to reach an agreement with the Egyptian Land and Building Company to utilize the Muntazah Palace for a period of 35 years. According to this law, this whole facility is to be eventually returned to the government.

But then we were surprised by the issuance of a decision that the Ministry of Tourism undertake the administration and utilization of the Muntazah Palace. This was in spite of the fact that there are commitments which are supposed to be met involving tourist projects, since the Muntazah Palace and palace grounds are considered to be the largest tourist facility in the Middle East, and in spite of the fact that the governorate is in charge of providing all services, utilities, sewage, and police protection for this area. But the governorate is nevertheless every day encountering, to its surprise, projects that are being carried out inside this area. They are being carried out without the governorate being informed at all, and they are being carried out on land that is supposed to belong to the governorate--at least from the point of view of the land's location.

There are many other examples of this conflict. The only sure consequence of this conflict is that hundreds of millions of Egyptian pounds are being lost by the government. What is needed in this whole matter is a decision which determines that one single government body should be dealt with instead of us having this dispute between the ministries concerning a non-essential issue--since in fact all of the land involved belongs to the government. Such a decision would definitely create stability with regard to the legal status of matters. Officials should know that the Governorate of Alexandria definitely does represent the state. They should know that the Governorate of Alexandria, by virtue of the technical resources which it has available, is capable of representing all government agencies when it comes to settling issues concerning violations of these lands. If things remain as they are, this can only harm the public welfare and deplete the public treasury.

9468
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REPORT ON DETERIORATING ASNA BARRAGE

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 2 Apr 83 p 3

[Article by 'Abd al-Wahhab Mursi: "An Urgent Telegram Which Jolted the Ministry of Irrigation Said: 'The Asna Barrage Is in Danger!'"]

[Text] Cracks and gaps have been spreading like cancer in the structure of the barrage for the last quarter of a century!

The prescription for a temporary cure would cost 2.5 million Egyptian pounds, and would involve 1,200 injections of cement, with each injection of cement being 15 meters long.

A permanent cure would cost 150 million Egyptian pounds, and would involve the building of a brand-new barrage equipped with an electric power station.

It all started with a telegram, consisting of just a few words, which jolted the Ministry of Irrigation. The telegram had been sent from the Upper Egypt Irrigation Inspection Office to Engineer 'Abd al-Hadi Samahah, the minister of irrigation, and it said: "The Asna barrage is in danger."

Twenty-four hours later AKHBAR AL-YAMN was on the scene, which is located 800 kilometers south of Cairo, and there it discovered a whole series of alarming surprises. It was found out that cracks and gaps have spread like cancer throughout the structure of the Asna barrage. Water from the High Dam at Aswan is leaking through the middle of the barrage with the force of a water fountain. Even frogmen with their cameras get tossed around when they are underwater in front of these streams of water which generate the pressure of fierce whirlpools. Something must be done immediately to deal with the danger of this barrage collapsing.

Experts have formulated both an emergency plan for dealing with the deteriorating situation and a long-term plan for replacing the barrage with a new barrage. The emergency plan, which is a temporary cure, involves injecting cement into the barrage in order to plug up the cracks and gaps. A total of 1,200 injections of cement, with each injection being 15 meters

long, must be done. This operation will cost 2.5 million Egyptian pounds. But the fundamental solution to the problem, according to both our experts and foreign experts, would be to speedily proceed to build a new Asna barrage which would be equipped with an electric power station. Such a new barrage would cost 150 million Egyptian pounds.

It turns out that the useful life of the Asna barrage has been over ever since 25 years ago! Water has begun to pour through the walls of the barrage with the force of water fountains. A careful inspection of the barrage has revealed the fact that cracks and gaps have spread like cancer throughout the structure of the barrage which is 800 meters long, 12 meters wide, and 18 meters high. The Ministry of Irrigation considers this barrage to be the most important one in the great series of barrages which has been erected all along the Nile, as well as along its tributaries and main irrigation canals, from Aswan in the south all the way to Alexandria and Damietta in the north. The Asna barrage is the first large barrage right after the High Dam, and it is located 160 kilometers north of Aswan. The Asna barrage receives the water which comes through the High Dam, holds up the water south of the barrage, and then lets the water run through the barrage into the Nile, on peak days, at a rate of 250 million cubic meters of water per day--enough to meet the country's demand for drinking water and the requirements of the agricultural, industrial, and social projects of Egypt's development plan.

The Asna barrage was constructed in 1908, and its useful life was to be a period of 50 years. This means then that this useful life has been over ever since 1958. Already a quarter of a century ago a new barrage was supposed to have been built in order to replace it, and this new barrage was supposed to have been equipped with an electric power station in order to help meet the country's need for power obtained from the cataracts in the Nile. This type of energy source is considered to be among the very cleanest sources of energy, especially when compared to electric power generated by nuclear plants. But then this is another story which we will not go into at this point.

The Reservoir and the Dam

One of the secrets revealed by the terse telegram concerning the danger of the situation with regard to the Asna barrage is the fact that it was originally designed to withstand only limited amounts of pressure since it was designed to receive only the small quantity of water stored by the old Aswan Dam--before it was heightened twice. But then the High Dam was built and the amount of water held back by the High Dam turned out to be far more than what was stored by the old Aswan reservoir. Consequently there was an increase in the amount of water which came through the High Dam to be stored by each of the barrages erected along the Nile. This situation especially affected the Asna barrage, which was then subjected to pressures and loads which it was not originally designed to withstand.

According to Engineer Ramzi Nassar, the resident engineer and overseer of the project to inject cement into and reinforce the Asna barrage, another result was that the water began eating away at the front wall of the Asna barrage. This created holes in the wall, and water penetrated through these holes until it reached the mortar of the barrage, and this mortar was then eaten away as a result of interaction with the water. Cracks and gaps then appeared inside the structure of the barrage, and the water, with all of its force and pressure, began pouring through the cracks and gaps until it reached the back wall of the barrage. The water then opened up holes in the back wall and began pouring through with the force of water fountains. This phenomenon can be seen most clearly in the canal lock wall erected at the western end of the barrage, in the 120 foundations of the barrage itself, and inside the 119 sluices which are located between these foundations!!

The Bedding and the Piers

All of the large barrages erected along the Nile have enormous concrete bases which rest on the bottom of the river bed and extend from one bank of the river to the other. These bases are called the "bedding" and are the foundations upon which all of the barrages rest. On top of this bedding we have the foundations which the engineers call the "piers." Above that we have the surface of the barrages which extends above the piers and over which all of the traffic--cars, pedestrians, and animals--moves.

The Frogmen

In order to deal with the situation, it is not sufficient merely to know all of the above-mentioned information. One must utilize the most advanced methods available to diagnose a case such as this. In foreign countries they have already produced sonar apparatuses which are capable of rendering a live image of every square inch of the inside portion of the structure of a barrage. There are also special television cameras which can be utilized to make underwater color sound films. These sonar apparatuses have not been available to us, and we therefore resorted to utilizing another diagnostic approach.

A team of frogmen utilized by the irrigation maintenance workshops did some diving. Each one of the frogmen carried a television camera and had a microphone inside the steel helmet which he wore and which was attached to his diving suit. This team included engineers and technicians who had been trained in this type of operation. Every day each frogman would dive underwater two or three times, spending 2 hours underwater each time. Another team of technicians was on shore and recording all of the information which the frogmen underwater received via their microphones and cameras. The frogmen spent a total of 340 hours underwater, and the cost of this operation was 53,000 Egyptian pounds.

The most dangerous evidence produced by the color television films was the fact that the cracks and gaps had spread not only throughout the piers which support the surface of the barrage. The cracks had also reached the concrete bedding resting on the river bed, that is, they had reached the foundations which support the 120 piers which, in turn, support the entire weight of the surface area of the barrage!

Films shot at a depth of 18 meters underwater also showed that some of the sluice gates which control the flow of water had fallen to a lower depth. The result of this was that there were strong whirlpools and water currents which endangered the lives of the frogmen as they did their job. The whirlpools pushed the frogmen's cameras around and nearly tore them out of their hands. In fact, these whirlpools and currents were tossing the frogmen themselves around. They found themselves drifting around underwater just like astronauts in space where there is no gravity.

They Knew About It

All of these shortcomings in the Asna barrage and the other barrages erected along the Nile were not a surprise. All of this has been known perfectly well for years, due to extensive research and studies that were conducted and published under the title of "The Side Effects of the High Dam, and How to Deal With Them." This work was published before any construction began on the High Dam. Why have we been silent about this for so long, and why did we not begin to deal with this situation at the appropriate time?

After the Honeymoon

During the sixties Egypt entrusted the Soviet Union with the job of building the High Dam. The Soviets then actually did build the dam during the honeymoon period which prevailed in relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. There was an agreement made by both parties to immediately begin to take the necessary preventive measures in order to avoid all of these consequences after finishing the building of the dam itself.

But what happened was that, after the High Dam was built, 'Abd-al Nasir was not around anymore, Khrushchev was not around anymore, and when they disappeared the honeymoon which had characterized relations between the two nations also disappeared. Not a single step to avoid the High Dam's side effects was implemented.

The Minister in the U.S.

While the minister of irrigation was visiting the U.S., he utilized this occasion to ask USAID to furnish some aid for the purpose of making a study of the barrage and discovering the best means of reinforcing it. USAID then requested some additional data concerning the barrage and then negotiations with the representatives of USAID began in Cairo. The result was that a definite agreement was reached which stipulated that U.S. experts would inspect the barrage and furnish the necessary aid to repair and reinforce it. These experts in fact did come to Egypt, they accomplished their task, and then they returned to their own country.

The Diagnosis and the Cure

By now the whole diagnosis process has been completed, and the only thing left to be done is to implement the cure.

Experts from the Ministry of Irrigation say that there is a type of quick cure which is temporary and which can be used to save what can be saved. It would take at least a full year to implement this quick cure, it would cost 2.65 million Egyptian pounds, and it would consist of injecting cement into the cracks and gaps of the barrage in order to fill them up. Another basic and definite cure would require a minimum of 7 years' time and would consist of building a new Asna barrage which would be supplied with an electric power station--after which time the present barrage would no longer be used. The cost of building the new barrage would be 150 million Egyptian pounds, at 1982 prices. It is interesting to note that the present barrage cost only 870,000 Egyptian pounds when it was constructed in 1908. In other words, the difference in prices is such that prices are 170 times as high as they were 75 years ago. And that is not all.

We Administer the Cure

The ministry then put the Asna barrage injection process up for international bidding, and Egyptian firms participated in this bidding. The contract was awarded to an Egyptian company which specializes in this type of work. This company is one which was formed with personnel who have had experience working on the High Dam and know how to use the required equipment.

Native Egyptians

Right now work is going on at the Asna barrage to implement the quick temporary cure. The engineers and workers are using enormous drilling apparatuses to drill 1,200 holes which are a total of 18,000 meters long, and each hole is 15 meters long. This will cover the entire structure of the barrage. The operation will require 1,500 tons of cement. So far 688 holes have already been injected with cement, and mortar-mixing machines that operate by means of air pressure have been utilized.

Engineer (illegible) Mahmud, the company's representative who is in charge of the operation on site, said: "The drilling process is being done by a drilling machine, the arms of which have a ring-shaped diamond cutting edge like a glass-cutting tool. These arms rotate at very high speed as the drill rotates. The drill penetrates the structure of the barrage to a depth of 15 meters, and then is taken out along the core. The price of a single cutting-edge unit for each drill is 1,000 Egyptian pounds. Several cutting edges of this type have been lost when the drills penetrated to large cracks in the structure of the piers and the cutting edges then fell off of the drills, passed through the open cracks, and then fell to the bottom of the river."

Ahmad al-Sayyid, a geological engineer, is in charge of the drilling operations. He said that work is proceeding on schedule in spite of the heavy traffic along the top of the barrage which goes on during most hours of the day.

Husayni Muhammad Husayn is also a geological engineer and is the company's engineer for injection processes. He said that the process of injection is being carried out by means of utilizing special mortar mixers which operate by means of air pressure and which are so efficient that they guarantee that all of the cracks and gaps which are being injected with cement will be totally filled up with cement.

Among the numerous points brought to the surface by the brief telegram that was received by the minister of irrigation there is one final extremely important point which we should mention. It is as follows:

The experts at the Ministry of Irrigation saw themselves confronted with a momentous decision which had to be made. They decided to restrict this quick and temporary cure to the piers and not to extend the cure to the bedding which the barrage rests upon, even though the cracks and gaps had also spread to the bedding. Injecting the bedding with cement would require drilling of hundreds of linear holes in this bedding which is 18 meters underwater. Experts were afraid that, if they did this drilling, the water would rush into these holes and this would make it impossible to inject cement into them. The result then would be that we would have created hundreds of new holes, with each hole being 3 meters long, in the structure of the bedding in addition to the cracks which the bedding already has. This would certainly make it possible for the entire barrage structure to collapse!! This was the opinion of Engineer William Kamil, undersecretary at the ministry and head of the department which deals with large barrages and reservoirs.

This is why it was decided to restrict the cure to the piers and to inject them from the top which is above the level of the water. It was decided to leave the bedding, which rests on the Nile River bed, as is because by at least 7 years from now a new barrage is going to be built anyway. This new barrage will replace the current one whose useful life ended 25 years ago!

9468

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IMPORTED GOODS HURT LOCAL READY-MADE CLOTHING INDUSTRY

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 23 May 83 p 3

[Text]

THE ready-made clothes industry should be one of Egypt's foremost but it has fallen on bad times. It does not take long to see the influx of imported ready-mades in Cairo's numerous boutiques and their aggressive display. They push the local product out of the picture. Yet these clothes — from Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and even from high-priced Western sources — are from countries which in general do not have advantages that Egypt has.

Egypt is a major cotton-producing country. It also produces high-quality cotton yarn much in demand abroad. But the days should be long gone when these basic products were exported, originally to Britain's flourishing textile industry in Lancashire, only to be reimported at much higher cost in the form of finished articles. True, Egypt did develop a considerable cotton-processing industry before World War II and in the post-war years went into the ready-made clothes industry. The clothing industry in fact recorded something of a boom in the 1960's and early 1970's when the country's trade was closely linked to the Eastern bloc. But the barter-type trade with Eastern bloc countries was not such as to stimulate the industry. Quality went by the board. It was largely a matter of shipping off sufficient quantities of clothing, and other products, to the Soviet Union and elsewhere to cover imports from those countries.

The result was that inferior ready-mades became virtually the only Egyptian clothing available. It was an easy matter for Taiwan, Hong Kong and the like to invade the market. Egyptian materials

for any kind of quality clothes were more or less confined to made-to-measure tailoring.

It is time for Egypt to end this situation. There is no reason whatever why the country's foreign exchange should be depleted by large imports of ready-made clothing when all the elements to produce the equivalent are available here.

One important factor is that the ready-made clothing industry does not require heavy capital outlays nor does it need extensive factory buildings. But it does need up-to-date machinery and a skilled

Skilled labour should be comparatively easy to obtain. It does not need much effort to set up institutes in various parts of the country to train a national workforce. New machinery would have to come from abroad but this is a case where the Government should consider granting import-duty reductions to revive a neglected industry. The private sector should receive every possible encouragement and there should be facilities for easy-term loans.

Another point is that whereas Egypt is famous for its high-quality long-staple cotton exported for the up-market textile industry, the domestic ready-made trade does not require such an expensive raw material which would automatically increase retail prices. What is needed is medium-staple cotton, which Egypt can produce, and judicious blending with polyester which would certainly have to be imported. Compensation for the cost of this would undoubtedly be a considerable reduction in the imports of ready-made clothes.

Not long ago the Egyptian textile industry made a study of the average sizes required for typical Egyptian men and women. It seems that this study has been pigeon-holed. It should be brought out of its covers and if necessary updated. This would mean a big advantage over foreign suppliers of ready-mades which may have been designed with less understanding of the average Egyptian figure. Of course, seasonal needs and artistic designing also require careful study.

Hand in hand with this there would have to be efficient marketing and management. This is a field where much Egyptian production has failed to find the necessary backing. There might be a need for foreign experts for help over the initial

phases in this, although the Egyptian textile industry, and the ready-made industry dependent on it, should by now have sufficient experts at hand.

Above all there would have to be a will to compete. Once the Egyptian ready-made industry can show that it is competitive and perhaps can even surpass foreign manufactures, there would be no need to think of any protective tariff or the like to cut down imports. With the material and labour resources available, this should be a goal readily attainable. If the domestic market is then secure in Egyptian hands, there would moreover be every opportunity to move on to the export of ready-made clothing.

CSO: 4500/230

WESTERN SAHARA

NEW MAGHREB EFFORTS TO RESOLVE WAR DESCRIBED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 312, 25 Apr-1 May 83 pp 24, 25

Article by 'Ali Hammadah: "Will the Polisario's Fate Resemble That of the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar?"

Text On 26 February 1983, the Maghreb witnessed a new stage in relations among the three nations of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. This historic stage began with the meeting and discussions which the Algerian president and the Moroccan monarch held on the borders between the two countries, in the context of a general overall meeting that included senior political leaders of the two countries.

It is certain that all observers agreed to describe the meeting as one that had not come about by chance, or as an odd note in the rhythm of the historic relations among all the countries of the area, which since the start of the seventies have been characterized by tension.

Tunisian-Algerian relations have been tense, as have those between Tunisia and Libya and Mauritania and Morocco. Each of those countries has its reasons for the tensions which have arisen.

What is new in the meeting between Bendjedid and Hassan the Second is that preparations for it had been going on for months, specifically since last fall. Observers and people close to the leaders in the two countries were stating, in private meetings far from the limelight, that something between the two countries was being prepared. The visit by Ahmed Bensouda, the counsellor to the Moroccan king, to Algeria, and his lengthy meeting with President Bendjedid, were aimed at putting the final touches on the date and place of the meeting and the agenda of subjects that were to be presented. Although the Algerian Foreign Ministry denied that agreement had been reached over anything, the king's counsellor made statements in a manner that stressed the impending occurrence of a meeting, or at least agreement over a point which would get the countries out of the vortex of regional struggle that had been underway since 1975 and which had developed in a manner that was bringing the international game and the balance between the two superpowers onto the domestic stage of each of the three countries, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania as well.

Preparations with Tunisian Participation

The meeting, therefore, was prepared for with the utmost care. Participating in the preparations for it were Tunisian diplomats, who have been most active

for a number of years and have been seriously trying to firm up relations among the three countries in the foreign and domestic contexts. There are people who analyze the orientations of Tunisian diplomacy as a quest to banish the specter of Libyan intervention in its affairs by surrounding itself with a network of organic relations and political and economic integration with Algeria and Morocco. This effort is being made in response to the need to have Tunisia exist in a friendly environment which is sympathetic to its particular situation, as it waits for an emergency to occur and the actual struggle for succession to President Bourguiba to begin.

There is an obvious explanation for Algeria's incentives which lays out a framework for the need to reach agreement and cooperate with Morocco.

First, Algeria has been finding that the Sahara war has gone on a long time and has gone beyond the boundaries that were set out for it originally. In addition, it has not produced profound political results. From the military aspect as well, for a year, since Morocco established the defensive triangle to protect the basic area in the Sahara, the war has no longer been adequate and the military machine of the Polisario Front has not been able to conduct operations of any magnitude which could be considered to have the effect of deeply disturbing Morocco.

Second, the current Algerian regime considers that it must eliminate all obstacles in the way of the country's economic and social progress, especially obstacles which the current regime inherited from the late President Boumediene. The war is very expensive, even though Algeria and Libya are dividing its expenses between themselves. The hemorrhaging is directly affecting the Algerian productive system and is striking at the core of the social relationships that govern that nation, which visualize, in the problem of the Western Sahara, a likely example of national or racial movement which the Berbers could carry out in the future in the framework of their demand for some sort of independence or something similar.

Third, while Algeria considers itself a democratic and progressive country, that does not prevent extremist Islamic religious movements from arising in the context of the rising religious wave in various areas of Islamic and Arab countries. The issue of extremist religious movements poses a serious problem to the country as a country and the regime as a regime, and the problem goes beyond geographical boundaries and thus becomes a matter common to neighboring countries which are being distracted by a war that is not theirs.

Morocco's Situation Is Like Algeria's

Algerian officials state that Algeria's incentives are quite sufficient to prompt its president, Chadli Bendjedid, to make a move toward peace with Morocco, within the limits of the commitment in principle to the rights of the people of the Western Sahara and the support provided to the Polisario front, which must also get out of its historic dilemma.

Conversely, when AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI asked a high level Moroccan diplomat in Western Europe about Morocco's incentives for seizing an opportunity for peace and continuing with it to the end, he said,

"Morocco's situation is somewhat similar to Algeria's. It entered the war in a manner that was not carefully studied, and the regional and domestic position of Morocco developed as the crisis developed. In other words, Morocco and Algeria were afflicted by the crisis and were led by it, rather than leading it. As far as Morocco is concerned, the problem here focuses on the length of the crisis, which is being more and more reflected on the domestic situation in Morocco. The costs of the war are exorbitant, the interference of the great powers is increasing in accordance with the magnitude of our requirements for weapons and the money needed to buy them, and crisis has started to appear in the form of social and economic problems and trade union and student conflicts. Morocco is a stable country, but, because of the war, and the length of it, it may begin to face a variety of shocks resulting from the fact that the arena is a vacuum as far as big power intervention goes."

In another area, the Moroccan diplomat considers, "Moroccan-Algerian detente will have the effect of reflecting positively on relations among the other countries in North Africa." In response to a question on the future of relations, he said, "The train is on the right track and the rest will come easily, except for the issue of Polisario, which might distress Algeria a little; it is not easy for a party to withdraw from a war when it consists of two parties."

In a meeting, a high-level Saudi official, responding to a question on the Saudi role in the Moroccan reconciliation, told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI:

"Saudi Arabia has striven from the beginning to have a reconciliation, and King Fahd has been and still is a basic intermediary between the two countries."

The Saudi official stated that Saudi Arabia has presented an outline for an agreement to put a final end to the war. He summarized this outline, which is still secret, as a plan to divide the benefits of the Western Sahara up among all the countries in the area in a just, rightful manner. These countries could be Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. The effort is to be made to establish a unified Saharan-Mauritanian state, on grounds that they are the parties closest to a bilateral settlement between themselves.

On this basis, a difficult question remains hanging: will the political destiny of Polisario be similar to the end the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar met, following the settlement policies that relations between South Yemen and the Gulf countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, came up with?

11887
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KHALIL AL-WAZIR DISCUSSES PLO'S LATEST POLITICAL POSITION

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 1 May 83 p 8

[Interview with Khalil al-Wazir by Ahmad Mahjub: "Abu Jihad in Exclusive Interview With 'UKAZ: Israeli Rejection of U.S. Plant Is Tantamount to Clinging to Continued Occupation; Nature of Palestinian Leadership Action Is Collective and Mandatory; Israel's Continued Occupation of Lebanon Is Crack in U.S. Credibility; We Have Disagreed with Jordan Because Reagan's Plan Does Not Meet Our Needs"--date and place not specified]

[Text] In an exclusive statement to 'UKAZ, Khalil al-Wazir, alias Abu Jihad, said that his visit to the kingdom is for the purpose of familiarizing the kingdom's officials with the outcome of the meeting held in Tunisia recently by the PLO Executive Committee and by Fatah's Central Committee.

Abu Jihad added that he will present the Palestinian viewpoint developed through these meetings and through the visits made by PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to the Arab capitals.

[Question] The first question was on the nature of the Palestinian movement (at the Arab level).

[Answer] My visit to the kingdom comes as part of the tours of organization members in the Arab countries. A number of members is visiting some of Arab countries in the wake of the series of meetings held by the Palestinian leadership and the PLO Executive Committee and the subsequent meetings by Fatah's Central Committee. At these meetings, there was a comprehensive review of new developments following suspension of the Palestinian-Jordanian dialogue in Amman and the ceaseless visits made by Abu 'Ammar and a number of Palestinian leaders to several countries. As a result of these meetings, visits and political moves, the Palestinian leadership emerged with a number of conclusions. The leadership then decided to send delegations to the Arab countries to discuss with the Arab leaders the nature of these developments and what means can be used to allow the Arab political movement on the international level to continue and not grind to a halt. It is within this framework that the meetings [with Arab leaders] will be held to present the gist of the Palestinian development in this particular phase.

[Question] Can we know the broad lines of the conclusions you have reached?

[Answer] We have reached several convictions, including a conviction of the futility of the current political efforts, even though we still believe in the need to continue the political movement in the international arena under the canopy of safeguarding the principles and goals agreed upon, especially the Fez Arab summit resolutions.

Second, it is necessary to find ways to confront the unjust U.S. campaign against the PLO--a campaign that tries to throw the causes of the failure of U.S. policy to deal with the facts of the situation in the area on the shoulders of the PLO at a time when the picture is becoming totally clear as a result of the Israeli intransigence, beginning with the Israeli authorities' absolute and outspoken rejection of Reagan's plan. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration is trying to throw the blame on our shoulders, while refusing to deal with us and while exerting efforts to reject restoration of the Palestinian people's national right, reject the right to self-determination and reject dealing with the PLO.

This policy of overturning the facts make Israel's rejection of the U.S. plan in light of the given facts a reason for the unjust campaign against the PLO at a time when the entire world is aware that Israeli rejection of the U.S. plan is no more than one of the enemy's motives--an enemy who persists in his intransigence and his refusal to withdraw from Lebanese territory.

This Israeli insistence on continuing the military occupation of Lebanese territory at a time when there have been repeated promises of Israeli withdrawal, which has not taken place, is nothing but an ever-present crack in the credibility of the United States. Moreover, Israel continues its policy of building settlements, confiscating lands in the occupied territories and seeking to entrench the aggressive Zionist presence in the occupied homeland without hearing a truly deterrent word from or seeing a decisive stance on the part of the U.S. administration. We even say that the U.S. administration continues to pamper this intransigent policy.

Why Campaign Against Organization

We assert that the U.S. campaign against the PLO is a campaign seeking to instigate international circles and the Arab area against the organization in order to take away the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people, as Shultz has repeatedly said in his speeches, at a time when everyone knows that the PLO's representation of its people has not come (easily) but after long years of struggle and sacrifices which have imposed this fact--a fact that has received the patronage, support and reaffirmation of our Arab nation. Our Arab nation undoubtedly supports the PLO and has never wavered in this support, regardless of the unjust U.S. campaigns or of the insidious attempts made by U.S. policy.

Oppressive Policies Inside Homeland

The other side discussed what is happening inside the occupied homeland, the continuing Israeli policy of oppression against citizens in the occupied territories and continued Israeli transgressions against the Islamic holy places, such as the attack against al-Aqsa Mosque, al-Ibrahimi Mosque and Hasan Bey Mosque in Jaffa, the attacks against university students and villages and the

well-known poisoning incidents. All these Israeli campaigns are inspired by a spirit of oppression, suppression and aggression against the Palestinian soil and the Palestinian citizens with the aim of seizing the land and evicting its citizens and forcing them to emigrate so that the aggressive Israeli presence can be entrenched.

Why Acts of Oppression?

[The discussions also included] actions that should be initiated at the Arab and international levels to expose these ceaseless Israeli methods of aggression against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. Another issue discussed was that of the Israeli military occupation in Lebanon and the protection and encouragement this occupation provides for continued aggression against the Palestinian camps and Palestinian people where large numbers of Palestinians are kidnapped, murdered and their bodies thrown into orchards, around the cities and villages and in the camps. So far, the number of Palestinians killed in this period is 46, people who were kidnapped from their homes and whose bodies have been dumped in various places. The Israelis continue to provide protection for these acts and crimes which include evicting the Palestinians from the camps and towns in the south and continued attacks on the Palestinians in Beirut--attacks that have included blowing up businesses owned by Palestinians, kidnapping Palestinians and detaining a number of them.

Issues Under Study and Examination

The above was one of the issues discussed and on which conclusions were reached. An action plan has been drawn up to make the necessary contacts in this respect, in addition to exposing the true nature of what is happening there so as to provide all the means possible to deal with it.

Our Decisions are Collective, Not Individual

[Question] Has Fatah given 'Arafat an open mandate to begin a dialogue with Jordan?

[Answer] The truth is that the nature of the Palestinian leadership action is that of a collective leadership. When brother Abu 'Ammar speaks of an issue, he bases his statements on the position of his colleagues and brothers in the leadership with whom he constantly studies the issues. As you know, brother Abu 'Ammar, and the Executive Committee along with him, were elected unanimously by the National Council. The nature of the circumstances facing the Palestinian action usually dictate that the opinion adopted be based on broad consultation. A decision taken by brother Abu 'Ammar comes after constant consultation with his leader, his brothers and also the brother Arab leaders. The closer we follow the path of consultation in light of the given facts and circumstances, the sounder the decision will be. Referring to and consulting with the leaders does not at all constitute a sign of weakness but rather a sign of strength. An opinion reached through broader consultation with the leader is a sounder and more correct opinion. When brother Abu 'Ammar adopts a decision, he relies on the broad base of support that usually takes part in making the decision.

There has been no discussion on the question of giving a mandate because the nature of the Palestinian leadership action is to constantly study the characteristics of the projected issues. The decision is then taken and this decision always guides our political movement.

[Question] (After letting us know the reasons for the suspension of the dialogue), does the organization have conditions for resuming the dialogue with Jordan?

Why We Disagreed With Jordan

[Answer] To put it frankly and clearly, the Palestinian-Jordanian dialogue has been frozen as a result of the difference in the positions vis-a-vis Reagan's plan. The brothers in Jordan find in the plan devices that make it possible to implement immediately and the Palestinian leadership finds that Reagan's plan does not meet the Palestinian national needs, considering that Reagan refuses to deal with the Palestinian rights and with the PLO. This is why we, as a liberation organization, cannot deal with the Reagan plan. We have asserted that the resolution adopted in Fez represent a minimum for the Arab movement and must constitute the basis for joint Palestinian-Jordanian political action in the international arena. When the Jordanian authorities declared their position in the statement they issued, the Palestinian leadership was eager to totally avoid getting involved in replies and reactions. It has even avoided engaging in any side battle out of its concern for the Palestinian-Jordanian relations to continue to be normal. Though we have disagreed on the political position, this does not mean that we embark on a conflict and persist in such a conflict. We must understand each other's positions and must be eager to search for new common factors in order to determine the features of the relations within the future political framework. At present, there is nothing new regarding resumption of the dialogue immediately. But the search continues for new given facts that could constitute grounds for reviving the Palestinian-Jordanian dialogue.

We Have Principles From Which We Don't Swerve

[Question] So the organization has no certain conditions for starting the dialogue with Jordan?

[Answer] The issue is not one of conditions but of a common search for that which is not in conflict with the joint national interests and which safeguards the national rights of our Palestinian people and our Arab cause. On our part, we have underlined the need to use the Fez resolutions as the basis for our political actions and the need to use all the efforts and capability of our Arab nation for greater pressure on the United States so that it will open its eyes to the fundamental facts, namely, the fact that it constantly disregards the PLO and Palestinian national rights. These rights are supported by our Arab nation, which has sacrificed for long years to safeguard them, as it has struggled throughout recent years to safeguard and preserve its principles.

Mainstays of Palestinian Movement

[Question] Does the PLO believe in totally excluding the U.S. role or does it want a U.S. role with conditions, and what are these conditions?

[Answer] When we chart the lines of our political action, we, as the PLO, must rely on a number of mainstays. The first is to provide a united Palestinian position on which the Palestinian political movement can constantly rely.

The second is to give the political movement a broad Arab position supporting this movement. When we, as the PLO, move alone, then it is certain that our voice will be weaker than when we move with support from the Arab position and Arab countries for this political action. This is why we are eager to always have the Arab position on our side and to rely in our international activity on the efforts, backing and support of our Arab nation. The ideal situation is the one in which we rely on a united Palestinian and Arab position. We must not hesitate to enter all spheres and to move in all international arenas to obtain support, backing and understanding for our national rights, especially the European arena by virtue of the role the European countries play in international politics and by virtue of their influence on U.S. policy.

Within this framework, we have always been eager to encourage the Europeans to take the initiative. We have repeatedly declared our encouragement of the positive lines contained in the European initiatives. We still urge all of the European countries, many of whom have begun to understand the nature and truth of the Palestinian people's national rights and some of whom have declared their support for the Palestinians' right to self-determination--to intensify their efforts and expand their activity in order to influence U.S. policy and make the United States listen not only to the Palestinian voice of Arab voice but also to the voice of the world that has turned to supporting the Palestinian people's national rights. We believe that the common Arab effort must be intensified and channelled toward the European countries to encourage and boost their activity so that it may perform its influential role in international politics.

The fourth mainstay is movement in the U.S. arena. The Palestinian and Arab efforts and whatever international efforts can be exerted through the international organizations or by friendly countries--whatever common or bilateral efforts can be exerted in the U.S. arena by all these sides vis-a-vis the U.S. administration--[must be channelled toward] conveying the voice of the truth and of the Palestinian cause to the U.S. administration, to U.S. society and the U.S. public opinion in order to give them more facts on the Palestinian issue and the Palestinian people's tragedy. I believe that we must persist in such a continuous effort and must not abandon it even if the U.S. administration is engaged in an unjust campaign against the PLO and against the Palestinian cause and in an attempt to distort the character of the organization, as we have seen in Reagan's and Shultz' statements.

Why Palestinian-Syrian Differences?

[Question] Is there a possibility that a Syrian-Palestinian summit will be held soon?

[Answer] Regarding the nature of the Palestinian-Syrian relationship, we in the PLO and Fatah have always been eager for the relations to be fraternal and we always seek to develop and enhance these relations and to eliminate any

obstacle that might arise on this path. The days following the Beirut battle abounded with situations in which there was disagreement of opinions between us and the Syrian brothers, whether toward issues of the war in Lebanon, toward the nature of the Palestinian political movement with some Arab countries or the nature of this activity in the European theater. These differences are known and have been followed by the international news agencies. But we have always been eager to embark on dialogue quickly in order to develop joint understanding over the disputed issues. We have repeatedly tried through numerous meetings to explain our viewpoints and convictions on all the issues. Now that the Palestinian National Council has convened, we believe that we have established a strong basis for the resumption of normal relations and for surmounting the problems, which have abounded with abnormal manifestations.

Contacts were initiated after the council's convocation and agreement was reached recently for meetings between Palestinian leaders at various levels with the brother officials in Syria. It is also possible that a meeting will soon take place between President Hafiz al-Asad and Yasir 'Arafat because we believe that top-level Syrian-Palestinian meetings are a must under these circumstances when we find the Zionist danger intensifying, see Israelis amassing their troops in the Lebanese arena and hear the constant Israeli threats that seek to accomplish what the Israelis could not accomplish in the latest battle in Lebanon, namely, to confront the Syrian military force in order to impose the Israeli fait accompli on the Arab nation and to demolish the Arab national military strength so that the Zionist enemy may continue to have the upper hand and that our nation may live in weakness. This is something that the enemy has always sought through his constant attempts to threaten and attack the many parts of our Arab homeland.

Israel alleged that its invasion of Lebanon was aimed at ousting the PLO from Lebanon. The PLO departed 10 months ago, but there has been no withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Rather, it has become clear that this enemy to serve his own interest, to impose the fait accompli, to entrench its aggressive presence and to create a new situation through which the door will be closed to all talk about his enemy's previous occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the occupied homeland. We see the Israeli intransigence in Lebanon in the attempt to impose Israeli conditions on Lebanon to make it open its doors to trade, to make it sign the treaties the Israeli enemy wants to sign, to keep Israeli troops in certain areas and in bases the enemy wants and to create around Israel a security belt consisting of agents such as Sa'd Haddad.

We Will Not Favor Military Option [as published]

Our Arab nation must not neglect the military option and must not slacken in continuing its military preparation to confront the Zionist dangers.

[Question] Now that the Israeli scheme against Lebanon has been implemented, do you think there are other intentions toward Syria?

[Answer] This enemy has gotten us accustomed to his dealing with the Arab fronts separately. Whoever reviews the history of the Zionist aggression throughout the long years of the Arab Palestinian tragedy will find that

primarily this enemy has always relied on two points in scoring his victories: first, dividing the Arab ranks and second, dealing with this or that front separately.

This is what has happened in all the Arab-Israeli confrontations. After isolating the Egyptian force from the Arab nation--a force which this nation has lost since the Camp David Accords--the enemy felt encouraged to deal with the Lebanese arena separately and launched his aggression last year. We saw how the enemy mobilized for that combat all his military forces and capability, his firepower and reinforcements, and how he was able to deal with this arena separately at a time when the other Arab fronts remained silent and did not contribute.

The enemy now wants to deal with Syria separately at a time when the other fronts remain silent or to deal with Jordan separately while the other fronts remain silent. This is something that has happened in the long history of our Arab nation [and is happening] now while the enemy is striking Lebanon, threatening Syria and hitting Iraq with his aircraft.

Confrontation on Syrian Front Expected

We must keep a salient fact in sight, namely, that this enemy cannot be deterred. He is always the one that determines the time, the place and the right conditions. When the circumstances are opportune, this enemy does not hesitate to launch his aggression. This is the enemy's constant policy. How can we make this enemy always think twice before embarking on a new step? This is our duty now. We constantly expect this enemy to try to score more victories through new attacks against Syria and against the Palestinian revolution in the Lebanese arena. We also find the Israeli forces amassing more troops and strongly reinforcing their positions in the areas facing the frontlines. We also hear the threats made by the Israeli minister of defense and other officials. These threats seek first to further intimidate the Arab area and, second, to blackmail this area in an attempt to achieve this presence in Lebanon--and, third, to stir battles that will divert the Arab nation's attention from talking about the territories this enemy has seized in earlier phases. This is the enemy's constant policy.

[Question] Will George Shultz meet with any Palestinian officials or West Bank mayors?

Facts Denied by Reagan

[Answer] I have not heard of this. But it is evident that when Shultz arrived in the area, he came within the framework of the campaign against the PLO. He and Reagan are trying to separate the Palestinian people in the occupied territories from the PLO and the Palestinians abroad. The U.S. administration is perfectly aware, through the reports sent by the U.S. press correspondents and through the administration's political missions, of the fundamental fact that the Palestinian people at home and abroad are a single unit that supports the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of this people. The attempt of U.S. policy to separate the Palestinians at home from the Palestinians abroad

has not succeeded. The Israeli enemy has tried throughout the past phases to divide the people at home and abroad but the answer has always come from the heart of the occupied homeland in ceaseless demonstrations and strikes and in statements issued by all the national organizations--demonstrations, strikes and statements that the entire world has followed. This answer is in effect that these people support the PLO leadership, consider the PLO their sole legitimate representative and will not back down on this support for their organization, no matter what means of oppression and terrorization the Israeli policy resorts to--means that have proven fruitless. The fundamental fact that these people are a single unit at home and abroad is becoming more evident daily, has been reflected in numerous events throughout the past period and has been conveyed by the media. Shultz will constantly hear from our people in the occupied territories what he has been hearing from Palestinian groups everywhere. This is why their attempts to separate and divide the Palestinian ranks will not succeed, no matter what their efforts.

[Question] Don't you think that there will be a meeting between the West Bank mayors and Shultz?

[Answer] Even if such a meeting takes place, Shultz will hear from them frankly that the Palestinian people inside the occupied territories consider the PLO their spokesman and the representative of their will. We do not at all fear any meeting between any U.S. official and any Palestinian because every Palestinian will certainly speak with the suffering and hardships of his people and will reaffirm the fundamental fact that the PLO reflects the will of the people everywhere.

[Question] What do you expect from the proposals being carried by George Shultz?

[Answer] We have not heard so far any specific and declared proposals within this framework. Rather, Shultz has declared that he has come to obtain an agreement on the Lebanese question. The U.S. administration must not ignore the fundamental facts in the area. The first of these facts is that there can be no solution that disregards the Palestinian people's national rights. There can be no solution without direct dealing with the PLO and the Palestinian people. Why does the U.S. administration persist in disregarding these national rights? The answer depends on the U.S. administration. When this administration learns the facts well, it will reach the start of the path to achieving peace in this area. This area will not know peace as long as injustice continues to be inflicted on the Palestinian people. It will not know peace as long as the Palestinian people's national rights are constantly disregarded. It will not know peace as long as the United States continues to disavow Arab aspirations.

[Question] How does the PLO perceive the possibility of (achieving) a collective Arab position when there are sides that have reservations about the Arab plan itself?

[Answer] First, there were no reservations on the Arab plan in Fez. There was Arab consensus on the Fez resolutions. The Palestinian position has been clear. In its latest session, the Palestinian National Council adopted decisions approving [the Fez] resolutions as a minimum for the Arab political movement

and drawing attention to the need not to neglect the Arab military option. These decisions have been approved by all Palestinian sides. Through this fact, the Palestinian establishment has asserted within the current given facts and conditions that division and weakness cannot make the organization's enemies respond to Palestinian and Arab national goals. Although we may initiate political activity, our voice will be weak unless we also rely on the Arab military capability, on the unity of this capability and on the Arab military effort. We stress the need for an Arab meeting that will not neglect the military option and that will draw up the lines for uniting the Arab military effort so that the enemy will have many things to think about. If the political option produces no definite results, then there is the possibility of the military option to scare the enemy and to make him think twice before doing anything.

We Adhere to Fez Resolutions

After the Fez summit resolutions were issued as a minimum unanimously approved by the Arab nation, we have seen in the Arab arena the attempt to bypass the Fez resolutions and to accept the Reagan plan. Our position toward this issue has been firm, namely, that we must adhere to the Fez resolutions as a minimum and that the Arab nation must be careful not to respond to the constant U.S. pressures trying to impose on us one concession after another without our getting anything solid in return. Our experience with the credibility of the United States is a long experience. There is our experience in Lebanon and our experience with the Sabra and Shatila massacres, despite all the U.S. promises to guarantee the safety of the Palestinian camps after the departure of the Palestinian resistance, and other experiences. All we hope for is to find from all the Arab sides true commitment to the Fez resolutions. If there is another line of thinking, then it must be submitted to an Arab summit so that it can define its position toward it.

Relationship With Egypt

[Question] Are there specific contacts with Egypt and what about the idea of Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Cairo?

[Answer] The Palestinian National Council did adopt resolutions on the relationship with Egypt. These resolutions have been misunderstood and misinterpreted. But we say that many of our brothers in Egypt have talked about these resolutions. These resolutions are not intended to undermine or to interfere in domestic affairs. Rather, they are intended to underline the Palestinian position, which clings to the principles that we believe form the basis for safeguarding the Palestinian right. They especially underline the Palestinian position vis-a-vis the Camp David policy, which the Palestinian National Council has demanded be abandoned. The Arab, especially Palestinian, loss with Egypt's departure from the Arab ranks encouraged the Zionist enemy to deal separately with the Palestinian revolution and with the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples in the last year's battles. We must, as the Palestinian National Council resolutions state, study thoroughly and profoundly how to deal with Egypt. Studies are currently underway to continue consultations with the sincere people concerned to find the way that can make the Egyptian role an effective role in supporting the Palestinian cause.

[Question] It is noticed that at times the PLO establishes strong and excellent relations with one Arab country while its relations with most of the other Arab countries turn lukewarm. We then find after a while that disagreement develops with this country and that the disagreement intensifies, the relations are severed and the campaigns start. The PLO then tries rapprochement with another Arab country. What is your comment?

[Answer] As a fundamental principle, we in the PLO and the Palestinian revolution are fully and constantly eager to have normal and fraternal relations with all Arab countries, relations based on mutual respect and nonintervention in the affairs of these countries. This is a main principle that we have established for ourselves. At times, there are outstanding relations with some Arab countries, especially countries adjacent to the occupied homeland. We are also eager for these relations to be normal. If we can entrench them in order to provide all facilities to the Palestinian struggle, then we do so. But we should not forget that conflict does develop at times. We are primarily eager for the Palestinian decision to be independent. This does not mean making the decision in isolation. It means a decision taken by studying the Palestinian circumstances and through consultations with the Arab brothers. The decision may at times please some Arab sides and not others, and so the latter launch their campaigns against us. Within this framework, we can do nothing but try to avoid the problem with this or that side. Our problem with Libya is at times the problem of constant accusations, of Libya urging us to commit suicide, as it did during the war, and of (dealing with us as if it were a professor of politics). All this is unacceptable to us. This is where the campaigns against us start. Believe me, our main concern vis-a-vis any side trying to confront us with its political or propaganda campaigns is to avoid such confrontation. Our main slogan is that it is not in our interest in the Palestinian revolution to engage in any peripheral battles. We have been eager constantly to avoid all peripheral battles because they always come at the expense of the main effort against the enemy. We have so many burdens in confronting the Israeli enemy, the Israeli dangers, the constant Israeli aggression against and suppression of our people in the occupied Palestinian territories and we have so many duties that preoccupy us totally and that should preoccupy not only us but the entire Arab nation. All our efforts must be consumed within this framework. Any peripheral battles divert our attention and limit our ability to do so and we are most eager to avoid such distractions. This is our constant approach. We say that even if some problems emerge at times, our constant aim is to overstep and bypass such battles because we need all the Arab efforts from the farthest part of the Arab Maghreb to the farthest part of the Arab East. We need to have the Arab ranks stand united and strong behind us so that we can proceed confidently, capably and strongly to perform our struggle duties and to confront the Zionist danger that is aimed against the entire Arab nation.

[Question] The main question facing every loyal and faithful Arab is: Can the difficult Arab circumstance and can this Arab fragmentation and division lead us to the point of capitulation as a result of despair and the constant frustration of the efforts?

[Answer] The answer is that every believer faithful to his Arabism, Islam and cause always uses the bitterness of the engulfing situation as a motive and

incentive for greater efforts. What is required in this phase is a further intensification of the efforts to deal with our problems and to overcome this bitter and divided Arab situation. What is required is intensification of the efforts toward unification of the Arab line. The steps taken in the Arab Maghreb by Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are a model that we should be eager to follow in the Arab East, regardless of the intensity of the existing local conflicts. We have in the Zionist dangers threatening us a stronger motive for speeding up unification of the Arab efforts and Arab force to confront these dangers. We also consider the spirit of cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council and within the framework of Arab cooperation a source of strength for the Arab nation.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

VISIT TO PLO HEADQUARTERS IN TUNISIA; INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL FATAH

Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 12-14 Apr 83

/12 Apr 83 pp 1, 5/

/Text/ Introduction. For the first time an Indonesian journalist has succeeded in covering the life of Palestinian guerrillas in Tunisia and Algeria. Nasir Tamara, a SINAR HARAPAN correspondent, in addition to obtaining permission to interview and hold discussions with PLO leaders and senior figures, also was able to see, at first hand, PLO headquarters and military camps in Tunisia. His articles on this subject appear below--Editor.

Hotel Salwa, Tunis--The blue sea and sky could be seen from the Hotel Salwa. The Mediterranean Sea was calm and had only small waves on it. This was in sharp contrast with the wave of feelings experienced by the residents of this hotel, the world headquarters of the PLO. Of course, the PLO has troops in many areas and has diplomatic mission in many countries. However, this is the control center for all of their operations now. From here the whole strategy of the struggle for Palestine is controlled. This is the capital city in exile for those who have their own country in a vision, as it were. For the time being.

From the boulevards of Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, to this place it takes about 30 minutes. On the wide, smooth highway, the traffic is always heavy because it is the main road to southern Tunisia. Across the road from a railroad station, about 7 kilometers from the small city of Soleiman, after we turn left and take a small road for about 1 kilometer, we reach our destination.

In front of the gate leading into the garden of the Hotel Salwa there is a guard post. Every day two Tunisian police officers in their dark blue uniforms take turns at the guard post. Three or four civilians accompany them. They have their weapons at the ready. They carry short, automatic weapons. About 20 meters from that point a tank is stationed. There are certainly more of them hidden behind the nearby, leafy trees--day and night.

For 5 days in a row I went back and forth, morning and afternoon--and sometimes at night--in order to speak to the PLO leaders. At first I was always ordered

to get out of the automobile I was traveling in. I was given a body search, and my card of introduction was noted. After they got to know me, they were friendly and informal in manner. Without much difficulty I was invited to enter the hotel. The fully armed Palestinian guards who were on duty at the door to the Hotel Salwa finally got to know me also. However, each time they telephoned ahead on their mobile radio, reporting my arrival to the security officer.

Usually, any reporter who wants to write about the PLO must introduce himself to the PLO Foreign Relations Section, which is headed by Mahmud Labadi. It is this section which will arrange the schedule which the reporter asks for. Then they contact the people who are charged with providing information. However, because it is an official body, this section is also an official mouthpiece for the PLO leadership. The information which it provides reflects the perceptions which the PLO wants to provide to other people.

I made use of this channel of information. However, by opening up other channels, through personal contacts with PLO leaders, I added to the possible sources of information. Fortunately for me, I had opened up the right channels the time I was in Europe, through reporter friends and university students who had contacts with the PLO leadership. I began this kind of contact from Paris and then continued to develop it in Italy, Algeria, and Tunisia.

The first successful contact which opened up the doors of PLO Headquarters began with a meeting at the PLO Embassy in Algiers. I was received by their military leader, Maj Ainu Somara. After waiting almost 1 week they agreed to meet me. There were several meetings. Finally, they had no more suspicions and believed that I intended to write about the PLO. Indeed, from Algiers they telephoned to PLO Headquarters, reporting my planned arrival in Tunis.

I heard the sentence: "Colonel, this is an Indonesian reporter who wants to write about us. Please help him." Shortly after that the answer was translated by Mokhtar, their press attache in Algiers. He said: "You will be received by Col Abdul Razak there. The colonel promises to open the door as wide as possible for you. He will also introduce you to our chairman, Yasir Arafat, for an interview when he is in Tunis.

Highly Secret

The Hotel Salwa was a holiday resort for Europeans in Tunis. A three-story building, the hotel is occupied by more than 200 members of the PLO. Of course, these are people who hold important positions. The hotel is painted white, and the windows of the rooms face the sea or the swimming pool. The rooms are clean and pleasant. The size of the rooms varies. The hotel also has a dining room, a bar, a sports center, and a number of other facilities generally found at tourist hotels.

The food and drinks are handled entirely by Tunisians. Whoever wants to drink coffee or tea must pay for it. At mealtimes the food is set out on long tables. However, it is also permitted to take food to the various rooms. It is easy to distinguish between uniformed hotel employees and the staff of PLO Headquarters. Most of them are in civilian clothing. Only those responsible for

security matters wear green, military clothing and carry weapons either slung over their shoulders, in holsters at the waist, or in the back pockets of their trousers.

The hotel is equipped with telephones and telex facilities. The activity in the communications rooms never stops. Incoming reports and information which must be sent out never let up. Those who are staying at the hotel and those visiting there are always changing. There is a high degree of mobility. While we were there we were always meeting people who had just arrived and others who were about to leave. They moved about quickly, without any ceremony, and without welcome or farewell parties.

The taking of photographs at the hotel and immediate vicinity is completely prohibited.

The Tunisian Government provides the hotel facilities free of charge to the PLO. The government also finds accommodations for staff members who do not live at the hotel. There are many of them. There are about 4,000 PLO personnel in Tunisia.

While they wait for a resolution of their status, Palestinian boys and girls are sent to schools in Tunisia. This leads to some problems. Here the languages used are Arabic and French. While they were in Lebanon the children spoke Arabic or, more frequently, English in school.

What kind of identity card do they use while they are in Tunisia? Of course, the Tunisian Government issues a kind of identity card. If PLO members need to go abroad, they use an identity document like a Palestinian passport. For Arab countries and other countries which are friendly to the Palestinian cause there is no problem. This identity document is recognized. However, in many countries throughout the world this document is not accepted. "A Palestinian passport? Where is Palestine?" This is the reaction of immigration officials in many countries. If this happens, they are often deported immediately before they leave the immigration section at an international airport or harbor.

Col Abdul Hakim, 37 years old, and a graduate of the Indian Army Command School, says: "That is one of a thousand problems which we deal with at this headquarters." Other problems are budget planning, personnel management, pay, military training, logistics questions, purchasing, storing and maintaining military equipment, diplomatic questions, relations with the Arab world and with other countries, and so forth.

Col Abdul Hakim, who talked to me for almost 2 hours in his office in the Hôtel Salwa, works steadily without paying attention to the time. Like his friends and associates. They wake up in time for morning prayers subuh and often don't get to bed until past midnight. Their work has not become any easier since they have come to Tunisia but, in fact, has become far harder. Coordination of the 12,000 Palestinian soldiers who were forced to leave Lebanon after the Israeli occupation in the middle of 1982 is not an easy matter. Contact must also be maintained with PLO soldiers in Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.

It is very difficult to get to know the organizational structure at this center of PLO government activity. We know clearly enough that the president is Yasir Arafat, and we know the position of a number of other PLO international figures. But who are the cabinet ministers and who are the directors general of the ministries? The PLO remains an organization which is organized in clandestine form. One helpful way to keep properly informed is to meet the right people, but it is also helpful to use one's instincts. Mahmud, from the PLO Foreign Relations Section, says: "Sorry, but we can't provide information on our organization. You know that our enemy, Israel, has a strong secret service organization, Mossad. Many of our leaders have been killed by Mossad. However, I am sure that you have met the right people already." Sartawi, one of the people in the PLO Foreign Relations Section, was shot dead on 11 April in Spain.

From Beirut to Tunis

PLO personnel have been in Tunis since they were forced to leave Beirut on a gradual basis at the end of August, 1982. Their departure after an unequal struggle against Israel took place after difficult diplomatic negotiations which involved the superpowers, the parties to the conflict, and the Arab countries. The departure of PLO personnel began with the arrival of troops from three countries: the United States (their forces arrived on 25 August), and later France and Italy. Yasir Arafat, the PLO leader who is also called Abu 'Ammar, was in the last group to go, leaving Beirut on 30 August on the Greek ship "Atlantic" with a very strong personal guard.

Col Abdul Hakim, who was responsible for the reorganization of the PLO, said: "We are only here for a while. Now we are carrying out a new strategy while we implement a large-scale reorganization of the PLO." He rejected the view that now is a time of rest for the PLO after the period of hostilities. He said: "It was a very bitter experience, leaving Beirut. In fact there were 25,000 of us. We were never defeated in battle against the Israeli Army, which totalled more than 100,000, had American military advisers, and was equipped with the most modern weapons. Many of these new weapons were still undergoing testing and were prohibited from being used in hostilities. For nearly 2 months the Israeli Army made very slow progress. Their military experts admitted that. However, as we didn't want the 200,000 civilian residents of Beirut to be wiped out (because of the war), we agreed to move."

He continued: "In Tunisia we are treated very well by the Tunisian Government and people. However, in any case, if I had to choose, I would have preferred for us to stay in Beirut. We were so close there to our country, Palestine. There we had organized an army. There we were closer to our brothers and our friends. However, I can't complain. These are the hazards of war. I believe we will win, although we will have to wait a long time," he added.

PLO foreign relations activity, their diplomatic effort, has been given high priority at the present time. It can be said that Yasir Arafat himself is in Tunis less than 1 week out of every month. He is always traveling. Following his tracks is very difficult. Even at this headquarters there are only one or two people who know where he is. I just read on the telex that he had left North Yemen, for example. Just now we heard he was in Japan. Col Abdul Razak,

who is chief of staff of the PLO Army, said: "If he were here and if there were not other, highly important matters to see to, he would certainly be very happy to meet you."

Finance

As is the case with many liberation organizations, the PLO also experiences problems with its finances. Whereas previously they had an easy time getting financial help from Arab countries like Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, since the oil price crisis has come up, help from those countries is declining. In the present, difficult circumstances, Algeria helps them a great deal, as is the case with Tunisia, which, although it is a poor country, is willing to extend a helping hand. PLO Headquarters is a very busy place. Every day they have to spend money.

Another PLO colonel said: "However, in any case our main source of funds is from Palestinians. Our sense of solidarity is very high. Every person who works contributes 20 percent of his salary to the struggle fund. We try as well as we can to handle our budget."

With the total number of troops approaching about 30,000, spread out in many countries and with civilians to take care of, not to mention the cost of weapons and transportation charges for PLO leaders flying from one country to another, one can image how much money is needed by this organization. Capt Abu Jihad Haymura, a headquarters security officer said, showing us a copy of the February, 1983, issue of LIFE magazine, which carried his photo: "No, we do not receive a salary. We get enough money to live on and continue the struggle."

Although there are a thousand problems to deal with, it appears that relations among the PLO comrades here are very close. They carry out their duties with complete determination. The physical condition of all of them is good. Here they get enough food and have adequate training and other facilities. Husin, an intelligence officer trained in Spain, said: "This is important so that we can continue to be ready for action. At times we may receive an order here to leave Tunis and go somewhere else."

At headquarters an attitude of seriousness stands out clearly. PLO personnel are nothing like rebel and terrorist groups as they are frequently described in many publications. Among the people whom I met it appeared that they were well-educated, had a high sense of discipline, and had clear, ideological views.

Many of the staff members here are accompanied by members of their families, including their wives and children. In this connection when they first arrived in Tunisia, there were only men. Little by little their wives and children came to Tunis from Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan, after a long and tiring journey. However, there are also PLO personnel who have had no news from their families since they left Beirut. This was particularly so after the mass killings took place at the Sabra and Shatilla camps, which were carried out by rightwing Lebanese soldiers, with the cooperation of the Israeli Army. The arrival of their families clearly raised their morale, although from the cost point of view, this has certainly kept PLO Headquarters busy.

Suspicions Regarding the PLO

PLO Headquarters is forced to accept the fact that its forces are now widely scattered. Certainly, headquarters would feel more comfortable if its forces were assembled in one place, in the interest of facilitating communications. However, headquarters is forced to accept the situation as it is. There isn't a single Arab country which would be willing to receive all of the PLO troops. They are afraid that PLO forces might later emerge as a political force which would become a state within a state. The example of Palestinian power in Lebanon before the Israeli attack is still fresh in their minds.

To avoid incidents, PLO Headquarters has ordered all of its troops and staff members to adopt a defensive attitude and to avoid provoking action which might lead to their destruction. They don't want their troops in one country to be attacked by the armed forces of that country. The slaughter of Palestinians in Jordan in the 1970's is an example which still stands out in their minds. One of the major problems of PLO Headquarters is that they do not know exactly how long they will have to remain in the present situation.

There are several views of this problem. One of them emphasizes the importance of carrying out the Fez Peace Plan, which was adopted by the Palestinian National Council (the PLO parliament in exile). Another view advocates that they immediately return in secret to Jordan or Syria.

At PLO Headquarters it is felt that, although the majority of those working here are supporters of Yasir Arafat of the al-Fatah group, there are also others who come from other groups, such as the George Habash group. If there is a difference of opinion, a meeting is always held. Often the meeting drags on endlessly until a decision is arrived at, which will satisfy all groups concerned. This is a democratic procedure. It should not be forgotten that the PLO consists of a union of Palestinian organizations.

However, I observed how much the leadership of Yasir Arafat is respected here. He is clearly the supreme leader. He is the man who has the last word in all matters. Although he is rarely here in Tunis, this doesn't mean he is not kept informed. Yasir Arafat's secretariat, which is directed by Dr Ramzi, is always busy, even though Yasir Arafat is not here. Whenever there is a meeting of the top PLO leaders from the countries where the PLO is located, it is always Yasir Arafat who presides over it, and it is held in a room designated for the purpose.

Yasir Arafat, "the old man," as the Palestinians call him, is treated as the captain of the ship. PLO Headquarters in Tunis is his principal ship. The other ships must accept the orders of the flagship. In an organization like this one it is not easy to know the direction he wants to take in the course of the struggle, although we know the principal objective: to establish a democratic, Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem.

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Madjez-el-Bab--Spring has come to Tunisia. From the window of the station wagon we are traveling in we can see leaves starting to sprout in bushes alongside the

road. Yellow and white wild flowers are growing among the green shrubs. Madmud suddenly says, breaking the silence: "Tunisia. This country is really beautiful. As beautiful as my country, Palestine!" I look at his face. His long, pock-marked face reflects the anguish of a terrible longing.

We don't speak after that. The olive and date trees grow on the left and right hand side of the road. One or two shepherds look at our car, which quickly moves past them. We were on the way to a Palestinian military camp in Tunisia located near Medjez-el-Bab, about 50 minutes' drive east of Tunis, capital of the Republic of Tunisia. The mountainous terrain near here was beautiful to see. The green of the countryside was very light in color, compared with the green of Indonesia. A view like this would be called barren by Indonesians, but it is beautiful to the Palestinians, whose own country, for the most part, is composed of sandy soil.

For 10 days I had been waiting for this day. After getting past a number of obstacles I had finally succeeded in obtaining a permit to visit soldiers of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Tunisia. However, before I reached the place, my heart was not overjoyed. It had been so difficult to obtain the permit. And anyone at all who didn't agree with issuing the permit could have found some small excuse which could have prevented my making the trip today. With a letter written by Col Abdul Razak in Arabic on a slip of white paper; escorted by Mahmud, a young man who had graduated from a university in the United States, and by Mohamad, a graduate of a university in the Soviet Union, who was acting as a courier, with both of them interpreting for me with Palestinians, I still had some doubts in my heart.

Mohamad said to our chauffeur, a Tunisian, in Arabic: "Turn right up ahead. And go slowly." It was 11:40 am. On the left side of the road was a small lake surrounded by hills. On the right side of the road we passed a strip of land about 100 meters long which had been flattened by a road-roller. To the left and right of us were five green-uniformed soldiers carrying light weapons over their shoulders who ordered us, clearly but politely, to get out of the car. They had no badges of rank.

When we got out of the car, two soldiers came out of a tent which had been set up on the left side of the barbed-wire entrance gate like those we were accustomed to find in military camps. They checked our letter of introduction. Then they asked what our purpose was in coming. I showed them the letter from PLO Headquarters. After this was read and discussed at some length, a soldier wearing glasses reentered the tent. He reported to the officer in charge of communications. They immediately telephoned to another office in the camp.

We waited outside the camp for 15 minutes. The camp security officer apparently was not in his office. From outside the camp we eventually heard a field telephone ring, followed by a short conversation in Arabic. The soldier with glasses came out again and asked Mohamad something. They appeared to be discussing some matter, apparently regarding our permit. I began to feel some concern that I would not be allowed to enter the camp. Indeed, considering the rudimentary character of their organization and the fact that there was a reorganization going on in the PLO, this might occur.

But finally we were permitted to enter the camp. Supriadi, third secretary and information and cultural attache at the Indonesian Embassy, who was accompanying me, seemed relieved. Thayeb, our ambassador to Tunisia and younger brother of Hadi Thayeb, governor of Aceh Province, had asked me to invite one of our diplomats in the embassy to come along with me if I succeeded in visiting a PLO military camp. Our embassy in Tunisia, the headquarters of the Arab League after it moved from Cairo, has to keep busy in this country. Especially as the PLO is treated by the Tunisian Government and other Arab countries as an honored guest. I was happy to accommodate the ambassador's request.

False Report Denied

Since the PLO set up its headquarters in Tunisia and since Tunisia became the place of refuge for about 2,000 (?) [question mark as published] Palestinian soldiers, there have been many conflicting reports about them. One version was that after the soldiers came, they would only stay for a few days. After that, in groups of two or three at the most, they would leave Tunisia to return once again to countries bordering on Israel like Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. In other words, by now there would be no Palestinian troops in Tunisia!

Reports like that were widespread because not many people have ever visited the Palestinian military camp. If this is true, then the people at PLO Headquarters or in the PLO Foreign Relations Section were right in saying that I was the only Indonesian reporter, accompanied by the first Indonesian diplomat, to visit the PLO military camp. We might be added to the group of people--their number could be counted on the fingers of one hand--who have been permitted to visit the camp. They gave me the permit because they thought I sincerely wanted to know about their situation and because they also hoped that through me the Indonesian people might learn about their situation. They knew that our government and people sympathized with them in their struggle to establish a Palestinian state.

After walking about 80 meters on foot, we arrived in front of a house. We were invited to enter. It was difficult to know what were the positions and ranks of those receiving us, for they had no badges of rank on their uniforms. We waited about 15 minutes. Several PLO military personnel accompanied us. I asked the interpreter, Mahmud, what was going on. In fact I could have asked the question directly in English or French of some of the soldiers there. However, for the time being I accepted the rules of the game that every question and answer must be handled by the interpreter in Arabic. It seemed that the headquarters people were afraid that the soldiers would speak frankly and not diplomatically enough to reporters. However, in a subsequent conversation we also had direct questions and answers: some officers answered directly and also asked questions in English.

Friday Prayers

It appeared that the military commander was not in his office, as it was time for Friday prayers. It was not until 1:00 pm that they were able to receive us for an interview. I was asked whether I also wanted to attend Friday prayers. I answered, of course. This was a good opportunity to get to know how the

Palestinian soldiers lived, in a more detailed way. A soldier brought us to a newly constructed building made of "prefabricated" cement blocks which had just been assembled. The building was used for Firday prayers.

There were already several people in the building when we arrived. I looked left and right for a place to wash. There was no water in sight there. I wondered whether they did not wash before praying. Impossible! My guess was right. Seeing that I was puzzled, looking for water to wash in, a soldier came up to me and, without saying anything, invited me to go outside. We went to a three-story building painted white. The building was old and looked like a school. This time I was like an illiterate, as the two interpreters and Supriadi from the Indonesian Embassy were not with me. They were waiting in the office of the military commander.

On the second floor of the building we turned to the right and entered a room. Several people were seated there, listening to a radio. A woman vocalist was singing a sentimental song. I was introduced. We talked for about 15 minutes. They talked about themselves. One of the people in the room, Ibrahim, was the imam and led the prayers on that Friday.

Of course, their bathroom was a public bathroom. There were several toilets that were clogged up, which smelled bad. However, in general it was clean. There was running water and enough electric light there. There was also a heater. From their point of view the condition of their quarters was rather good. Their needs were satisfied. There were three, four-story buildings, each of which had enough space for hundreds of men. In addition there were old buildings and dozens of new buildings which had just been completed. The smell of paint was still noticeable, and scraps of building materials could be seen here and there between piles of dirt left over from the construction of foundations for the buildings.

Will They Stay Long?

If you look at the construction of buildings replacing tents which have been used up to now, it looks as if the soldiers are here for a long time. According to my calculations, I felt that this military camp could take care of more than 2,000 soldiers. Clearly, this was an orderly and disciplined military camp. It was not a place for a guerrilla army which must move around continuously.

After they left Beirut the Palestinian soldiers were stationed in several countries: North Yemen, South Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia. Of course, this does not mean that the places where Palestinian soldiers were stationed in Syria, Jordan, and Iraq were abandoned. Only those in Lebanon were forced to leave that country after the Israeli occupation in the middle of 1982. Almost all of the Palestinian troops in Tunisia are former fighters who previously controlled Beirut. In Tunisia the soldiers have already been trained and have combat experience. Those who have just begun their military service are stationed and trained at the military camp in Tebessa, Algeria, which can be reached by road in about 6-8 hours from the camp in Tunisia. It appears that arrangements were made so that the two military camps would not be too far from each other, although they are located in two different countries. It is

estimated that there are about 2,000 Palestinian soldiers in Algeria, while the number in the two Yemen's cannot be stated with certainty.

The soldiers here are of various ages. It is believed that many of them are under 15 years of age. However, there are more than a few who are close to 60. Relations among the soldiers are very close. They call each other the equivalent of "brother" /"saudara"/ in our language. There is no sign of strict military courtesy /saluting/. However, this does not mean that the state of discipline is slack. The sentences for those who violate discipline and the strict orders common in the Palestinian army are well known. Not even one woman was to be seen at the army camp.

Each day the soldiers go through continuous training to keep themselves in good physical condition. Military subjects are taught, along with other matters. Courses and lectures continue to make sure their morale is maintained. The leaders have given careful thought to one matter which might harm their morale: the feeling of homesickness and being far from their country, Palestine.

Although when they were in Lebanon, they were not in their own country, they were relatively close to family and friends, and Palestinian territory occupied by Israel was not too far away. No one knows--and it is difficult to say--how long they will be in Tunisia. However, they must always be ready to be sent anywhere, any time. It's not easy!

It's Enough

Of course, there is considerable difference in the background of these soldiers. Some were engineers, small merchants, hotel employees, mechanics, carpenters, unemployed, and so forth. Those who were in Lebanon the longest were of course those who had joined the armed forces of the al-Fatah organization under Yasir Arafat, which became the PLO in 1968. The newest soldiers are those who joined up at the time of the Lebanese civil war and when the PLO had its headquarters and military camps in that country.

Ibrahim, who was the imam leading prayers on that Friday, is a former student at an electronics school in Cairo. After he completed his studies, he joined the PLO. In his sermon on that Friday he emphasized the need to have a firm belief in God. The way they prayed that Friday is no different from the way followers of the Sunni variant of Islam pray in Indonesia. So I don't have to go into details here. I only noticed that there weren't many people who joined in prayers that day--less than 100 in all. There were many of them who stayed outside, even though the call to prayers was carried on a loudspeaker.

Although the Palestinians are included in the Arab ethnic group and their language is also Arabic, not all of them are Muslims. It is clearly stated in the text of their temporary constitution that the Palestinian state is open to every Palestinian, wherever he may be or whatever his religion. The religious convictions of every person are respected. It is not surprising that Palestinians who are Christians, Jews, or are of other denominations are given the opportunity to practice their religions in accordance with their respective beliefs.

After praying I chatted with several soldiers to get an impression of their feelings. They spoke without hesitation. They even competed to invite me to where they were living. I used the opportunity to look around the whole military camp. Unfortunately, as with military camps everywhere, picture-taking was not permitted. It was very difficult to know how big the whole military camp was. It may have included more than 50 hectares, with a barbed wire fence around it as a sign of the boundary of the military zone. It was located far from where the people live.

Complete control of the camp was in the hands of the PLO. The administration of the military camp was completely handled by PLO soldiers themselves. There was no involvement of the Tunisian Army at all, although in the office of the commander there was a middle-ranking Tunisian officer who was visiting the camp at the time. The needs of the PLO troops are sufficiently met by the Tunisian Government within the limits of their capabilities. At the military camp there were not only soldiers but also weapons and equipment owned by the PLO. Buses and private automobiles were available for travel to PLO Headquarters at the Hotel Salwa on the east side of Tunis.

In general the soldiers whom I interviewed had no complaints about their hosts, the Tunisians. Indeed, the Tunisians were considered friendly people who liked to help them and who had good manners. PLO soldiers and civilians displayed an attitude of self-control. They did not want to be a subject of discussion. They appeared to know that they were there as guests. They were aware that if they did not behave properly, made trouble, or acted impolitely, they would certainly be punished severely.

A Tunisian student who was going to school in Constantine, Algeria, whose home was near PLO Headquarters in Tunis, said on the way between Algiers and Tunis: "At first we welcomed the Palestinian soldiers, but after they were in Tunisia for a few weeks there were several incidents that were not so good. Many of the soldiers have rather crude manners. There are even those who are afraid of them. However, at the time, of course, the soldiers had just come out of combat: they were still affected by a given, psychological atmosphere. After they had been here for a time, they got used to living again in the midst of a community."

A reporter for TAP /Tunis-Africa Press Agency/, the Tunisian press agency, said: "Now there are no problems. The Tunisian press rarely speaks of the PLO here. Finally, we have come to accept their presence here." He was speaking 2 days before we made this visit.

After I had had a good chance to look around, I was invited into the office of the commandant, whose name was Colonel Fatah. He appeared to be absorbed in talking to his associates, Colonel Saadi and Col Abu Saleh. I was introduced. Not long afterward lunch was served, consisting of Italian pasta, chicken, and green-looking vegetables. A very simple meal. We all ate with our hands while sitting on the floor, together, without using plates. I was really hungry. The sun was high in the sky.

/14 Apr 83 p 5/

/Interview with Colonel Fatah, commander of PLO camp in Tunisia, by Nasir Tamara, in Colonel Fatah's office at the camp; date not specified/

Medjez-el-Bab--Yasir Arafat entered the room in the palace of Habib Bourguiba, president of Tunisia. That evening there was a state reception because Chadli Ben Chedid, president of Algeria, was visiting Tunisia for a few days. Yasir Arafat's young-looking face is well-known. Wherever he goes, he never forgets to wear his headcloth with a black pattern on it and his distinctive, white Palestinian clothing. Near him was a middle-aged man wearing a headcloth: this is Thayeb, the Indonesian ambassador to Tunisia. Warmly greeting him in fluent English, Yasir Arafat said: "Thank you, Your Excellency the Indonesian ambassador, for having sent a reporter and one of Your Excellency's diplomats to our headquarters."

Ambassador Thayeb had been looking for us since that night to discuss the meeting with Yasir Arafat. Even though it was short, it was impressive and useful. In an unplanned way the meeting had occurred without his expecting it. Ambassador Thayeb discussed his meeting with Yasir Arafat and authorized me to quote Arafat's comment to him. It was at that time that I learned from the ambassador that a new cabinet had been appointed in Indonesia. I had been busy looking for information on the PLO, and the lack of information on Indonesia in Tunis was the reason I did not know of the new cabinet.

It was only after I had been in Algeria and Tunisia for almost 10 days that Yasir Arafat appeared in Tunis. He had wanted to attend a meeting between two chiefs of state of countries which supported the PLO. Apparently, he was quickly informed about us. I had long since submitted a request to interview the man who is treated as a chief of state in many countries. It was too bad that he was too busy to make the interview possible.

Although this was the situation, it seems he had received reports of my interviews with seven PLO colonels and other important PLO leaders. On the afternoon after I had completed my visit to the PLO military camp, I interviewed the commander, Colonel Fatah. During the interview Colonel Fatah was accompanied by two of his associates, Colonel Saadi, a graduate of a kind of army staff and command school in Egypt, and Col Abu Saleh. The three of them, and especially Colonel Saadi, were well-acquainted with Indonesian history and also with the struggle for Indonesian independence. The interview went off well for more than 1 hour in Colonel Fatah's office.

Behind his desk was a large photo of Yasir Arafat and a Palestinian flag. Several posters on the sufferings of Palestine were hung on the wall. Letters and hand-written notes were neatly stacked on the desk. The office was not very large. However, it had a pair of sofas, and there were many chairs in it. It looked as if this office was never lacked for visitors. Following is the interview:

/Question/ PLO soldiers have been here for more than 6 months. What is their mental state? Frustration? Does this have an effect on their behavior?

Answer Their morale is still high. They are still vigilant against an attack by the Zionist army which could come at any time. They have been ordered to stay alert.

There is a factor which helps us, a very strong feeling of brotherhood among them. Most of them have known each other for a long time. They have fought together on repeated occasions on a number of fronts against Israel in Lebanon. They also have the same objective which strengthens the ties between them, that is to turn the goals of the PLO into facts: to establish a democratic Palestinian state.

Question During the fighting in Lebanon, were many PLO soldiers killed or wounded? How will you replace them? Are you recruiting more soldiers? What conditions are required? May only Palestinians serve?

Answer We are trying to improve the organization of our army. After we were dispersed, we were forced to reorganize. That reorganization is still in process and is not yet complete. Of course, we would be happy to have volunteers. The total strength of our army is needed for a war against Israel. But how can we carry on such a war? It would be difficult because here we are guests of Tunisia. This is not our country. We are not free to do what we would like to do.

We are guests in various countries, including Tunisia. For the time being we are limited to the soldiers we have on hand, and they are only Palestinians. I hope that in the future non-Palestinian volunteers will be attracted to help in our struggle and that we can bring them into our military service. Why not Indonesians also?

Question If a Palestinian state is established in the future, what will be the role of the army? Will the government be controlled by civilians or by the military, as is often the case in the developing countries?

Answer It's too early to answer that question. That's for the future, when we have won and have our own country. We are now engaged in a revolution. I hope that in the future we will have our own country. Please pray for that. The Palestinian Army is a part of the PLO organization. We work shoulder to shoulder with civilians. Furthermore, under the present circumstances every soldier must be able to work as a civilian and vice versa. We are fighting together. Later, the army will certainly be a part of the Palestinian state.

Question There are armies which have been created and organized after many former colonies have successfully obtained their independence without armed conflict. On the other hand there are more than a few armies which have successfully fought for and won their countries' independence, thanks to the armed struggle of the soldiers of these former colonies: China, Algeria, Vietnam, etc. Is there a type of liberation army and a type of ordinary army which is established in time of peace? What is the doctrine of the PLO Army?

Answer We are a revolutionary army. Of course, we are a liberation army. We haven't won our struggle as yet. We have followed various paths, both

military and diplomatic. Of course, there are those who would like to exchange roles. Will we be like the armies which later hold power? I don't know. What is clear is that our country will be led by those who have fought. The Palestinian state which will be established will certainly be a state based on democracy. The man who gets the most votes will certainly have the right to rule through elections. Meanwhile, right now our organization functions in a democratic way.

They Don't Understand Peace

Question The PLO is engaged in a great deal of diplomatic activity. In your view does Israel understand the language of diplomacy? Will pressure from a "super power" (the United States, for example) help the situation the PLO finds itself in?

Answer Israel was founded on the basis of hegemony which was blessed by the "super powers" at the time and still continues because the situation has not changed. In my view Israel will never understand the language of diplomacy and the language of "peace." For them peace means attacks, aggression, and killing. They understand no other language. They have only one weapon: the weapon of force, of power. That is why we fight. We also use the language which they understand and which they use.

We doubt that the attitude of a super power, and the United States in particular, will change in a direction which would be beneficial to our side. For whatever the situation, Israel will remain a mere puppet of the United States.

Question If this is so, are you saying that the way out of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the war between Israel and Palestine, is in the hands of the United States?

Answer Yes, but once again I doubt that the United States is prepared to pressure Israel to the extent that we could benefit from that. Israel is the strongest country in the Middle East. Without the help of Arab countries, the attitude of Israel cannot possibly change. This means that the Arab countries must be more determined in exercising pressure on the United States, by using the power of Arab oil and money in the world. In that way the attitude of Israel can be changed.

Fez Peace Plan

Question Do you long for peace? What do you think of the Fez peace plan?

Answer Of course we want peace. But we also must have our own country. We will fight with all our might until lasting peace is achieved. The Fez peace plan (which was proposed in Fez, Morocco) is one of the peace plans already advanced. It is not perfect. It has many shortcomings. However, the Palestinian National Council (the PLO parliament) which met in February 1983, in Algiers decided that we should try to follow up on that peace plan. At least some of it.

We are fighting, using two weapons: political and military action. Once again: for us there will be no peace until Israel really understands the real meaning of peace. By returning the territory of Palestine which they are occupying.

Unfortunately, they have a great desire to carry out a policy of imperialism. Didn't the founders of Israel once say that Israel has no borders? In other words, their borders go as far as can be achieved by their military power. I am a pessimist. The Fez peace plan, like the Reagan peace plan, is just a toy in the hands of Israel.

Support

Question Are you satisfied with the solidarity displayed by the Arab, Islamic and nonaligned countries, as reflected at the NonAligned Summit Conference held in New Delhi last May?

Answer There is some support, but it is not enough. The Zionist-Israeli state is very strong, and the support which we need must be very strong also. Since the 1967 war we have been fighting alone without help from the Arab countries. They just give us lip service. None of that is enough in a war against Israel, which is supported by the United States.

Solidarity is important. You also know the history of your country, Indonesia. When it was still colonized by the Dutch, the movement opposing them came from abroad, from the Middle East, from the Arab countries. For us solidarity is also important. However, we need more assistance in the form of people, money, and moral support.

From Indonesia, for example, we hope to obtain help in the form of medicines, help in the United Nations in fighting for us (a boycott of the United States, if necessary). Now it is not military help which we need. Indonesia is one of the major oil producing countries of the world because it has close relations with the countries of the industrial world, with Japan, the United States, Europe, and so forth. At least Indonesia can pressure those countries to pressure Israel in turn so that the present occupation of Lebanon by Israel can be brought to an immediate end. Indonesia can convince those countries that there will be no peace in the Middle East without the establishment of a Palestinian state.

We regret that we don't have a diplomatic mission in Indonesia (in September, 1982, a representative of Yasir Arafat met Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in Jakarta). Meanwhile, we have several missions in Europe. We are happy to see that there will be very good relations between Egypt and Indonesia. We would be happier if those relations were further improved. However, we think that at this time Palestine has greater need for Indonesian help than Egypt has need for Indonesian help. You reporters are the same as us. You are soldiers. We have weapons, while you have your pen. Both of them are very much needed.

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SAUDI ARABIA

PRINCE SULTAN VISITS KING 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ NAVAL BASE

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 21 Apr 83 p 3

[Article by Hazza' al-Hazza' and 'Awad al-Qahtani: "Saudi Royal Naval Forces Rush Forward To Self-Sufficiency"]

[Text] His Royal Highness Prince Sultan Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, second deputy prime minister and minister of defense and aviation, made a visit yesterday to the King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Naval Base in the eastern district.

Meeting his Highness in the base airport were staff Capt Talal Salim al-Mufaddi, vice-commander of the naval forces, and staff Capt Badr al-Salih, commander of the King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Naval Base in al-Sharqiyah, and a number of officers in the naval forces.

After a short rest in the airport hall his Highness Prince Sultan made his way to the base piers, where he was met by Capt 'Uthman Fad'aq, commander of the floating units "on base." His Highness Prince Sultan went aboard the 'Abd-al-'Aziz warship and raised the Kingdom's flag over it. Then he went aboard the al-Faruq warship and raised the Kingdom's flag over it. He then inspected the parts and facilities of the ship and became acquainted with the war material contained in it, and heard an explanation from the ship commander, Lt Cmdr Yusuf al-Hadil about the bridge of the ship, the operations room, and the ship's duties.

After that his Highness Prince Sultan Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz made a statement to the staff of the naval base, officers and individuals, in which he saluted them with the salutation of Islam and conveyed to them the greetings of the supreme commander of the armed forces, his beloved Majesty King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and his loyal crown prince his Highness Prince 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz. He said it pleased him to see them this day when they had arrived in the dear homeland on their advanced warships, piloting them themselves. This is the result of continuous hard work and the acquiring of a high degree of knowledge and skill. His Highness emphasized in his speech that the young Saudi Royal Naval Forces are pushing forward toward self-sufficiency. This is the result of preplanning for building modern Saudi naval forces that advance with steady steps and unshakeable faith in God, praised and exalted be His name, in the service of religion, then of the monarch and the nation.

His Highness commanded in his speech the development and progress currently attained by the naval forces in all the fields of naval power equally in the sea, on the coast and in the air.

Now the naval forces partake with the other land and air forces in the defense of the sacred homeland and its independence and sovereignty.

His Highness concluded his speech by saluting them and expressing his pride in them. He prayed God to protect and take them under His care.

After that a number of students from the boys' schools, sons of base employees, came forth to greet his Highness. Then his Highness Prince Sultan visited the center for collecting and providing technical information in the base, where he heard a detailed explanation of the parts and missions of the center. Then he inspected the interior of the center.

His Royal Highness Prince Sultan Ibn 'Abd 'Abd-al-'Aziz, second deputy prime minister and minister of defense and aviation as well as inspector general returned to al-Zahrani yesterday afternoon after visiting King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Base in al-Sharqiyah. Bidding his Highness farewell as he left the naval base airport were vice-commander of naval forces Staff Capt Talal Salim al-Mufaddi and base commander Staff Capt Badr al-Salih.

His Highness Prince Sultan issued a declaration on the occasion of his visit to the base in which he expressed his pleasure in visiting King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Naval Base in al-Sharqiyah and meeting its staff, and his pride in all the members of the naval forces. His Highness called them first to the obedience of God, then to persistent work. He also prayed God to give success to the Kingdom's Muslim youth and called on them to enlist in the armed forces, whether it be the sea, land, or air force. That would be service to religion, and moreover would give strength to the body and provide an opportunity to drink from the sources of learning while at the same time defending the territory of this precious nation.

His Highness Prince Sultan emphasized that studies of the project of building a new civilian airport in the eastern district are currently in progress, and that it has been decided to complete these studies in the current fiscal year. He expressed his hope that work to implement this project would begin next fiscal year, God willing.

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SAUDI ARABIA

AL-QASIM SILOS, FLOUR MILLS EXPANDED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 748, 20-26 Apr 83 p 20

[Article: "'Abd-al-Ilah Inaugurates New Expansion of al-Qasim Silos"]

[Text] His Royal Highness Prince 'Abd-al-Ilah Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, governor of the al-Qasim district, inaugurated last Saturday the flour mill project, the feed factory and the expansion of the al-Qasim silos.

The ceremony held for this occasion and attended by his Excellency Dr Sulayman al-Salim, minister of commerce, and a number of functionaries began with a recitation from the Holy Qur'an. Then his Excellency the minister of commerce made a statement in which he welcomed his Highness 'Abd-al-Ilah and said that the project inaugurated today will raise the capacity of the silos in al-Qasim to 135,000 tons. He indicated that the project includes a flour mill with a capacity of 300 tons per day, which can be increased, and that it serves the districts al-Qasim and Ha'il and saves consumers and distributors the trouble of going to al-Riyad or Jiddah. He added that the side product from this operation, bran, will be used in a feed factory producing different kinds of feed for poultry, sheep and camels. In addition, there has been completed in this complex a unit for selecting and cleaning seeds for the benefit of farmers.

Dr Sulayman al-Salim went into the evolution of silos and mills in the Kingdom. He said that the capacity of the al-Qasim silos, which were established in 1383 A.H., was 20,000 tons, and that these silos were expanded to 60,000 tons, then again by 75,000 tons to a capacity of 135,000 tons. This last increase is what we celebrate today. Moreover we will work, God willing, for a further expansion of 150,000 tons next year, so the capacity of the al-Qasim silos would become 285,000 tons.

His Excellency indicated also that the al-Riyad silos have a capacity of 160,000 tons. He said we will work, God willing, for an increase of another 150,000 tons. A mill was also added to Jiddah, another to al-Riyad, and silos in Khamis Mushayt.

His Excellency attributed that to God's mediation, the vigor of the Saudi citizen, and what modern science has attained in production improvement. He said that the state offered incentive prices, which provided sufficient motivation and guaranteed that prices stay well above cost. That made

citizens turn to wheat planting, which increased its production to 240,000 tons per season, while it had started with 8,000 tons for the year 1398 A.D. God willing, production this year will reach, according to the state's estimates, between 500,000 and 600,000 tons.

After that Dr Ahmed Shinawi, general manager of the general foundation for grain silos and flour mills, made a statement in which he welcomed his Highness Prince 'Abd-al-Ilah and those present and mentioned that the al-Qasim district now produces its needs of wheat, and the excess will be sent to the Jiddah mills to be ground and distributed to the rest of the Kingdom's districts.

Dr Shinawi added that the al-Qasim project was an auspicious beginning in the Kingdom's agricultural renaissance, for it created a stable market for wheat farmers. He raised the incentive prices, to which there was good response, and increases in production followed in close succession.

After that his Highness Prince 'Abd-al-Ilah pressed the activating button, signaling the start of production. His Highness then toured the project with high dignitaries.

His Highness Prince 'Abd-al-Ilah expressed his exceeding pleasure in activating this project and said it was something of which every citizen can be proud as he sees projects like this functioning with the latest that modern technology has attained.

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SAUDI ARABIA

CHARTS SHOW TRADE WITH ITALY

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 4 May 83 p 16

[Article by Ahmad al-Duwayhi: "Joint Saudi-Italian Commission Meets To Discuss Enhancement of Economic Relations Between the Two Countries"]

[Text] His Excellency 'Abdallah 'Ali Rida, undersecretary of the foreign ministry for economic and cultural affairs, heads the Saudi side in the meetings of the Saudi-Italian commission which will be held tomorrow in Rome to discuss the expansion of the economic relations and joint cooperation between the two countries in different fields.

Mr Rashid Salih al-Bakr, general director for foreign trade, stated (to AL-RIYAD) that the Saudi delegation is carrying ideas for participating in finding solutions for some of the problems encountered by the private sector in the Kingdom in dealing with some of the companies and businessmen in Italy.

He added that the focus will be on a discussion of adopting ways to guarantee the protection of Saudi merchants from operations of swindling and fraud to which some merchants are exposed in Italy.

About the indicators of commercial exchange between the Kingdom and Italy al-Bakr said, "The Kingdom's imports from Italy have increased two and a half fold during the interval 1977-81 A.D.; they increased from around 3 billion Saudi riyals in 1977 to about 8 billion Saudi riyals in 1981."

The value of the Kingdom's imports from Italy in 1981 represents 6.7 percent of the value of the total Kingdom's imports from the various countries of the world. Thus Italy occupied fourth in the list of countries from which the Kingdom imported in 1981.

The most important imports to the Kingdom from Italy consist of metals and metal products (16.6 percent followed by products necessary for construction (14.3 percent), equipment and machines (13.4 percent), trinkets and jewelry (10.7 percent).

In 1979 Italy was among the top three countries to export the following commodities to the Kingdom: airplanes of different kinds, planks and sheets of iron or steel, machines and equipment for treatment of materials, aluminum plants, freezers and refrigerators, and wood plants.

He added that the Kingdom's exports to Italy increased 2.5 times from 1977 to 1981 as they increased from about 11 billion Saudi riyals in 1977 to about 29 billion Saudi riyals in 1981.

The value of the Kingdom's exports to Italy in 1981 represents 7.09 percent of total exports to the various countries of the world. Thus for the year 1981 Italy occupied fourth place in the list of countries to which the Kingdom exported.

The Kingdom's exports to Italy consist basically of petroleum and its derivatives.

He concluded his talk (with AL-RIYAD) by emphasizing that the trade balance is in the Kingdom's favor. The surplus in the year 1981 came to about 21 billion Saudi riyals, and to about 3 billion Saudi riyals in the first half of 1982.

It should also be mentioned that the Saudi side includes delegates from the government ministries and other concerned parties.

The Most Important Commodities

Imported From Italy Since 1980 A.D.

<u>Total Commodities</u>	<u>Value (in Millions of Saudi Riyals</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Food Products	172	2.3
Metal Ores and Products	151	2.0
Chemical Products	192	2.6
Medicines	46	0.6
Tires and Rubber Products	72	1.0
Wood and Wood Products	543	7.4
Paper and Paper Products	52	0.7
Textiles and Clothes	317	4.4
Products for Construction	1,051	14.3
Trinkets & Jewelry Made of Precious Metals	792	10.7
Metals and Metal Products	1,219	16.6
Home Appliances	350	4.8
Equipment and Machines	984	13.4
Electric Appliances & Their Parts	509	7.0
Means of Transportation of Various Kinds	178	2.5
Other Commodities	717	9.7

Evolution of the Kingdom's Imports and Exports
From and To Italy (1977 Taken as 100 Percent)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports to Italy Value</u> (Millions of S.R.)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Imports from Italy</u> Value (Millions S.R.)	<u>Percent</u>
1977	11,182	100	3,168	100
1978	9,359	84	4,945	156
1979	17,313	155	6,047	191
1980	22,305	199	7,346	222
1981	28,738	257	8,010	253
1982*	7,295	---	4,360	---

*First half only

Statement of Commercial Exchange Between the
Kingdom and Italy Values in Millions of Saudi Riyals

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports Value</u>	<u>to</u>	<u>Italy</u> <u>Percent</u>	<u>Imports from Italy</u> <u>Value</u>	<u>Trade Balance</u>
1977	11,182		7.3	3,168	+ 8,014
1978	9,359		6.7	4,945	+ 4,414
1979	17,314		8.1	6,047	+11,767
1980	22,305		6.1	7,346	+14,959
1981	28,738		7.09	8,010	+20,728
1982*	7,295		0.5	4,360	+ 2,935

*First half only

12226
CSO: 4404/344

IMPACT OF SOVIET OCCUPATION ON AFGHAN HIGHER EDUCATION REPORTED

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 21, May 83 pp 9, 10

[Article by George Hardy]

[Text]

As the new academic year opened in Afghanistan on March 21 – the Nauroz (or New Year's Day) festival in Afghanistan – it is appropriate to examine some recent changes at Kabul University, the only large and developed centre of higher education in Afghanistan. How has the crisis affected the University, its teachers and its students?

Kabul University still functions as an educational institution, although admittedly at a reduced level compared even to 1980, the first year of the Soviet occupation. The numbers of students registering for courses declines each year, with the continual drain of young men into exile in Pakistan, Iran, India or Europe, and of those who choose instead to leave the cities to join the resistance inside the country.

After matriculation from the capital's many high schools, thousands of students who in the normal way would have gone on to study at the University now simply leave the city, often with the goodwill or the active encouragement of their families.

Studying at the University is now more than ever considered a privilege, since the requirement decreed in 1981 that young men should serve two years in the army before starting studies at the University. The effect of this decree has not been as hoped by the Karmal government and its Soviet advisers, for thousands of young men now avoid both military service and higher studies by fleeing the capital.

Another way out for students has been to apply for places in the 20,000 or so courses (both long- and short-term) currently offered abroad in the USSR and other Comecon states of Eastern Europe. These courses cover a wide range of subjects, from chemistry and economics in the USSR, to agriculture in Bulgaria,

and are provided free, but are reportedly in poor demand from Afghan students. Perhaps because of this, the normal requirement of military service in the Afghan army is often waived for applicants for these foreign courses.

At Kabul University, the replacement of what were mainly western educational links (until 1979) by Russian and East European ties has gone far. Universities in the US, West Germany and France, which had close relations with various departments of Kabul University for the past 20 to 30 years, are now completely cut off, and the loans of staff and the collaboration in teaching of courses by these universities at Kabul is a thing of the past – like the prestigious high schools in Kabul, which had West German and French help until the end of 1979.

The economics department at Kabul University, for instance, now has six lecturers from East Germany, in place of those from West Germany's Bonn and Bochum universities. Afghan colleagues on the University staff reportedly assess the East German teachers as more competent than their more numerous Soviet counterparts at Kabul University, but many complain that standards of teaching have deteriorated sharply in general since 1979. Not only does the constant warfare overshadow academic life – that is something no resident of Kabul can escape – but the compulsory classes in political science, taught by recently appointed members of the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), inevitably fluent in the principles of Marxism, intrude into the teaching curriculum.

However, there is still a considerable measure of free speech on the University campus, in spite of a network of informers. (Last year, six university teachers were arrested and sen-

tenced to long terms of imprisonment. The six were said to be behind organised opposition among staff and students, and responsible for the printing and distribution of shabnameh - "nightletters," newsletters and manifestos of the opposition to the Karmal regime.)

In some departments, Afghan teachers are said to be expressing their resentment at increasing (and seemingly inevitable) Sovietisation of the university system by refusing to cooperate with any of their colleagues from the USSR. It is mostly Russians and, in some departments, Soviet citizens from Central Asian republics, who have replaced western staff and sometimes filled the posts left vacant by the defections of the Afghan educated elite.

In the circumstances, it is natural that foreign languages taught at the University are rapidly changing in importance. Besides Persian and Pashto, it used to be English, French and German which were most widely taught and used, with Russian relegated to the inferior-status halls of Kabul Polytechnic. Now Russian is predominant. But a new departure at Kabul University is the creation or rapid expansion of existing centres of study of the various ethnic and tribal minority groups, not of Afghanistan alone, but of the wider region as a whole.

A new research centre, the "Oriental Studies Section," opened on March 21. It is intended for research into Pakistani politics in general and the Pashtunistan issue in particular - that is, the past and future political status of the Pathan-majority areas in Pakistan, which has been at the root of the rivalry and bad relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan ever since the creation of the Durand Line in 1893 dividing the Pathan/Pashtun lands between two different rulers.

When Pakistan was created in 1947 out of united India, it was Afghanistan which challenged Pakistan's right to a seat at the United Nations, and the rivalry has never eased. The Oriental Studies Section has been set up with what is said to be an excellent and comprehensive library, much of it given by Institutes in the

USSR. A specific aim of the new section is to attract Pakistanis as well as Afghan researchers.

There are other international implications of recent changes at Kabul University. The Persian department is steadily moving away from its close ties with Iranian literature and universities, into the orbit of the other major centre of Persian culture, Soviet Tadzhikistan. Other ethnic cultural departments established are for the Hazaras, Uzbeks, Baluch and Turcomans.

The cultural links between Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan and Soviet Uzbekistan are probably closest of all the national minorities; indeed, almost half of the Uzbeks in Afghanistan are descended from the Uzbek families who migrated from Russian-occupied territories after the Bolshevik Revolution in the 1920s. It is an Uzbek from Soviet Central Asia, Professor Abdul Zahore, who is associated with the Uzbek department.

The cultural centres established for the Baluch and Turcoman ethnic minorities are for much smaller communities inside Afghanistan; even before the flood of refugees in 1979-80, Baluch and Turcoman minorities amounted to some 300,000 people each. The main centres of population of the Baluch tribes lie across the borders in Pakistan and Iran, while Turcomans are mostly to be found in northern Iran and in Soviet Turkmenistan.

Given the origins of the Karmal government, and its continuing dependence on massive Soviet military and economic support, it is hardly surprising if the model for developing Afghanistan now being actively promoted in Kabul is that of the republics of Soviet Central Asia. If the Marxist government remains in control of the media, and develops the present strategy of "separate development" for the national minorities in Afghanistan, the members of the various minorities will face considerable pressure to think of themselves as Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turcomans, Hazaras or Baluch, rather than as citizens of a united and independent Afghanistan.

POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES CRITICIZED

Dhaka SANGBAD in Bengali 26 Apr 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Government's Modus Operandi in Birth Control"]

[Text] The agencies that grant foreign aid have expressed dissatisfaction regarding our government's work procedures. A discussion paper has levied much criticism, pointing out various faults and transgressions. This discussion paper was prepared jointly by the 14 foreign agencies working with population control in Bangladesh that give aid. This paper submitted to the government comments that the working procedures in the field of family planning in Bangladesh are not up to expectations. In this context, for strengthening the working of the family planning program, the foreign agencies that give aid have strongly recommended the formation of a "national population control board." The chairman of this autonomous board will have ultimate control over financial matters and will be government appointed. This matter is under consideration by the government.

The donors are saying that the target set for the control of population in the Second Five-Year Plan has not been achieved. In order to achieve a two-child family target by the year 1990, at least 65 percent of the couples have to adopt family planning methods. But at present this rate is only 18 percent. In this discussion paper, which cites administrative complications and bureaucratic red tape, it is stated that the slow procedures for releasing funds, frequent transfers of high officials, lack of coordination among the workers of the health and family planning departments at the thana level are reasons why the government's population control program was unsuccessful. Besides administrative inefficiency, commenting on the framework the paper stated that the available government and private sector frameworks are not being utilized and the services of the 67,000 workers employed by the family planning division are not being properly used. For all these reasons progress in family planning is not satisfactory, the discussion paper observed.

For a change in the existing conditions and for a dynamic population control program, the study recommended the adoption of a new three-tier working plan. The objective of the plan is to keep the population of Bangladesh within approximately 150 million by the year 2005. To make this new plan successful, the discussion paper suggested the immediate adoption of two

steps, which are: the Government should give the highest priority to the plan and extend it strong support, and together with it, should adopt a national population control policy keeping in view the existing conditions. It also suggested the removal of bureaucratic obstacles and lengthy procedures.

Since the subject of the formation of a board as recommended for this new plan is under the consideration by the government, we are not going to make any comments on it. The faults and shortcomings pointed out by the foreign agencies are no doubt present in our governmental procedures, but we are not aware of them. Probably the lack of self-criticism regarding success and failure is responsible for this. We lost sight of our aim because of the glory of propaganda. But that mistake has been discovered due to the criticism of the foreigners. As in the case of success, in the case of failure too the public should be correctly informed. In that respect it has to be said that the government has not carried out its responsibility in the past even though this is a matter of utmost significance.

In the social and economic development of the country, over population stands as a very big problem, and the government is also fully aware of the seriousness and extent of it. It seems that the government is conscious of the difficulties in the implementation of the family planning program. Nevertheless, whatever reason may be, the public is not aware of the problem. There can be no question of any participation by the people if they do not have an awareness of the rights and wrongs of the program. Lack of proper communication is a big hindrance in this field. If the government on its own could have corrected the work procedures, wide participatory cooperation could be expected; then we would not have to bear the criticism made by the foreign agencies.

9783
CSO: 4607/8

LACK OF BASIC AMENITIES RESENTED

Dhaka ITTEFAQ in Bengali 24 Apr 83 p 2

[Editorial: "No Electricity, No Water"]

[Text] On the front page of yesterday's ITTEFAQ a brief news item appeared. The headline of this news item was "Tangail District Has No Electricity, the Town Has No Water." There is nothing new or unusual about this headline. The news is very common and simple. However, the realistic picture that has been portrayed in this brief and simple item concerning the breakdown in electricity and scarcity of water conjures the thought of a frightful eventuality, which cannot but give us anxiety and concern. But in this cursed society, such a big disaster has also become bearable and routine. Nobody is concerned whether the electricity is there or not, what lights up and what does not, or if it lights, what the rate of fluctuation in power is and what damage it can cause. In Germany, for the last few decades there has not been a single instance of a power failure. The same applies to nearly all the Western countries. When and in which year a power failure occurred is actually a matter of research and inquiry for these countries. In comparison what we experience is that a whole district is sunk in darkness due to lack of electricity, and in the district town, since there is no electricity there is no water, disrupting public life.

We do not say that the power department has no difficulties or problems. It is very true that it works with limited resources and under various adverse circumstances. By gearing up the maintenance services within our limited means, by procuring equipment and planning a workable strategy to use it efficiently, it is possible to improve the situation. The difficulties [we face in our] development effort at present are obvious. There are various problems, including those of equipment and machinery. On top of that, one cannot rule out the realities of natural calamities related to rains and storms. Even after considering these matters sympathetically, the problem of water and electricity in our country cannot be taken lightly. Not to speak of districts, subdivisions, police stations, villages, and marketplaces, even Dhaka, the capital city, regularly witnesses the drama of the water and power crisis, and it is becoming a cruel joke in the lives of the city residents. Therefore, we can easily imagine what can happen in Tangail or any other place. But even for this it will be meaningless to put the blame on the shoulders of only the management of electricity and

water supply. As in other fields, in this instance too our lack of consciousness as citizens is no less a cause for grief.

Probably our lack of consciousness has led the electricity and water departments to reject their responsibility. Whereas on the one hand there is acute electricity problem and scarcity of water, on the other hand there is a large-scale waste of water and electricity. Comparing these two instances side by side, our own total lack of consciousness becomes apparent and we cannot help but feel disheartened. The Tangail instance is very clear. The whole district is without power. "As of dawn today the entire district will have no electricity." Datelined 22 April this was printed in the daily ITTEFAQ on 23 April. Since there was no electricity in the town, the water supply was also stopped. The entire district was without electricity and the whole town without water. Imagine what a dangerous situation it is! But no matter how difficult it is to imagine, this was the exact situation of Tangail District and Tangail town on 22 April. There is no use to blame or accuse anybody for this situation. By shutting down light and water for 1 day, the water and power authorities have shown us their sense of responsibility in maintaining the essential services which are supposed to be faultless and continue uninterrupted. This is something for all of us to keep in mind.

9783
CSO: 4607/8

KASHMIR VOTE SEEN AS ANTI-CONGRESS (I) VERDICT

GF141146 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Jun 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Congress (i): Debacle in Occupied Kashmir"]

[Text] Elections to the 76-seat State Assembly in occupied Kashmir, which had generated a lot of heat and led to constant clashes between supporters of Mr Farooq Abdullah's National Conference and Mrs Indira Gandhi's Congress (i), have drawn to a close. The National Conference has already bagged 39 seats till the time of writing and gained a clear majority, and was, according to REUTER, expected to pick up several more seats in the 22 results still to be declared. Congress (i) had captured 23 seats while the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party and the Panthers Party won one seat each.

Despite her presence in the occupied state and her vigorous personal campaigning Mrs Gandhi could make no major dent in the valley and almost all the seats bagged by her party have come from the Hindu dominated belt in Jammu. The Indian prime minister's towering personality and her much talked about charisma could make little impression on the Kashmir State. Nor could her allegations (frivolous?) of massive rigging levelled against the National Conference have an effect on the outcome of the polls. Although the elections were held almost under the shadow of Indian bayonets, with large contingents of India's security forces having been rushed ostensibly to ensure peaceful polling, the electorate was not intimidated. Kashmir has proved a Waterloo for Mrs Gandhi.

Apart from being a grave setback to the strong lady of India and her Congress (i), elections in the occupied state can be seen as a major challenge to Mrs Gandhi's authoritarianism. It is that and the demolition of its fetish that must have been most galling for the Indian prime minister and the vast network of Congress (i) throughout her country. State elections in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh had already shown that the popularity of her party was on the wane and that the masses were no longer prepared to countenance authoritarian rule. Besides, elections in the occupied Jammu and Kashmir have brought the polarisation between the Hindu dominated Jammu and the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley into sharp focus.

With the clear majority of State Assembly seats won by the National Conference, Dr Farooq Abdullah, whose party has administered the occupied state

for the past eight years, will hold the fort. What has happened now was inevitable after the fraudulent accession of the disputed territory to India and the foisting of New Delhi's governance on the unwilling Muslim population of the valley. What step Mrs Gandhi with all her political sagacity decides to take will have to be seen. However, it will not be long before she takes a decision which, in any case, is bound to be of crucial importance.

CSO: 4600/680

INDIA

BRIEFS

SIKH AGITATION--Amritsar, (JANG Report)--The Sikh Akali Party has acquired large quantities of U.S. and Chinese-made arms. The arms include 432 revolvers, automatic rifles, rifles with telescopic sights, and a great number of carbines. These arms are kept inside Sikh temples. Indian officials are taking measures to prevent the use of these weapons. The situation was first disclosed when an American correspondent was interviewing Sant Jarnail Singh at (Nanaknawas). The correspondent heard the sound of firing. The Sant explained that the Sikhs had received new weapons which they were testing. The reports indicated that the Sant followers have great quantities of foreign arms while they also have arms from the 1965 war which were never surrendered to the Indian Government. It is reported that many Indian military officers are involved in smuggling arms to Sikhs. According to the reports, the Sikhs have also hired many Muslim youths for their army. [Text] [GF141716 Lahore JANG in Urdu 9 Jun 83 p 1]

CSO: 4656/192

VARIOUS FACTORS IN IRAN'S OIL STRATEGY EXAMINED

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 21, May 83 p 76

[Article by Shaul Bakhsh]

[Text] The question of post-revolutionary Iran's oil policy is a subject of intense debate in the West. Equally, the issues of increased oil production, secure markets and satisfactory prices are of deep concern to Iranian policy-makers.

This new Brookings Institution study suggests that Iran must first mend relations with its traditional customers, and re-establish a reputation as a reliable supplier, if it wants to raise production and regain markets. Dr Shaul Bakhsh, the study's author, who is visiting professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and consultant to the Brookings Energy and National Security Research Program, says that Iran must also "reach some understanding on prices, production levels and market shares" with its Opec partners and bring the conflict with Iraq to an end.

The study examines the ideological, political, regional, and economic factors in Iran's oil strategy since 1979. It notes that Iranian production fell from 5.5m bpd in 1978 to 1.2m bpd in mid-1982. Iranian authorities began marketing oil aggressively then, in an attempt to win back a large share of the international market, substantially undercutting Opec prices and exceeding the production ceiling set by the cartel (by 1m bpd) in order to stabilise prices.

Iranian policies on pricing, production and dealings with international oil majors were relatively moderate immediately after the fall of the Shah in January 1979, according to Bakhsh, but became more extreme as a result of ideological considerations, factional struggles and radical influences in the government.

The revolutionary leaders believed that oil had been used as an instrument for the exploitation and domination of Iran (and other

oil-producing and developing countries) by the industrial powers. They abrogated the agreement under which the international majors purchased the bulk of Iranian oil, reduced foreign involvement in the industry, withdrew from joint ventures outside Iran, and sold small amounts of oil to more than 50 customers on short-term contracts.

Bakhsh's analysis shows how these developments gave Iran a reputation as an unreliable supplier, and disrupted its relations with big customers. In addition, he shows, a deliberate lowering of production levels in 1979 and 1980 caused exports to drop to 700,000 bpd, from earlier levels of millions per day, by the start of the Gulf war in September 1980.

He goes on to say that Iran must work more closely with its Opec partners. Iranian representatives pursued an aggressive pricing policy in Opec in 1979 and 1980, arguing for higher prices and lower production to sustain high prices – then Iran raised its own prices above the Opec ceiling and lowered production in an attempt to influence the market.

In 1982, Iran cut prices unilaterally, offered large discounts under the table and on the spot market, ignored an Opec production quota plan to prevent price falls, and argued that Saudi Arabia should cut production so that Iran could have a larger share of the market. Bakhsh adds that the possibility of reaching an agreement with Opec members, while not out of reach, is hampered by continuing friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia and by the Gulf war.

Iran's third task, says Bakhsh, is to bring the war with Iraq to an end. It has been costly: 60-65 per cent of refinery capacity has been knocked out; pipelines and gas production facilities have been destroyed; and a large

petrochemical complex has been damaged. Although Iran has been successful in raising exports to their present level, he adds, the war could disrupt its oil-exporting capacity at any time.

In a situation where its foreign exchange reserves are nearly exhausted, and it is facing pressing needs of repairing the war-shattered economy and of providing its people with food, housing and social services, a degree of pragmatism is now visible in Iran. Its new official position is to use oil revenues to finance the reconstruction of the economy and the confrontation with domestic and foreign enemies, Bakhsh reports.

In the near future, he concludes, "Iranian production levels appear likely to be determined primarily by immediate economic requirements." But he says that the "erratic oil policies" of the recent past persist, and that therefore the successful pursuit of Iran's goals is not assured.

CSO: 4600/657

PRESIDENT REGARDS MAJLIS ACTIVITIES AS 'SUCCESSFUL'

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 31 May 83 p 2

[Interview with President and Head of the Supreme Council of Defense Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i by IRNA on the third day of Majlis familiarity week; date and place not specified]

[Text] On the third day of Majlis familiarity week, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the president and head of the Supreme Defense Council, in an exclusive interview with IRNA correspondents, explained his views on Majlis [familiarity] week, the activities of the Majlis in advancing the goals of the Islamic revolution, coordination between the executive and legislative branches, and the position of the Majlis vis-a-vis domestic and foreign issues.

First, in response to a question concerning his views about Majlis familiarity week, his recommendations for the greater familiarity and relations of the people with the Majlis as well as his evaluation of the effects of this familiarity on the society, the president said:

The initiative of the Majlis brothers in charge of holding Majlis week has been a very interesting step. I believe that to familiarize the people with the Majlis, the very rich and exceptional archives of this young but industrious Majlis must be utilized and the interesting and exciting experiences of this Majlis in the course of these three years must be taken into consideration. The views of the honorable speaker of the Majlis and the representatives who have been in the current of events during these few years in particular must be utilized so that the people can be reminded of this fruitful past and to ensure that the intricate details which have not been recorded anywhere be recorded.

The president was asked about the characteristics of the Majlis. He said: Our Majlis has several important characteristics which I think are exceptional and unmatched. First, it is a people's Majlis. You may not find any Majlis whose representatives have been elected in the manner of our representatives, from the middle strata of the people, those who have mingled with the people. As you see, the representatives of the people consist of the clergy, teachers, those in different trades who were from among the people, villagers, workers and physicians, each of whom have lived among the people, who were with the people and who do not belong to the elite, aristocratic class. We have no aristocrats in this Majlis. There may be a handful of parliaments in the world which can boast of a similar situation. Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i added: The second characteristic is the freedom of this Majlis. No personal considerations are given in this Majlis. Everyone says whatever comes to his mind. Of course, I am not defending everything that is said in the Majlis, but the existence of such an open situation and the sense of freedom is something that I defend as very valuable.

Anyone who claims that he wanted to say something in this Majlis but was unable to is not telling the truth. In this Majlis, everyone can speak out.

Success of the Majlis in Various Issues

The third characteristic of our Majlis is the strong inclination towards and belief of nearly all the members in Islam and Islamic injunctions. The representatives truly wish to understand the Islamic laws and to legislate accordingly. Another characteristic is the interest in and inclination of a large number of the Majlis representatives towards supporting the oppressed. As you know, the land, housing, and trade issues and issues related to production and the economic situation of the country have been discussed in this Majlis. Despite the short life and the large volume of work of this Majlis, the fact that such issues have been raised indicates success and is an interesting characteristic.

Among the other characteristics of this Majlis worth mentioning is its fairness. In other words, in cases where individuals have received incorrect information about an issue, as soon as they are told the facts, they immediately change their position and one does not sense any sort of obstinacy. In any case, those that I have mentioned are some of the distinguishing characteristics.

In response to the third question of the correspondent concerning the success of the Majlis in achieving, advancing and preserving the gains of the Islamic revolution, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i said: I can say that the Majlis has succeeded in

making great strides, although these efforts have not always achieved results. However, much work has been accomplished. This Majlis holds at least three open sessions every week as well as numerous committee meetings. The work accomplished by these 250 persons is quite voluminous in quantity. In quality, it is not bad either and this itself is a success. The job has been successfully done, although some of the tasks, as I said, have not achieved results. For example, the issue of agriculture, the issue of distribution, the issue of foreign trade, issues related to production and some other important issues have remained unresolved.

Many of the laws also have not as yet been discussed in their Islamic form in the Majlis. However, newsworthy and intricate laws have been discussed in the Majlis. For instance, the bylaws of the Guards Corps or, recently, the bylaws of the Reconstruction Crusade, the bylaws of the committees and the new plan for the army have been studied in the committees and, on the whole, much has been done. Many judicial laws which have been sent to the Majlis by the Supreme Judicial Council have been studied and many other issues, such as the bill for the elimination of banking interest, the proposal for the national intelligence organization and many other issues, have been studied by the Majlis and can be considered worthy accomplishments. Of course, sometimes the Majlis passes on certain things. In other words, it passes a proposal that, for instance, the government should propose a bill for the hajj issue and puts this responsibility in the hands of the government. I would like to say that in my opinion, instead of making this a responsibility of the government, considering that the government has so much to do, the Majlis should itself give its views and legislation. There are such cases at times, but they are few. The majority of cases consist of those which the Majlis has dealt with, provided answers for and, thanks be to God, been able to conclude.

Coordination Between the Legislative and Executive Branches

In response to a question concerning the coordination between the legislative and executive branches and whether the executive branch has thus far had expectations from the legislative branch which have not been met, the president said:

Coordination between the executive and legislative branches is not bad. Fortunately, although both sides have certain expectations, cooperation between the two branches is at an acceptable and reasonable level and I hope that it will even improve. But, concerning whether the executive branch has certain expectations of the legislative branch which have not been accomplished, yes, the executive branch is very much interested in the legal views and decisions of the Majlis

concerning the general issues related to the oppressed, including the several cases that I mentioned which are to be presented to the government as laws. Thus far, this has not been done. Perhaps the legislative branch believes that certain cases have been referred to the executive branch as law which have not been implemented thus far. I accept this, that is, the executive branch has also at times had shortcomings and problems in implementing some of the laws which have come from the Majlis. But this does not prevent our expecting the executive branch to receive laws from the Majlis and to be able to act on them. It is natural for the executive branch to ask the legislative branch for laws and the legislative branch to expect implementation by the executive branch. This mutual expectation is natural. Of course, it is also natural for the legislative branch to be unable to present to the executive branch all that the executive branch expects and, likewise, for the executive branch to completely implement all the laws in a short period of time.

Islamic Economy

The president was asked: In order to support the oppressed, to implement an Islamic economy and also to create a free atmosphere conducive to the growth and advancement of individuals in the society, in your opinion, what policy should the forces which are faithful and believe in jurisprudential Islam follow? Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i responded:

In regards to the issue of supporting the oppressed, we believe that the faithful forces who follow the imam's line should carefully investigate what bill presented by the government to the Majlis can be ratified and to ratify it, or to determine what proposal in this area can be presented to the Majlis and prepare it and whenever necessary, to ask the government to expedite its efforts.

In other words, they should not be disappointed if a proposal has not gone through its legal stages and they should try to continue to attend to the concerns of the oppressed. The truth is that the people and the oppressed expect the Majlis to take the first step in resolving their problems, that is, to prepare the laws and put them at the disposal of the government. In regards to the issue of a free atmosphere, I believe that, thank God, our social atmosphere is free. Those who do not accept this have certain expectations which are by no means appropriate for a revolutionary society like ours. Perhaps some people expect that every minute natural government problem which exists in the country be placed by certain individuals under a magnifying glass, be blown out of proportion, polished and put before everyone's view, thus resulting in the disappointment of the people in the revolution. We do not consider this freedom. We consider it stupidity. A government which allows its natural

weaknesses to be blown out of proportion and placed before the eyes of the faithful and revolutionary people has displayed its stupidity. This is not the meaning of democracy. Today, thank God, the people are free to study and to read books; they are free to test various ideas and to discuss them; and they are free to argue. No one will ask them why they are reading a certain book or discussing a certain issue. Right now, those who oppose this government have meetings and teaching sessions and the government does not question why they have them. But, if there are people who try to conspire in the guise of teaching and discussions, we will confront their conspiracies. One kind of conspiracy consists of the samples we witnessed in the newspapers during the time of Bani-Sadr. Some of the newspapers at that time ran editorials, printed large headlines, blew an insignificant issue out of proportion or presented nonexistent problems. They would raise an issue before the people which in fact did not exist. The people who had worked so hard, had given their blood and their lives, would then think that this problem existed in the path of the revolution. Well, they would despair. However, there would, in fact, be no such problem; it was a forgery and a lie. To tolerate such actions is in fact to tolerate a conspiracy, which we cannot accept. But, other than this, there is no problem and, thank God, freedom exists in our society today.

Positions of the Majlis

The IRNA correspondent asked Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i: Undoubtedly, one of the characteristics of the Majlis is its positions vis-a-vis various domestic and foreign issues. What is your opinion in this regard and also regarding the role of Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani as head of the legislative branch? The president responded: My opinion concerning Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani is that he is an irreplaceable speaker of the Majlis. In other words, we could not have found anyone else throughout the country who could manage the Majlis so well, and with such maturity as does Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In fact, Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani is considered one of the pillars of the regime of the Islamic Republic. He is a person who has a past record and who has been a major figure in this revolution and this Republic. He has been able to manage the Majlis and the legislative branch in the best manner. His presence in the Majlis has caused us to accept as correct and appropriate the positions of the legislative branch in all areas of domestic and foreign policy, despite the differences of opinion in certain cases. In other words, the outcome of all the ideas and views in the Majlis has been very good, logical and appropriate. And this is a blessing resulting from the presence of Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani. I was of the opinion from the beginning that he was the best speaker for the Majlis and time, thank God, has proven this. We hope that under his guidance and correct and precise management, the Majlis

will be able to take more rapid steps and to benefit more from his presence.

The last question of our correspondent was: Considering that before your presidency, you served in the Majlis as the representative of the people of Tehran, what good memories of that period remain with you? Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i responded:

One of my good memories of the Majlis was the day that the issue of martyr Raja'i as prime minister was discussed, when he spoke and finally received a vote of confidence. The entire period when we confronted the issue of Bani-Sadr in the Majlis, the position of the Majlis as well as the position of the brothers of the imam's line, all are sweet and good memories for me.

[Another] one of my good memories of the Majlis is of the day that we discussed the issue of Bani-Sadr's incompetence. That day, the Majlis showed true independence and solid logic. The Majlis showed that it was able to take strong, powerful actions concerning this most important of social and political issues, that is, the issue of changing a president.

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CSO: 4640/237

MAJLIS DEPUTY EVALUATES WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY JUDICIAL COMMITTEE

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 1 Jun 83 p 10

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Abolfazl Reyhani (Musavi-Tabrizi), Majlis representative for Tabriz, by JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, date and place not specified]

[Text] Political Section of JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI:

Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Abolfazl Reyhani (Musavi-Tabrizi), the representative of the people of Tabriz and deputy director of the judicial affairs committee of the Majlis, responded in an exclusive interview to the questions of our correspondent concerning the activities of this committee in relation to the ratification of proposals and bills, the relationship of this committee with the judicial authorities of the country and also the judicial situation of the country, especially since the decree before last of the imam.

According to a report by our correspondent, in the beginning of this interview, he sent greetings to the great leader of the Islamic revolution, the combatants of Islam and the soldiers of right against wrong and wished blessings upon the pure souls of the virtuous martyrs of Islam, especially the martyrs in the monstrous crimes of Saddam in Dezful, Poldokhtar and Baneh. Referring to the dual role of the Majlis in the two areas of legislation and exportation of the revolution, he said: As the imam of the people has said, the Majlis is the highest decision making organization in the country and is the result of the people's chants of God is great.

The Role of the Majlis in Exporting the Revolution

During the three years of the life of the Majlis, it has worked in two areas for the revolution. The first concerns the issue of

legislation, beginning from the single article and amendatory note to a series of revitalizing and fundamental laws, some of which concern the judicial committee, which were studied one by one. I now have in my possession 4 booklets consisting of 100 pages each which list the laws ratified in the Majlis. This is what the Majlis has done in regards to legislation, in providing solutions for the country. In addition, the Majlis has accomplished a series of important tasks which have strengthened our revolution's international relations. For instance, in these two or three years, it participated in both the spring and the fall interparliamentary conferences. I participated in the one which was held in Cuba.

The Speaking Voice of the Revolution

In addition to the meetings that most of the representatives have had with the diplomats from around the world, I must say that the honorable speaker of the Majlis has had a truly effective role in exporting the revolution, explaining the language of the revolution and the oppressed nature of our revolution to countries abroad. If we wanted to take an average of the involvement of the Majlis in exporting the revolution abroad, 40-50 percent of this task involves the Majlis. I am saying quite boldly that in exporting the revolution, the Majlis has had a 40 percent role, because the relations of the representatives with countries abroad and the trips that Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani made once or twice are the speaking voice of our revolution. They have been reflected in various societies and in the mass media of those countries and have, in fact, played an important role in the exportation of the revolution. This has been a side activity of the Majlis in the political area which has been very successful. He added: Thank God, it can be said that most of the representatives, that is, 95 percent, have sufficient knowledge of the revolution and Islam. Thus far, every law that has passed through the Majlis has conformed with the revolution, the Constitution and Islam. Of course, the Council of Guardians, which is the final stopping place for laws and which controls them, has also played a role. At the same time, this is characteristic of and part of the general work of the Majlis.

Judicial Committee and the Ratification of Religious and Islamic Laws

Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi-Tabrizi, in regards to the activities of the judicial affairs committee of the Majlis, said:

The judicial committee has been very active during these three years, particularly in the third year. According to the statistics provided by the Majlis regarding the work of the committees, the judicial committee ranks first both in the quantity and quality of its work. After the imam's decree before

last, the imam said that the laws contrary to the religion must be discarded, because the revolution is Islamic and in an Islamic country, laws contrary to religion cannot rule. After that decree, the judicial committee, the Council of Guardians and the Supreme Judicial Council held a joint session to discard the anti-religious laws as far as possible and replace them with religious laws, which also included the penal laws. On the whole, since that time, the judicial committee has been successful in throwing out the penal laws of the country which were contrary to the religion and replacing them with Islamic penal laws as follows: the retribution law, the law for mulct and Islamic punishment, the prosecution bylaws and the reform of the civil code, which together consist of about 1,500 articles. These 1,500 articles, thank God, after the imam's decree before last and with the attention paid by the Majlis to the judicial committee in accordance with Article 85 of the Constitution, were referred to the judicial committee for ratification, ratified and announced to the government. Now, our judicial branch works in accordance with these laws. The judicial committee has had other activities than these, that is, most of the laws that are given to the Majlis as proposals or bills, the items that have legal concerns, are often referred to the judicial committee. For instance, the law for the revitalization of manpower in the administrative offices is totally the work of the judicial council, because it has a legal aspect. In short, the judicial council must give its opinions on legal matters concerning any bill presented to the Majlis. For example, the law for calling back to service retired employees and the law for the administrative court of justice were ratified in the judicial committee. Some of the articles of the law were completed and the procedure for the use of townships and incomplete construction complexes which have been suspended were ratified by the judicial committee. The committee expressed its views concerning the law involving municipalities which used to confiscate property and the law for the establishment of the judicial police, the determination of judicial rank and position by the Supreme Judicial Council as well as the law establishing the requirements for selecting judges were also ratified by the judicial committee. I think in the one year which is left of this Majlis, the laws which must be ratified by this committee are the trade and foreign trade laws, of which the trade law is the total responsibility of the judicial committee. And most of the articles in the foreign trade law concern the judicial committee, which has also studied the remainder of the penal prosecution law. God willing, this year we will undertake these studies and, God willing, the judicial committee will determine the essential role of domestic and foreign trade. In short, I think the judicial committee has been successful in 95 percent of its responsibilities. He added: The official committee hours are 6 hours per week, but we work 10-12 hours per week, that is, when there is nothing extra. If there is something out of the

ordinary, we might work more than 12 hours. Hence, the judicial committee has been the most successful committee both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Relation of the Committee with the Concerned Authorities

The deputy director of the judicial affairs committee, responding to a question by our correspondent concerning the relationship of the committee with the officials of the judicial branch, said: The committee has not held an official session with the Supreme Judicial Council, but for whatever is at issue in the committee, we invite the members of the Supreme Judicial Council and they usually participate in the committee meetings. Some members will come to the committee and, generally, all those who work in the judiciary system can be present at the meetings of the judicial committee on a proposal or bill which concerns them.

In these meetings, the officials provide us with information concerning the implementary problems and we make our decisions accordingly. In fact, it can be said that the judicial committee is connected with the judicial branch of the country in every way. The officials participate in the meetings and discuss their problems and then, with consideration for the implementary issues, proposals and bills are ratified by the committee.

The Present Judicial Situation of the Country

In connection with the judicial situation of the country, especially following the message before last of the imam of the people, the representative of the people of Tabriz said:

The judicial system of the country has progressed, especially since the decree before last of the imam, in which he said that laws contrary to the religion must be discarded. And recently, its activities have been swift, effective and more or less timely. Our intention is that, God willing, our justice department and our judicial branch become 100 percent Islamic. It can be said that the judicial branch today is moving to become a modern "house of justice" like that of his holiness Amir ['Ali] of Kufa. His holiness Amir of Kufa had a "house of justice" in which judgments were based on faith, clear proof and religious documents. Our Justice Department and the judicial branch will be a modern "house of justice" in the present century. Thank God, the members of the Supreme Judicial Council are more active these days. In the establishment of penal courts one and two, which we ratified in terms of the prosecution laws, they have become especially active, in the provinces in particular. For instance, I was in Tabriz some time ago and Ayatollah Sane'i, the prosecutor general, had also come there. He saw the situation and most of the theological students and the respected and committed clergy each accepted some responsibility and they are

now working. As far as I know, in other provinces, the situation is the same and, on the whole, it can be said that our judicial branch today is not the same as it was two or three years ago or at the beginning of the revolution. Today, there is a movement and a vision in the judicial branch which, thank God, are improving affairs. Of course, at times, there are obstacles, especially in the case of some of the individuals who cannot be conferred with responsibilities from a religious standpoint. In the Justice Department, there are also those whose situation must be determined in accordance with the law. These obstacles exist, but the fact remains that our Justice Department and the judicial branch do function with independence and determination and do, in fact, provide security for the people and the country. Much remains to be done and, God willing, we will improve with each day.

In the conclusion of this interview, the representative of the people of Tabriz said: It is our constant wish and request of the judicial authorities, since they are involved in implementary affairs and know the problems of the country, and we have also proposed this to the ministries, that they uncover the laws which are meddlesome and create delays for the people, that they study these laws and propose reforms to the Majlis or inform us and we can provide proposals or have them come to the Majlis as government bills, so that we can ratify these amendments as soon as possible and be able, God willing, to remove the injustice from the back of this suffering nation which has been a victim of injustice during the previous regime and throughout the course of our monarchical history and to move the society toward the Islamic social justice which was intended by the Prophet, Almighty God and the pure imams, may peace be upon them. This is our request of the judicial branch and other executive organizations.

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CSO: 4640/238

CLANDESTINE RADIO REPORTS ON MAJLIS SESSION

GF061816 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 6 Jun 83

[Text] The mullah's consultative Majlis held an open session today. Three of the deputies, namely, Seyyed Kazem Akrami, representative of Bahar and Kabud Rahang; Qorban-'Ali (Darri) Najafabadi; and Seyyed Fakhreddin Musavi (Nanekaran), representative of Ardabil, spoke to the session.

During these speeches, the deputies outlined the multifarious and unsolvable problems of their constituencies and demanded the elimination of agricultural difficulties and the clarification of the conditions of the rural residents. They also demanded concrete steps by the executive bodies to prevent the astronomical price hikes and the hoarding and paucity of foodstuffs.

Today Asgar-Owladi, the commerce minister of the mullahs' government, attended the Majlis of the mullahs in order to answer the queries of 100 Majlis mullahs regarding the high price of rice, difficulties in obtaining fertilizer and [word indistinct] measures for the control of (?consumer goods) and (?foodstuffs) and the unjust distribution of government wheat and differences in the price of flour in various districts. But his replies were far from satisfactory and the mullahs referred the questions to the commission for dealing with queries.

The mullahs' Majlis also approved three clauses of an illegal bill on profitless banking activities according to which the people's assets would be considered an interest-free loan and people should not expect any interest on their capital. In the three clauses that were approved, banks can issue (?prize bonds) in cash or kind on the deposits. Depositors will be exempted from paying [word indistinct].

CSO: 4640/245

SOUNDING THE KNELL FOR IMMINENT IRAQI FALL

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 16 May 83 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, 16 May 83 (IRNA) In an editorial published in its Saturday's issue, the Persian daily Jomhuri Eslami questioned whether it would not be advisable for the Islamic Republic to finish the war with crucial attacks on the enemy forces rather than resort to international organizations for condemning the myriad of war crimes continuously committed in Iran by the Iraqi forces. Excerpts.

"The arrest of the treacherous leaders of the (pro-Moscow) Tudeh Party has infuriated Baghdad as well as Moscow. The potentates in Baghdad have benefitted from the Soviet spies in Iran as much as they have benefitted from the Soviet-made MiGs, Tupolovs (fighter planes). Therefore the arrest of the mercenary members of the Tudeh Party and the expulsion of 18 Soviet spies from Iran had, as though, inflicted a heavy blow upon the rotten corpse of the Zionist regime in Baghdad, thereby precipitating Saddam and his aides in their eventual fall from power. Then we may believe that Saddam should now be missing the reports of his intelligence services in Iran, and that his dropping of Soviet-made missiles upon innocent civilians in Andimeshk and Dezful portrays only his craving for vengeance.

"The question is, how long should Saddam Hussein be

permitted to indulge in Barbarous operations with the aid of the American, Soviet, French and British armament? How long should he be permitted to indulge in his criminal acts sparing not even small babies, and ruining most bare-facedly our towns and cities. True such crimes betoken his wretched status, and his headlong plunge into his doomed fate, but yet he must not be permitted to make so much havoc and destruction as did the ex-Shah in the last days of his ignominous flight. A strategem should be designed and implemented in order that this notorious criminal (Saddam) may fall from power so that the people in our towns and cities will feel safe from his tyrannical acts. Needless to mention that the coming here of foreign reporters and the filing of complaints with the international organizations which have come to being principally for the purpose of siding with the big powers and their puppet governments is not likely to bring any result whatsoever to the Islamic Republic...

"The task should be finished by drawing on our stalwart combatants and by bringing to rubble the pillars of tyranny in Baghdad onto Saddam's head and his Zionist clique. Without doubt there seems to be left no alternative.

CONSCRIPTION OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON NEW DRAFT LAW

GF060428 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 May 83 p 19

[Exclusive interview with Colonel Razmj, head of the National Conscription Department--date, place not given]

[Excerpts] Colonel Razmj began by discussing the national conscription bill. He said: The bill has already received first vote approval in the Majlis and is currently under review by a special commission formed of the defense and internal affairs commissions, and 10 articles of this bill have already received second vote approval by the Majlis. In general, the bill currently under discussion in the Majlis has three distinctive parts. One is that those eligible for service will not be able to avoid service in the future since they will be subject to deprivation of a great many of their social rights. Even if they can live in the society for a short time without the majority of their social rights, the evaders will not be able to endure this for a long time and will be forced to give themselves up. Such evaders will have this deprivations of rights as a punishment for 10 years after the end of service if they evaded their national service during the time of war.

On second part of this bill, Colonel Razmj said: In the future, all exemptions granted on the basis of being the sole breadwinner will be eliminated. The only ones eligible for exemption under the new bill will be those who have a parent who, according to the opinion of a medical panel, is unable to look after himself or herself and would require the round-the-clock care of someone to nurse him or her, or those who have a minor brother or sister. There is no longer any criteria for income. In all other cases those eligible for service will be drafted and if they have a family which will suffer financially as a result of this, then their families should contact the imam relief committee which will offer them financial aid. The third part deals with medical exemptions in which case every illness and handicap will no longer merit exemption. Only those people whose handicap or illness would prevent continuous service will receive medical exemptions. Other people who may be weak or have a handicap preventing them for active service can carry out their military service in noncombatant positions. Doctors will only receive a medical exemption if they cannot carry out their profession.

CSO: 4640/246

HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI UK BANK BALANCE REPORTED

GF121815 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 12 Jun 83

[Text] Our correspondent in London has managed to interview an official of the regime's embassy in England who has been recalled to Tehran. This official of Khomeyni's embassy in London has told our correspondent that during his tour of duty in London one of his major duties was to look after two bank accounts of the Majlis speaker, Hashemi-Rafsanjani. This official of the Islamic Republic Embassy revealed that the contents of the account, which is close to \$100 million, has earned over \$5 million in interests during the past 3 years. The former official of the Islamic Republic Embassy in London added: For nearly 3 years I was given the responsibility of looking after the two accounts of Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Since I was the only one who knew about these accounts I would have been hunted down and destroyed by the agents of the regime had I revealed anything in the past. However, since I have now been forced to leave the embassy and have asked for political asylum, I can reveal all the information I have about Rafsanjani's accounts.

The report, quoting the former official of Khomeyni's embassy in London, adds: One of the accounts was opened by Mohsen Rafiqdust, a relative of Rafsanjani in June 1979 in the Royal Bank of (?Fox and Ford) with a sum of \$12 million. Two months later Rafsanjani's brother-in-law, Mar'ashi, who owns a registry office in Vanak Square of Tehran added \$7 million to the account by bringing a draft to London. The account is under the name of 'Ali Bahrebani, which is the real name of Rafsanjani. The second account is in a Bank of America branch under the name of Mrs Mar'ashi, Rafsanjani's wife, and was opened with \$22 million as a 6-month fixed deposit account. The former official adds: I had the power of attorney allowing me to renew the deposit terms and was in charge of looking after these accounts during the past 3 years. I served in the guards and committees for 6 months and because of my father's acquaintance with Hashemi-Rafsanjani, I was sent to London as a student with the aid of Mr Rafsanjani in June 1979. I also got a job in the embassy. Rafsanjani was given multimillion dollar commissions from large companies during the past 3 years, which were put in Rafsanjani's two accounts. The total sum in the two accounts is currently around \$93 million.

CSO: 4640/243

LIBERALIZATION OF BAZARGAN'S ACTIVITIES QUESTIONED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 p 4

[Text]

Some Iranian observers also warn that recent signs that former premier Mehdi Bazargan is being allowed to resume some political activity must be seen strictly in the light of recent signs of public dissatisfaction with the situation inside Iran. There have been recent signs that the mullahs are aware that secular nationalism is gaining ground against purely Islamic fervour and Bazargan was one of the first to warn that the Tudeh party was benefiting from the Islamic regime's policies more than any other.

Bazargan, in spite of his obvious humanity compared to the bigotry of the conservative clergy, represents and is part of a moderate section of the community which has a natural aversion to the fanatical form of radicalism that is being purveyed by the Khamenei and Imam's line clique who are the right wing mullahs implacable enemies.

Thus while the conservative or moderate elements, possibly now represented publicly by Mahdavi Kani, seem to have the ear of Khomeini at the moment, any change of mood could bring a new backlash against Bazargan and his kind, it was felt. One reason the Soviets were pursuing such a mild line over the break-up of the Tudeh party was their realisation that if the conservatives stay in the ascendant Khamenei and the Imam's line people and other radicals could be the next to be purged--with the result that the Soviets would be deprived of any natural allies of any kind in Iran. Any further exacerbation of the situation by Moscow could bring this about sooner rather than later, Soviet officials might feel.

CSO: 4600/641

NEWSPAPERS AFFECTED BY ARRESTS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 p 4

[Text]

Sources in Tehran said 32 members of the staff of the leading Ettelaat daily in the capital had been arrested, with the result that the paper was unable to appear for several days. A further 19 were reported held at the Kayhan, the other main daily in the capital.

The efficiency and the wide nature of the operation, covering most of the country, tended to belie contentions that the arrests were solely motivated by animosity towards the Soviet Union, which was the theory of most western commentators.

"Though resentment over recent Soviet actions may have added to their ire there is no doubt that the so-called Hojjatiah or more conservative mullahs have been waiting for a chance to whip up feeling against the Tudeh party for a long time", an experienced Tehran observer told IPS. "The evidence, documented down to the last detail, that has seemingly been presented to confirm the Tudeh members' anti-state activities and their organisation, must have taken a long time to amass. It could only have persuaded Khomeini and his aides that a move at the right time was essential and it looks as if Soviet opting to support Iraq merely supplied the pretext for launching the anti-Tudeh campaign that climaxed swiftly with last week's clampdown long after the first arrests."

CSO: 4600/641

RAFSANJANI COMMENTS ON TUDEH PARTY, SOVIETS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 May 83 pp 1, 4

[Text]

TEHRAN- Soviet Union has definitely lost all hopes in Iran after the arrest of the treacherous Tudeh Party members acting as a gigantic espionage network, said Majlis Speaker, Hashemi Rafsanjani in an interview with Islamic Republic daily Thursday.

Speaking on the arrest of Tudeh Party members Rafsanjani stated, "There are many revelations to be made yet concerning this Satanic party. The case is under investigation and the result of their trial, which has opened, will no doubt be brought to public notice."

Remarking on Iran-Soviet relations, Rafsanjani continued, "The arrest of Tudeh Party members who had infiltrated into many organs of our country, will certainly have some effect on relations between both countries, because the Russians relied on the party as one of its principal espionage agents."

Rafsanjani further added, "When they (Russians) see that they cannot continue their spying operations in Iran, they will not go so far as to completely lose a neighboring country like Iran and by doing so put themselves into trouble."

"They are aware" the Majlis Speaker stressed, "of the fact that if they intend to have cordial relations with us, they must not interfere in our internal affairs. When they find

that we want to have healthy mutual relations in business, technical, cultural and transport affairs, they will surely accept the truth".

Remarking on the Russian concern on the arrest of Tudeh Party members Rafsanjani went on to say, "The Russians were annoyed by the arrest of Tudeh Party members. But they will finally calm down and the situation should straighten itself out", he said. He added, "We have no desire to get involved with our neighbor (Russia) with whom we have 2,000 kms of border, but on the other hand wish to promote what is mutually beneficial for both countries."

"If they follow a realistic policy such as the one we are now following, then there need not be problems in our relations in the long-run and we are sure we can reach positive results," Rafsanjani said.

Elaborating, Rafsanjani remarked, "As long as the Tudeh Party operated as a spy network in Iran, we were concerned about our northern neighbor, but when we are assured and the Russians also have lost hopes (of conspiratorial tactics in Iran) it is possible that we can have normal relations with them, provided they want to have just relations."

"However, we have to

wait until the matter is cleared up fully, because we are not

yet quite certain as to what all their other objectives and plans from this relation with Tudeh Party have been. There may be some matters still to be cleared. And we are almost sure that they have realized the truth." he said.

In conclusion Rafsanjani revealed the Tudeh links with Russia, saying, "We were aware of this link and everything was under our control although we were only waiting to act at the proper time. Every single step in this process was pre-arranged and carefully studied and was not executed in haste. This same policy which we have observed in the past, will be pursued in the future," he said.

CSO: 4600/659

TUDEH, SECULAR PARTIES IN ISLAM VIEWED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 May 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Secular Political Parties in the World of Islam"]

[Text] Secular political parties in the Islamic nations have customarily been under the influence of foreign powers. These political parties in most instances act as a foreign power proxy in their own countries.

Before we begin to substantiate the above hypothesis, attention should be drawn to the fact that these secular political parties, in the world of Islam, fall into three categories.

The first category contains the government sponsored parties. These parties are established by the heads of the ruling government to maintain themselves in power and to create a popular power base. The success of these parties in absorbing the masses and the control of political variables is very limited. Obviously the life of these political parties is dependent on the life of the ruling regime. Should the regime perish so will the party. As ready examples of such parties we can give the following: Jamal Abd Al-Nasser party in Egypt, Anvar Saddat's party, the Noor Al-Saeed party in Iraq, the Adib Al-Shishleeki party in Syria, and so on.

The second category contains the nationalist parties. These parties although not founded on a well-defined ideology and lacking a global vision have come up with designs and plans for the management and supervision of their societies. To acquire political power, these groups declare their programs to the people with much ballyhoo and sloganeering. Such organizations were originally founded in Western Europe and continue to enjoy prominence there. Their organizational skeletons are based on liberalistic visions and aspirations.

The difference between the first and the second category is that the parties belonging to the latter enjoy power in confronting imperialism, foreign-inspired hegemony and attracting popular support.

The third category contains the parties that claim to have an ideology and global vision. Communist and socialist parties fall into this category. Thus, considering the above classification, the working and political responsibilities of these parties in the Islamic countries can be easily understood.

Also, the above classification clarifies the harmony or disharmony of these three categories with each other.

The regimes in power have often taken the utmost advantage of the disparity existing between nationalist and communist parties. And they have often conspired in many different ways to widen the rift between these two inimical parties. The CIA has exploited this rift most skillfully.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that in such political feudings the Muslims in Islamic countries try to stand clear and through this position lose their political presence altogether. One of the most rudimentary reasons for the political absence of Muslims in these battles is the existence of complete discord between the aspirations of the nationalist and communist parties on the one hand, and that of the Islamic parties on the other. Their goals are in an unmitigating and eternal clash. The last half century of history in the Arab world is a proof of the correctness of the above statement.

The communist parties in the world of Islam have been dependent on the internal political changes of Moscow's Communist Party. In other words, the communist parties in the Islamic nations in the era of Lenin held the belief that communism worked for the execution of a proletarian revolution under the leadership of the Soviet Union. But gradually, and specially in the Stalinist era, such styles of thinking and inference were changed. Communist parties in the Islamic world used to harbor the belief that the Soviet Union was the mother of communist parties in the world. Consequently, the fate of the "mother" is inseparable from that of the offspring.

But, eventually, in the era of Khrushchev the Soviet Communist Party's line of thinking took a drastic shift from that of Lenin and Stalin and led to the complete subjugation of the communist groupings especially in the world of Islam, to the whims of Moscow. Of course, one should not forget that this subordination existed in the era of Lenin and Stalin too. For instance, Abolqassem Lahooti in his renowned book "My Life" expounds on the complete dependence of the Tudeh Party and its collusion with the Soviets.

This party (Tudeh) opposed Mossadegh and claimed he was an agent of Britain, thus following the commands of its master (Moscow) and the mood of the prevalent political atmosphere.

In addition to the above-mentioned three categories there are other factions which have drawn and expanded on the precepts and the tenets of communist ideology. Examples of such factions are the left wing of the Congress Party in India and the Iraqi Ba'athist Party.

The history of the recent decades of the Islamic world demonstrates clearly that the non-Islamic parties not only have been faltering but have in many instances impeded potential Islamic movements. The Moroccan Communist Party, in very obvious ways, opposed Algeria's complete independence. That group explained this opposition by relying on the sophistry that the Algerian working class had not reached adequate political maturity, thus legitimizing the French imperialism in that country. Also the Soviet Communist Party defended

the preponderance of Italy over Libya. They conjectured this line of thinking would catapult the Italian communists to power in that country's elections.

The policies of the Communist Party in Iraq is another noticeable example of treason committed by this party to the world of Islam and the masses of Muslims. The Iraqi Communist Party served the corrupt and shame-ridden government of Saddam and tried to qualify its misdeeds. This was despite the inherent contradictions present in the aspirations and the policies of the two parties. But eventually the Ba'athist regime hung on the gallows the leaders of this ill-starred group. The Soviet Union was annoyed by this act and Saddam's violent and repressive measures were criticized by Pravda, the official organ of the Soviet regime. The Iraqi regime, in turn, repudiated Pravda's criticism and accused it of interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq.

Political events during the last three decades clearly disclose the essence and philosophy of these secular parties and reveal they are a collective blight on the aspirations of the world of Islam.

CSO: 4600/662

TUDEH PUBLICATION ATTACKS KHOMEYNI REGIME

GF071900 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 7 Jun 83

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The temporary mouthpiece of the defunct Tudeh Party RAH-E TUDEH which is disseminated outside Iran has, in its latest publication, timidly attacked the mullahs' regime but has not been able to overtly attack Khomeyni and all the other mullahs in extolling the virtues of whom the Tudehis had even left the Hezbollahis behind.

The strongest attack that has been made in this publication against the mullahs' regime is in an article entitled: "The Simple Fascists" which is excerpted in the form of a letter of a mother addressed to her son abroad but is actually the opinion of the present Tudeh leaders living abroad. In one part of this article it says: Dear son. I hope you are fine. I miss you very much. On the other hand I am very happy that you are not in Iran. The society fears Islam. Barbaric rage (?because of) the imprisonment of your friends has engulfed everyone. They have taken all of them without clothes, without their glasses and even some without their artificial teeth.

Following this barbarism, torture has been inflicted in the detention camps. All these things are evidence of the fact that we are confronted with a (?simple) fascism. (?This has been planned by) the SAVAK, (?pseudoclergy-men) who are becoming more violent and irrational due to the insanity and senselessness of their leaders. They imagine that the only means of their salvation lies in the elimination of their opponents with all their might and mean.

Hitler killed the Jews and the communists. The Islamic Republic has (?eliminated) the members of the (?juriconsults) and all those who have different views as well as communists. Hitler burned communist and progressive books; the guards (?ruling) over the Islamic Republic are doing the same. One in the name of fascism, one in the name of Islam.

It is interesting that the officeholders of the Tudeh Party and RAH-E TUDEH have at long last after 4 years awakened to the fact that the Islamic Republic's regime is in no way different from the fascist Hitler regime but have not dared to mention the name of the Hitler of Iran, Khomeyni the criminal.

CSO: 4640/247

TUDÉH LEADERS NOT FOR EXECUTION YET

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 pp 1, 2

[Text] It looked as if the mullahs in Tehran had decided this week to stop short of summarily executing the Tudeh party leaders who have confessed to spying--at least for the immediate future. Revolutionary guards chief Mohsen Rezai, who appears to be taking much of the credit for the seizing of the Tudeh activists, said on Wednesday that it was too soon to carry out such a penalty for the Tudeh leaders had so far given up only a small part of their store of information.

Observers saw this as a possible response to the muted Soviet reaction to the arrest of the pro-Moscow Tudeh members and the expulsion of 18 diplomats from the Soviet embassy. Although the party newspaper Pravda has been warning the mullahs of the consequences of their action, the government has preserved a surprisingly mild stance. Firmly denying the charges against both the diplomats and the Tudeh leaders it said it still wanted to have good relations with its southern neighbour.

Independent Iranian observers said the Russians had enough on their plate in coping with the war situations in Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran border regions to encourage them to try to defuse the Tudeh crisis. They point out that the Soviet-backed National Voice of Iran communist radio beaming from the Caucasus has for a long time been warning that the right wing clergy were planning to take moves to the advantage of western imperialists, so it was unlikely Moscow was entirely surprised by what happened.

By midweek sources inside Iran were suggesting that at least 5,000 people had been held in the round-up of suspected Tudeh activists and members. Rezai claimed that most of the leadership had been caught, though there were persistent reports that a big section of the middle level party members had realised what was happening in time to go into hiding or even get out of the country.

Rezai said more than 1,000 people were being held, but the sources said that possibly that number had been apprehended in the armed forces and among revolutionary guards alone. Another claim was that 200 retired officers were among those held. Reports said the allegations against the Tudeh had sparked off a nationwide witch-hunt, with people hunting out and denouncing suspects

to the authorities. This could explain the high number of arrests, which had suggested to some observers a security effectiveness that would have been surprising.

"The mullahs certainly know how to manipulate the Iranian public", one observer commented. "Just when the latter looks as if it is getting really discontented they set off a campaign like this one in which the people, those who have always been against the regime as well as hezbollahis, help the mullahs to wipe out any pockets of resistance to the regime."

There were suspicions that other leftist secular opponents of the regime had also been mopped up with the more active Tudeh participants. The Tudeh had provided at least some small means for political expression in private for those of more leftist inclinations and, one source pointed out, it could not be easy to know where a person's Tudeh connections really began.

Once again the tameness with which suspected opponents of the regime confessed to their crimes was a point for discussion among Iranians. The regime and many of its opponents contended that, as reports had claimed, the evidence presented to the Tudeh activists of the authorities' knowledge of their actions and associations was so irrefutable Kia Nouri and the others had no alternative but to confess.

But more sophisticated observers dismissed this, pointing out that fabrication of evidence was a special skill of the regime. In addition Kia-Nouri and his colleagues had the example of Sadegh Qotbzadeh, Khosrow Qashqai and others who confessed to crimes on television--and then were promptly executed to warn of what happened to those who admitted their guilt. More and more observers were coming round to the point of view that the security services in Tehran have available drugs or other means to force defendants to confess to crimes they may never have committed. North Koreans in Tehran, it was suggested, could have the kind of skills needed in this field.

CSO: 4600/641

TUDEH MEMBERS CONFESS ON TELEVISION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 pp 3, 4

[Text] Whatever the pressures used to induce them to talk publicly the members of the Tudeh central committee who appeared on television confessed in a manner that seemed perfectly designed to destroy any remaining vestiges of legitimacy the party could have had as a nationalist Iranian party. —

Gholam Hossain Qaem-Panah said that his party was so dependent on the policies of the Soviet Union, where the party had fallen totally into the Russians' hands, and Bulgaria that it had no policy of its own in the interests of the Iranian people. On their return to Iran after the revolution a number of prominent members had formed a commercial company to provide the link between first secretary Kia-Nouri and Soviet organisations.

Other Tudeh committee members confessed they had become KGB agents.

One, Mohammad Ali Amoui, said that although the party announced its support for the Islamic republic's constitution in fact it continued its treason, disregarding Interior ministry regulations on legal activities of the party. He said that spying for the Soviet Union was a major responsibility of the party and the northern provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Azarbajian were the first places where its activities were started under the protection of the Soviets.

CSO: 4600/641

PERIODICAL DISCUSSES 'CONFessions' TACTICS ADOPTED BY REGIME

Paris LIBERATION in French 2 May 83 p 19

[Text] The repression which is falling upon the Tudeh, and which will probably end with the execution of its leaders, reflects factional struggles existing within the Islamic power, particularly over the attitude to adopt towards the United States.

"Today before the Imam Khomeyni, the guide of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic, I am going to try to ask pardon, and facing him ashamed, explain the infractions of our party during 4 years of activity in the Islamic Republic." Nureddin Kianuri, secretary-general of the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, began his "confessions" with these words on Iranian television Saturday evening.

Arrested last 6 February with 30 other persons, Nureddin Kianuri spoke slowly with portraits of the Ayatollah Khomeyni and his "dauphin" Ayatollah Hosseyn Montazeri posted up in back of him.

"We have not been able to free ourselves from our foreign dependence and our political activities have become activities of espionage and treason against the Islamic Republic." In shirt-sleeves, with an open collar and graying beard--he is 72 years of age--, apparently not in poor physical condition, Kianuri thus replied to an anonymous interviewer. The staging of these "confession" sessions is moreover always the same: seated behind a desk, a "revolutionary" placard at his back, the "accused" answers in short phrases, punctuated with silence. The questions follow in a fast rhythm for 15 minutes. Thus, on Saturday evening Kianuri admitted that the Tudeh "sent political and military reports to the USSR," and that it had "infiltrated elements into desirable places"....

"These infractions are so serious that the Islamic Republic has the right to use the most severe punishments," Nureddin Kianuri had to conclude. The sinister ceremony of the "confessions, which has become common practice in Iran, could be drawing to a close: it lasted a half-hour here, during which Kianuri provided Khomeyni all the arguments to achieve the final liquidation of his party.... The naming of a new commander-in-chief of the Iranian Navy, Esfendiar Hosseyni, could moreover be connected with the Tudeh affair: according to certain rumors Captain Afzali, his predecessor, was close to the Tudeh....

The practice of "confessions" was really established after the second half of 1981, after the destitution of ex-President Bani-Sadr by Khomeyni. It is as though these parodies "made up for" the silence in which the so-called trials of the "revolutionary tribunals" transpire which are closed to the public and for even better reasons to foreign journalists. All the witnesses who have emerged alive from Khomeyni's prisons relate that in the course of their "interrogations" the mullahs try to obtain two things: names and information on the resistance and (in the case of the militants of the "mojahedin"--the Islamic left) for the prisoners to condemn on television Mas'ud Rajavi (the leader of the mojahedin) or the latter's meeting with Tarek Aziz, the Iranian vice prime minister....

The little screen has shown many "confessions" in 2 and a half years: Sadeq Qotbzadeh, former minister of foreign affairs, was run through it before being executed for a "plot" on 29 September 1982 as well as the Ayatollah Shari'at Madari, one of the main figures of the Shiite hierarchy, today under house arrest. And one of the closest woman collaborators of Abdol Hasan Bani-Sadr, Sudabeh Sodeyfi, made her televised "confessions" only after having seen with her own eyes the execution of young girls and after they threatened to continue these executions if she did not go on the television....

Whatever the case, the "confessions" of Kianuri, as well as the new wave of arrests which took place on Friday in the Tudeh, indicate that the contradictions within the Iranian regime are becoming ever more pronounced. The Iranian leaders at the present time are actually clashing over two slogans: "Death to the USSR" and "Death to the Great Satan." In a context where some of them are accusing the others of wanting to make an "opening" toward the United States--and also Turkey--(the Iranian Minister of Foreign Trade, Asgar Oladi is even said to have met very recently with American officials in Algeria), the problem of the Tudeh has become a pawn. The arrests in the Tudeh thus confirm the desire of the most committed elements in Teheran completely to neutralize the Tudeh, the activities of which had up to now been all the more tolerated because this party did not hesitate to collaborate with the regime of Khomeyni, including tasks of repression.... This "liquidation" of the Tudeh will make it particularly possible to "relax" the atmosphere with the United States.

During this time demonstrations against the Khomeyni regime took place in the town of Dezfoul on the occasion of the funerals of the victims of the Iraqi bombardments of that town. According to preliminary information which has arrived in France, more than 2,000 people are said to have demonstrated in the so-called "Siahpoucha" quarter of Dezfoul. Eighty people are even said to have been arrested and to have been transferred to the city of Ahwaz.

6108
CSO: 4619/72

RAFSANJANI RUMORED AGAINST TUDEH DISSOLUTION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 p 5

[Text]

The absence of Hashemi Rafsanjani from Friday prayers and his failure to comment on the Tudeh arrests publicly within the first few days of it taking place strengthened rumours that he and president Ali Khamenei were against the dissolution of the Tudeh and a possible rupture with the Soviets at this stage.

Sources in Tehran say that in addition to Mohsen Rezai, now seen as a revived power, foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati played a leading role in convincing the ruling mullahs that a hard and uncompromising stand against the Soviet Union was desirable.

Velayati was the original candidate for the premiership when the then holder of the office Javad Bahonar was killed in a bomb blast. But the Rafsanjani faction were against Velayati for the post and Mussavi was elected instead. Now, it is believed, Velayati is bidding for the post again, rumours recently suggesting that he has taken every opportunity to undermine Mussavi's position. Persistent rumours over the past few months have suggested that Mussavi's hold on the post is not secure.

The Tehran rumour-mill said not long ago that Sadegh Tabatabai would replace Mussavi as premier. Later Mehdi Bazargan's name was brought out again. Now there is talk that Velayati will get the post.

CSO: 4600/641

TUDEH ACTIVISTS IN EUROPE SEEK SUPPORT, SAY STRUGGLE WILL CONTINUE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 pp 5-6

[Text] Communist parties throughout Europe were planning meetings and propaganda campaigns this week in support of the Tudeh party in Iran. They called for international outcry against the "tortures and other abuses" inflicted on the arrested Tudeh members in Iran--a stand which Iranian nationalist groups were not slow to point out was in direct contrast to the both vocal and tacit support Tudeh gave the mullahs for their actions against other opposition groups.

An active party member told IPS this week that the Tudeh had been fully prepared for an onslaught by the mullahs one day. "We did not believe for one moment that our work under a mullah-dominated regime would be easy", he said. "We were always on our guard. Our files were well-protected and the party machinery is intact. The mullahs have arrested only a tiny number of our immense potential."

Not that the party had anything to hide, he went on to say. The relations Tudeh had with communist parties elsewhere were the kind normally developed between groups and organisations sharing identical ideals. "There is nothing new in the mullahs' smearing tactics", he said. "For the past 42 years our existence our enemies have tried to smear the healthy relationship which exists between the Tudeh party and the communist party of the Soviet Union."

He said the party had decided to continue its struggle on two fronts. On one it would do its best to safeguard the Iranian revolution from subversion by imperialists, while on the other it would try to secure the release and safety of the true revolutionaries now in custody. The Tudeh would not allow harm to come those people.

"We are now mobilising international public opinion to safeguard the Iranian revolution and to seek release of our comrades," he continued. "We have protested at the way our comrades have been arrested, tortured and made to sign confessions. We have made it clear that charges brought against the leadership are all baseless. We have proof of our innocence. All along, we as a party have respected the laws of the Islamic republic. In any independent tribunal we would win our case."

The central committee of the party had demanded a neutral commission should investigate the evidence and ensure no harm came to the arrested people. "But we must stress that our overriding concern is to save the revolution in Iran", he said. "The revolution was a mass movement to oust the Shah, who was without any doubt the agent of imperialism in the region!"

He claimed that the so-called nationalist opposition groups were known to be more critical of the Tudeh party than anybody else. Bakhtiar's publications had given up writing against the mullahs and were concentrating on fighting the "progressive elements". Other groups were doing the same and the opposition radio stations beamed anti-Tudeh propaganda into Iran. But this could not affect a "great" party.

He said the imperialists needed to help the right-wing mullahs to emerge as the main bastion of power within Iran's ruling society. The right wing managed to convince the authorities that if the Tudeh were allowed to continue to operate freely it would soon win over the masses. So the authorities turned against the Tudeh and in doing so they were primarily influenced not by popular feeling but by "the propaganda of the counter-revolutionaries like Bakhtiar, Amini, Madani and the like!"

The expulsion of the Soviet diplomats from Tehran was also part of a worldwide plot against the popular international feeling for peace, the Tudeh man claimed. "Our regret is that our country has followed in the footsteps of such countries as Britain, France, the USA and others in expelling Soviet diplomats on such unfounded charges.

He appealed to all progressive elements to come forward and help Tudeh save the Iranian revolution. They had to act swiftly, he said, adding an appeal to young Iranians not to be led astray by "revisionists".

CSO: 4600/641

REZAI WINS BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF GUARDS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 pp 6-7

[Text] The intense personal rivalry between revolutionary guards commander Mohsen Rezai and voluntary militia minister Mohsen Rafiqdoost seems to have been temporarily resolved in favour of Rezai. He now takes overall command of both the militia and guards operating under the command of the committees.

This means that interior minister Nateq Nouri has also lost his personal control of the guards who double as police in urban areas. However, a compromise plan has been formulated which provides for two different kinds of semi-official armed groups to patrol urban areas together with the ordinary revolutionary guards.

One group will check for subversive activites and be responsible to Rezai. The other will act as a watchdog body to ensure that people do not "commit sins or engage in permissive activities." This group will report to committees under the control of Nateq Nouri.

The guards acting as enforcers of Islamic ethics are known as "jondollah", meaning troops of God. They also have to ensure that any other guards to not stray from the right path.

Despite the new development sources say rivalries and jealousies continue between various factions of the guards.

CSO: 4600/641

SOVIETS HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 pp 2, 3

[Text] The fact that the Soviets had reacted so mildly to what could be seen by most of world as a severe blow to their prestige was also viewed by many observers as a sign that they realised they were virtually impotent to influence events in Iran. The mullahs have shown repeatedly that they will not bend to pressures and even the Syrians and North Koreans, though valuable allies for Tehran and useful suppliers of arms, are not indispensable.

In addition, it was suspected that the Soviets have other allies and agents inside Iran who have not been foolish enough to reveal their hand. Many are thought to have been infiltrated across the borders in the last two years, most of them Persian-speaking and with cultural and other associations with the areas in which they now live.

As far as the war with Iraq is concerned Moscow has to face up to the fact that officials who are perfectly happy to see thousands of young Iranians to die in their cause are unlikely to hesitate for long if it comes to deciding to stop the war temporarily to allow them to stand up to any Soviet pressures in other domains.

With Tehran mouthing huge figures which it says it will accept as reparations and the Iraqis issuing threats of new attacks on targets inside Iran there were once more signs that somebody has been making offers to the mullahs if they will give up the war. The Gulf Arab states said on Monday that they are planning a big new peace initiative. And when the talk has been of negotiations in the past both Baghdad and Tehran have begun plotting out their positions as they did earlier this week.

One Paris commentator suggested that Khomeini might even agree to suspend the war with Iraq so that he can move troops up to the border with Afghanistan and boldly threaten to support the rebels in that country. This, it was felt, would make Khomeini such a hero both inside Iran and in other Third World countries that the Soviets would have to handle the situation with kid gloves for fear of alienating their friends. And Khomeini could be guaranteed new popularity and another breathing space.

"Let's face it, Khomeini and his colleagues would see no less virtue in sending in young Iranians to fight against Soviet tanks and helicopters inside Afghanistan as they have done in the war against Iraq", he said. "The sanctity of Islam, not human life, is the mullahs' cry. Perhaps Moscow understands that it is better to put up with a little humiliation than to get involved in some imbroglio with Iran that could have much worse effects in the long run."

CSO: 4600/641

ABSENCE OF RAFSANJANI FROM SCENE SPARKS RUMORS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 p 3

[Text] The virtual disappearance of the constantly heard and seen Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani for several days provoked rumours of his having been "framed" as part of the Tudeh plot. Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, the former premier and a member of the Council of Guardians, took his place as leader of Tehran's main weekly prayers last Friday and Rafsanjani's voice, so often heard on the radio, where his brother is in charge, was not to be heard there either.

Mahdavi Kani, on the other hand, was everywhere and it was understandable that there should be suggestions that his star is now very much in the ascendant. At the time he resigned, following the appointment of Ali Khamenei, he is reported to have told a friend that then was not his time, but it would come. Observers say he may be one of the main beneficiaries of the conservative mullahs' determination to oppose the leftists. Khomeini himself, it would appear, could be on his side now.

Khomeini's ability to sense and go along with the mood of the people once again stood him in good stead when the moves against the Tudeh were mooted, Iranian observers point out. The name of Shaikh Halabi, said to be one of the leaders of the right-wing hojjatieh group, is being bandied around in Tehran as being the initiator of the campaign against the Tudeh. It reached sufficient proportions, it is said, to make Khomeini realise he must associate himself with it, with the result his unique statement expressing his support for the move against the party which ended in its dissolution.

Physical violence against Tudeh officials or suspects led to the deaths of more than one person, reports from Tehran say. An official of the party in Astara, on the Soviet border west of the Caspian Sea, was hanged publicly, it was alleged.

Mahdavi Kani told his Friday prayers congregation that in the early days of the revolution, when he was in charge of the revolutionary committees, evidence was repeatedly brought to their attention of subversive operations of the political groups. Before moving against them, however, it was felt necessary for the crimes of these people to be evident to masses of the people.

"You and we knew from the beginning that the Tudeh party was an unprincipled party", the Islamic Republic News Agency quoted him as saying. "Ever since the constitutional revolution nearly 70 years ago they (the communists) have indulged in many plots...I think members of Tudeh have been more unprincipled and treacherous than any other group here...This group avowed to be treading the path set out by Imam Khomeini. They even criticised the Council of Guardians and claimed that it was not acting in keeping with the Imam's policies."

CASE OF 'SPECIAL ENVOY' TABATABAI REPORTED

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 21, May 83 pp 44,
45

[Article by Manik Mehta]

[Text]

Few people had heard of the "Iran Committee" in Frankfurt until it filed indictment proceedings against West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and some diplomats in the Bonn Foreign Office for allegedly "obstructing the course of justice and enabling the escape of former Iranian deputy prime minister Sadegh Tabatabai," who was charged by a court in Dusseldorf with smuggling raw opium into the country.

Tabatabai's escape to Teheran was preceded by a protracted tug-of-war between the Foreign Office and the court in Dusseldorf. The bone of contention was whether Tabatabai enjoyed diplomatic status and, hence, immunity against prosecution instituted by the court.

Tabatabai, who arrived with a diplomatic passport, had been subsequently given diplomatic status by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati who wrote to Genscher that Tabatabai was a "special envoy" on a "secret mission" to a number of West European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany. Genscher had promptly informed the court in Dusseldorf that Tabatabai was a "special envoy" of the Iranian government and as such enjoyed diplomatic status which granted him immunity from prosecution.

The court released Tabatabai on bail, pending his court trial. Tabatabai boarded a Lufthansa plane on March 9 and quietly left for Teheran, knowing very well that he would be sentenced by the court to a number of years' imprisonment. He was right. The court passed a three-year prison sentence on Tabatabai the following morning.

An embarrassed defence counsellor of Tabatabai sheepishly informed the presiding

judge that the accused had to rush to Teheran in order to "report to the highest authority in his country of the incidents in the Federal Republic of Germany, which had obstructed the accomplishment of his most secret mission."

The case began on January 8 when customs officials at Dusseldorf airport discovered a neatly wrapped package of 1.718 kilos of raw opium in the baggage of Tabatabai, who had arrived from Teheran via Zurich. Tabatabai, who at once produced his diplomatic passport and, reportedly, tried to impress the officials with his status, is alleged to have assured them that the package was not opium but a "pomegranate extract" commonly used in Iran for treating swellings and headaches.

A laboratory test quickly confirmed that it was opium. The ever-smiling Tabatabai changed his story. The substance, he said, was a strong painkiller for treating an aunt suffering from cancer. Much later, however, Tabatabai maintained that political opponents must have put the raw opium into his bag at Zurich airport to discredit him in the eyes of the Germans!

Foreign Office officials were literally dragged out of their beds in the late evening of January 8, to testify whether they were aware of any diplomatic mission of Tabatabai.

The Foreign Office certainly knew him well. One of its top officials had negotiated last September with Tabatabai about the fate of Iranian students who had clashed violently with anti-Khomeini students in Mainz. Tabatabai, who speaks good German and lived in Germany for many years — he gained a doctorate in biochemistry from the University of Bochum — appeared to the Germans to be an

ideal intermediary with Teheran, where he had contacts with top officials, as well as with the Ayatollah himself.

Tabatabai had held important posts in 1979 in the newly-installed Khomeini regime. He was government spokesman, deputy interior minister, deputy prime minister, and for some time even the officiating head of government. He held talks in 1979-1980 in Bonn with the former American deputy secretary of state, Warren Christopher, on the release of the 52 American hostages held in Teheran.

Tabatabai made frequent trips to Dusseldorf to be with his family and also took the opportunity to hold talks with German officials, often at short notice. Tabatabai had then switched over to a more lucrative business: the arms trade. The source of arms supply to Iran had dried up and arms had to be purchased on the black market to meet the exigencies of the Iran-Iraq war. He ran into trouble with West German law in 1982 when the Federal Crime Office cracked down on clandestine arms dealers. At that time the Foreign Office intervened, and Tabatabai escaped the attentions of German law.

When the opium smuggling charge arose, the Iranian government did everything in its power to get Tabatabai released. The German charge d'affaires in Teheran and the Iranian ambassador in Bonn issued a welter of statements confirming Tabatabai's status as a

special envoy on an important mission. (Special envoy status has been used increasingly in diplomatic matters in the past 20 years although it has never been strictly defined in legal terms.)

Finally, Genscher accepted Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's statement that Tabatabai had been sent to conduct secret talks with high-ranking government officials on "extremely sensitive political issues." Genscher forwarded this statement to the court in Dusseldorf with the remark that Tabatabai could now be considered a special envoy.

The Dusseldorf court recognised Tabatabai's immunity and released him – twice – on bail. But Foreign Minister Genscher, who had endorsed Tabatabai's immunity till the very end, was so irritated with the dope smuggling racket that he declared the Iranian persona non grata, not suited for conducting talks with the Foreign Office.

Tabatabai sensed that he had already played all his cards and the only way out for him was to board the first available plane to Teheran. Although the immigration and security officials at Frankfurt's busy airport could identify the passenger as Sadegh Tabatabai, they could not detain him without an official arrest warrant issued against him. It was, perhaps, the most elegant solution for the Germans that Tabatabai should have fled: had he been gaoled the Foreign Office was sure to have incurred the wrath of the Khomeini regime.

CSO: 4600/658

BAKHTIAR INTERVIEWED BY TURKISH JOURNALIST

Istanbul MIDDLE EAST REVIEW in English No 43, May 83 pp 3, 4

[Interview with Shahpour Bakhtiyar, by Kenan Akin, in Paris date not specified: "Last Shah's Last Prime Minister Relaxed"]

[Text]

I recently interviewed the "last Shah's last Prime Minister", Shahpour Bakhtiyar, at his residence in Paris. Iran's 58-year-old, long-suffering "wolf" of a politician, Bakhtiyar, gives the impression, more than anything, of being hopeful for the future. Above all, he appears to be "at ease"... to be enjoying the comfort provided by security and powerful support. In this sense, he differs obviously from all the other exiled Iranian leaders living in Paris. To be sure, he is pursuing his activities with calmer but surer steps than a Rajavi, a Bani Sadr or even a Dr. Ali Amini.

Nevertheless, the difficulty of doing anything in Iran at this particular time is clear. Coming face to face with a bloody war just when it was about to settle down, the "Iran Revolution" today still has the strength to wage a successful struggle against foreign intervention despite all the support the aggressor is receiving. Under the circumstances, Shahpour Bakhtiyar's chances of doing anything are nil, let alone those of Rajavi, Bani Sadr or Dr. Ali Amini. Still, there are already signs that Bakhtiyar is going to be a big name after Khomeini.

Shahpour Bakhtiyar, who suffered in prisons for 37 years in the Shah's time and managed to remain prime minister for only 37 days under the Shah, is engaged in an all-out effort to win the total support of the more than three million Iranians living abroad. He holds receptions like a prime minister and maintains contacts, if unofficial, with official persons. He even has his shadow ministers and ambassadors. In addition to his well protected residence, he also has an office with a printing press and telex which is reminiscent of a political party's general headquarters.

Bakhtiyar, who knows English and speaks excellent French, has three daughters and a son who is a high ranking official in the French Police Department. Indicating that the day when he will return to Iran is "very near", Bakhtiyar said that he sincerely believes that he has the power to do something, despite Khomeini.

Below are our questions and Bakhtiyar's answers.

AKIN: How do you evaluate the present situation in Iran?

BAKHTIYAR: The present situation in Iran is common knowledge. There is hardly any country in the world which disrespects human honour and values to this extent.

Reports in the mass media frequently mention the large number of prisoners in Iran. In order to be accurate about this point, we had better say that Iran itself has been transformed into a vast prison, from which everyone is trying to flee. This fact is well known to you, because every day hundreds of Iranians try to escape this horrible prison through your borders, not to mention other borders after suffering many hardships on the dangerous mountain paths.

In such a situation it is quite normal that each one, by leaving his home country, tries to safeguard his physical existence, hoping to see some day a gleam of hope in the darkness enveloping his homeland. These painful realities are known to the world, but what Iranians feel moreover is that scarcely any era in the long history of Iran has witnessed such horrors.

AKIN: How far do you think you can influence the future of the country?

BAKHTIYAR: The principles of liberty and national sovereignty on which my convictions are based, are representative of the deep aspirations of Iranians. In other words, I just translate the national wishes of my countrymen.

Therefore, I leave to you the evaluation of the influence and effectiveness of my policy over the future of the country. But I would like to add that the tyranny of the regime is an advantage for the success of those who struggle against it.

AKIN: By what means are you hoping to affect the future of the country? Are you considering an armed struggle? If so, what, in your view, are the chances of such an armed struggle succeeding?

BAKHTIYAR: The most effective way to free Iran from the jaws of tyranny would be the will and action of the Iranian people. Obviously, they will never submit to these horrors and suppression for very long. They will also not submit to a return to medieval customs or allow themselves to be

forced into an indecent way of life. As to armed struggle, it depends on Khomeini's perseverance in using violence. If the Mullahs continue to retain power by means of force and terror, in order to undermine the right of people in their national sovereignty, obviously the nation will have no choice but to respond with violence.

AKIN: Have you established any relationship with the countries neighbouring Iran? Would you give details of these relationships?

BAKHTIYAR: My relationship with Iran's neighbours is in essence the same as that of the Iranian people with these countries. It is worthwhile mentioning here that the real interests of Iran's neighbours and those of all countries of the region are based on peace and stability in the area, without which opportunities to work for a better life will never exist.

It is evident that with the continuation of the Mullahs' regime in Iran, this stability will never materialise, because Iranians will never sit back and accept this state of affairs. On the other hand, as the ruling Mullahs are obliged to preserve their privileges they continue to create incidents in order to divert public attention from their suffering, to external affairs. A characteristic example of this is the provocation of Iraq into war, and the Iranian rejection of all peace efforts.

No doubt it is in the interests of Iran's neighbours to consider the establishment of national sovereignty of the Iranians as a sine qua non factor for peace and stability in the area. In other words the objectives of national forces fighting the Khomeini regime are along precisely the same lines as the interests of regional countries. Therefore a good relationship between Iran's neighbours and Iranian national forces is natural.

AKIN: Would you mind giving the names of those countries and organizations which support your struggle directly or indirectly?

BAKHTIYAR: The answer to your previous question would perfectly fit this

one. It means that all countries and organisations aspiring to peace and stability in the region are our natural allies. Mentioning their names and describing their roles in this struggle would not serve anybody's interests.

AKIN: Would you comment on the reports that you have established a shadow cabinet or government in exile?

BAKHTIYAR: I ignore such reports or if necessary deny them. I have not created a shadow cabinet or a government in exile.

Taking into consideration Khomeini and his clique's animosity towards the Iranian nation and its culture, there is no legality, from the people's point of view for Khomeini's rule and his ridiculous "Velayat Faghish" constitution, which puts in the hands of an ignorant individual the destiny of a country. In this case, the question of the legality of the government arises. In order to avoid any complications, the establishment of new governments abroad would not be wise. ●

CSO: 4600/656

DISAPPEARANCE OF ARMS DEALER REPORTED BY RADIO IRAN

GF311244 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 30 May 83

[Text] One of the dealers of the Islamic Republic from the guard corps who, has so far squandered millions of dollars of public funds, has so far been missing for some time, and the officials of the regime of the Islamic Republic are searching for him in a number of countries. This dealer of illegal arms is called Taqi Pilehvar.

It has been said in Stockholm that the members of the regime's embassy in Sweden have been searching for Pilehvar, an employee in charge of purchases for the Ministry of Guards.

He, who is a close relative of the minister of guards, Mohsen Rafiqdust, suddenly disappeared a while ago during a buying trip to DPRK and is hiding in an unknown location. He is the special dealer for Mohsen Rafiqdust and is involved in Rafiqdust's illegal deals since he is one of his close confidants.

The Foreign Ministry of the regime has ordered all its embassies, via telex messages, to search for Pilehvar. His photographs were recently distributed to Khomeyni's charges abroad.

There is currently a strong rumor that he is in Stockholm but the officials of the regime have yet been unable to find any clue about his whereabouts.

He has millions of dollars of cash and travelers checks belonging to the Islamic Republic in his possession. Last year while the minister of the guard corps was being introduced in the Majlis, the mullahs severely criticized him and the person who was to be his deputy, in connection with his financial embezzlements. Sheykh Sadeq Khalkhali said: These two gentlemen are old and well-known embezzlers. I have a great deal of information which I will not reveal right now.

However, Rafiqdust's post was finally approved by the Majlis deputies after intervention by Hashemi-Rafsanjani and he was then able to put Taqi Pilehvar in charge of the most sensitive post in the Guards Ministry which is arms purchase.

CSO: 4640/241

IRANIAN CLANDESTINE RADIO ON EXPULSION OF STEEL WORKERS

GF141830 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 13 Jun 83

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The news may not be new but this time we are talking about the lives of 7,000 people and their families. The expulsion of 7,000 workers during the era of the rule of the mullahs' regime has not made the largest headline in the confiscated newspaper ETTELA'AT. It is instead hidden in the middle of its pages and reported in tiny print in the section answering letters of readers. It may have even been mistakenly printed.

No matter, the news states that to date 7,000 employees of Ahvaz steel mill complex have been fired. The public relations' department of the complex in answer to the protests of a group of expelled workers has sent a reply which has probably escaped the multicolored SVAMA agents and the censoring mullahs who have usurped the paper. This is all in the 15 May issue of the newspaper.

We are talking about the expulsion of 7,000 expert technicians. Employees trained courtesy the national budget who used to operate this immense complex. We are talking about stopping the operations of one of the largest Iranian factories created during the years of effort and construction through large national expenditures and a lot of heartache by thousands of Iranians. It was a complex which was considered one of the best and most productive factories in the Middle East thanks to the efforts of its Iranian workers.

This complex, in the not too distant past, had employed thousands of Iranian workers thanks to its proper management. Its production had made the country self-sufficient in this respect.

The answer by the complex' public relations department which has tried to portray the expulsion of the workers as legitimate is not at all logical and in fact reveals the struggle that is going on in all parts of this land every day to bring down the self-proclaimed regime of the mullahs. The answer claims that the employees repeatedly resorted to strikes and slowdowns and that the organization had been transformed into a headquarters

for the organization of the struggle against the Islamic Republic. The answer also notes that the complex had suffered 3 years of strikes and sitins. It explains that the expulsion of the 7,000 employees was not simply because of the strikes and slowdowns. It goes on to claim that all these employees who were daily workers were asking for contracts. Allegedly they continuously instigated strikes, sitins and marches.

You see their crime was asking for a contract and the rest is all excuses used to legitimize the expulsions. This strawlike regime hopes to close the resistance and struggle centers to every Iranian individual by firing these 7,000 noble Iranian workers and adding them to 5 million other unemployed Iranian workers. However, these centers are formed everywhere even in family circles and they are preparing for the struggle and the final blow against the wornout regime of the mullahs who have based its foundation on the destruction of Iranians.

CSO: 4640/242

IRANIANS IN DIASPORA

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 121, 12 May 83 pp 7-8

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] Most truly nationalist Iranians will welcome the seemingly general acceptance of constitutional monarchy as part of the programme of the large cross-section of professional and middle-class movements which are slowly coming together to form what may well be a united nationalist front in the not-too-distant future.

You don't have to be a dyed-in-the-wool monarchist to see that it has a key role to play in not only uniting the non-left opposition but in helping to support the legitimacy of the 1906 constitution, a return to which most of the groups now include as a key plank in their policy platform. Provision for the monarchy is a part of that constitution and if it ceases to exist it must create a vacuum that would be difficult to fill.

In addition, those senior clergymen who are opposed to Khomeini and to the velayat-e-faghīh in particular must see the monarchy as the tool which can replace the faghīh concept and provide them with their legitimacy and room for manoeuvre once Khomeini is dead and a power struggle starts.

No doubt some republicans with ambition to become president will also see a restoration of the monarchy now as one of the most effective means towards their end. Iranians don't follow individuals they don't know but a symbol like the monarchy is familiar enough to encourage them to support the up-holder of it until such time as either the upholder or others with ambition wish to dispense with it.

It does look now as if the young Shah's advisers have guided him successfully through some troubled waters to a position where nationalists who quarrelled with his father's way of doing things can accept a return of the monarchy in a form strictly controlled by the constitution. On this aspect of their policy they fully deserve the gratitude of their compatriots.

But so far they have failed in an area which could reduce the long-term effectiveness of what they have achieved thus far--that of moulding together the factions who give their full support to monarchy, and are its main grass roots

support, so they play a proper role in the development of the nationalist movement as a whole. Indeed, the young Shah himself is at loggerheads with many of those who have done most to try to restore the prestige of the monarchy and his father's work for Iran so that Iranians and the world in general can take a more sane perspective of the Iran of the past.

This seems basically the result of political naivety on the part of his advisers where the democratic and popular side of his image are concerned. This is a common failing with all Iranians, no matter how well meaning they are. These advisers obviously feel they know best what is good for the Shah in the sense of ensuring he has a place in the nationalist scheme of things, and so they should not be required to answer to his supporters for what they are doing, or to help that support organise itself into an effective, harmonious political force.

The result has been what we see now--groups squabbling among themselves, newspapers which abuse those trying sincerely to bring about unity among groups and generally an unacceptable face being presented of the monarchist cause. The result is that his own supporters are now threatening to damage the careful work that has been put in on establishing the young Shah's relationship with the other nationalist groups.

Much of the abuse and counter-abuse in which the monarchist groups and press are indulging is solely result of their frustration over the failure of the Shah and his entourage, whoever they are, to give them recognition. He should see his job now to try to diminish that frustration; to provide the kind of leadership and inspiration that will answer the emotional needs of his ordinary supporters and the liaison that will ensure that their activities and their media serve the general nationalist cause in between contributing to closing the monarchist ranks.

Like all the personalities and groups making up the opposition other than the Mojahedin he lacks any meaningful public relations. But that may be of secondary importance to the job of controlling his supporters and forming them into an effectively working political instrument that can help his case now and if or when he returns to Iran. After all, if he lacks any properly organised support when he is restored to the throne temporarily, the referendum he says he is happy to accept to decide if he stays could be easily manipulated against him. The result could be the very chaos which the retention of constitutional monarchy as part of the nationalist campaign is designed to avoid.

Under a constitutional monarchy the sincere nationalists now believe it should be possible to organise the true democracy which Iranians, like other people, seek. But the supporters of the young Shah hardly reflect that ideal in the way they behave at present, often behaving irresponsibly in a way that is calculated to turn uncommitted middle-class Iranians against them instead of gaining their sympathy.

The young Shah and his advisers, having established his position in the general firmament of the nationalist set-up, must now set to work to set their

own house in order. They must show some diplomacy towards the more fanatical or earnest of monarchist supporters, rationalise the bitter feelings that exist among those who were so long loyal to the monarchy and the Pahlavis but who have felt abandoned since the revolution. Politics are an ongoing business and successful politicking means attention to every aspect and not just the satisfactory achievement of a basic aim.

CSO: 4600/641

IRAN

BRIEFS

TIES WITH WEST GERMANY--BONN (IRNA)--The Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Federal Republic of Germany, Mahdi Navab, met with German Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher here Thursday. In this meeting, Genscher stressed the expansion and improvement of relations between the two countries and added that his country respects the people and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was told IRNA by Navab after the meeting. He further said the bilateral relations between the two countries were discussed in the meeting, and the two sides expressed their interest for expansion of political, economic and cultural ties. Mahdi Navab also told IRNA that they discussed the elimination of barriers existing on the way of improving relations between their countries. He also described this meeting as fruitful and added that such meetings are expected to result in taking positive steps towards maintaining and strengthening feasible relations between Iran and Germany. The Iranian Ambassador further said that official contacts between the two countries' were among the matters discussed in the meeting. He added that it is expected that political and economic delegations from the Federal Republic of Germany would travel to Iran in a near future. [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 29 May 83 p 2]

WEST GERMAN ENVOY ON CULTURAL AFFAIRS--TEHRAN, (IRNA)--Issues related to the Iranian students in Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and cultural relations of Iran and Germany were discussed in a meeting between FRG's Ambassador in Iran Dr. Jens Petersen and the Minister of Islamic Guidance Hoj. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami Tuesday morning. The Ambassador expressed gratitude over the investigation by Iran to Germany's Islamic scholars and men of letters, now observing accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution here. Khatami expressed hope for further improvement of cultural relations between the two nations, calling on FRG government to grant more privileges to the Iranian students studying there. Khatami said the Islamic Republic intended to expand its relations with other countries which respects its interests. Khatami expressed hope that Germany's visiting Islamic scholars would realize the falsehood of the Western propaganda launched in an attempt to disgrace Iran, and that they would convey to the world the true achievements of the Islamic Revolution, which, was "more cultural than political", he said. [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 May 83 p 2]

CSO: 4600/661

IRAQIS TO FIGHT SADDAM--Tehran, June 14 (IRNA)--The Centre for Mobilisation of Popular Islamic Forces of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, today in a statement called on Iraqis in Iran to enlist in the centre and go to warfronts to fight against the Iraqi Ba'athist regime. The statement requested the volunteers to report to the Basij headquarters of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps for the necessary registration. [Text] [LD150227 Tehran IRNA in English 1938 GMT 14 Jun 83]

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS BAN--Khomeyni ordered the ban of publications of the various organs of the Islamic Republic today. In a meeting with Kamal Kharrazi he expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of content of such publications and said that such excesses should be stopped, since the contents of such publications are repeats. [Text] [GF121834 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 12 Jun 83]

CSO: 4640/244

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